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Research suggests that most Americans harbor weight-related prejudices, which can 
translate into discrimination against the obese across a variety of contexts. Yet, little is known 
about how anti-fat bias may influence juror decisions in cases involving an obese trial 
participant. This study examined the main and interactive effects of plaintiff weight, 
deliberations, and individual differences on jurors’ decisions in a medical malpractice case. The 
Culpable Control Model (CCM) was used to ground the research and to help illuminate the 
attributional processes underlying mock jurors’ decisions. 
College student mock jurors were presented with a photograph of either a normal 
weight or obese plaintiff and assigned to non-deliberating or deliberating conditions. After 
reading the case summary, non-deliberating jurors rendered case judgments independently and 
responded to a series of items designed to measure attributional processes in accordance with 
the CCM. Deliberating jurors also reviewed the case summary independently but then discussed 
the case in small groups; each group rendered case judgments as a jury. Following deliberations, 
jury group members were instructed to provide independent, “individual level” responses to the 
same series of items completed by the non-deliberating jurors. Several individual differences 
were assessed in the total sample, including belief in a just world (BJW), belief in the protestant 
work ethic (BPWE), and anti-fat attitudes (AFAs). 
Results revealed no main effects of plaintiff weight on case-related judgments or on any 
of the measures of attributional processes. However, deliberations and several individual 
difference variables moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on the dependent variables. 
Contrary to expectations, deliberations appeared to exacerbate rather than attenuate the 
effects of anti-fat bias on jurors’ decisions. Compared to non-deliberating jurors, deliberating 





and awarded fewer non-economic damages to the obese plaintiff. Numerous individual 
differences variables moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on the dependent variables, but 
BJW was the strongest, most consistent moderator. As expected, those with stronger just world 
beliefs were less likely to find the defendant liable and were overall more punitive toward the 
obese plaintiff than those with weaker beliefs. Analyses further indicated that jurors’ 
attributional processes were consistent with those proposed by the CCM, such that their initial 
reactions to the case and the plaintiff and defendant influenced their interpretation of 
attributional information and criteria, which in turn influenced their case decisions. Significant 
findings not directly tied to formally advanced hypotheses also emerged. Overall, deliberating 
jurors were more lenient toward the defendant than non-deliberating jurors. In addition, 
analyses revealed several main effects of individual difference variables on case judgments and 
attributional processes. 
This research is limited in terms of verisimilitude and generalizability; yet, it also yields 
many significant findings that have thus far been undocumented in published studies. Both the 
contributions and limitations of this study illuminate exciting directions for future research. In 
particular, more research is needed to clarify how anti-fat bias may affect jurors’ in particular 
circumstances, how civil jurors’ decisions may be impacted by deliberations and individual 
differences more generally, and how the CCM can best be used to help understand decision-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The integrity of the U.S. justice system largely rests upon the decisions made by ordinary 
citizens. In assuming the role of a juror, these citizens are faced with a formidable task. Though 
humans naturally incorporate prior experience, attitudes, and intuition into their decisions 
(Kunda, 1999), jurors are instructed to ignore such factors, rendering a verdict only in 
accordance with the evidence and testimony presented at trial (Feigenson, 2000). Such verdicts 
bring serious consequences. They often permanently alter the lives of alleged victims, 
defendants, and the trial participants’ families; they also may set a precedent for legal 
interpretation in future cases.  
 Over the past several decades, social science researchers have become increasingly 
interested in the processes underlying jurors’ decisions and susceptibility to bias. Though case 
facts are the primary predictors of jury verdicts, a growing body of evidence indicates that jurors 
often incorporate emotions, attitudes, values, and other extra-legal factors into their decisions 
(see Devine, 2012; Feigenson, 2000). Most of this research has been conducted within the 
context of criminal cases; however, studies also suggest that civil jurors often are influenced by 
extra-legal factors (e.g., Feigenson, Park, & Salovey, 1997; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1998). As 
“extra-legal factors” encompass all legally irrelevant considerations, researchers have examined 
a variety of phenomena that may inappropriately influence jurors’ decisions. Examples include 
juror demographics and personality characteristics (see Lieberman & Olson, 2009, for a review), 
case-specific attitudes and beliefs (Giner-Sorolla, Chaiken, & Lutz, 2002; Hans & Loftquist, 1994; 
Vinson, Costanzo, & Berger, 2008), and consideration of case-related but legally irrelevant 
material such as pre-trial publicity (Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 1999) and inadmissible 





stereotypes may influence juror decisions as a function of victim or defendant characteristics 
such as race, religion, and attractiveness (e.g., Jones & Kaplan, 2003; Miller, Maskaly, Green & 
Peoples, 2011; Patry, 2008); this literature almost exclusively targets criminal jurors. 
 The current study will extend this line of research in examining the effects of plaintiff 
weight (obese vs. normal) on mock jurors’ attributional processes and decisions in a 
hypothetical medical malpractice case.  The near-ubiquity of weight-related stereotypes and 
prejudice in America is well documented (Crandall, 1994; Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Teachman, 
Gapinski, Browness, Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003) and these negative attitudes and beliefs often 
translate into behavioral responses. Overweight and obese individuals are subject to 
discrimination across a wide variety of contexts, such as in employment, educational, and 
healthcare settings (see Puhl & Heuer, 2009, for a review). Considering the prevalence of weight 
stigmatization in America, it is conceivable that anti-fat bias may affect juror decisions in cases 
involving an overweight party. Yet, this extra-legal factor has been largely ignored by jury 
decision making researchers, with two exceptions (Reichert, Miller, Bornstein, & Shelton, 2011; 
Schvery, Puhl, Levandoski, & Brownell, 2013). A more thorough understanding of how anti-fat 
bias may influence juror decisions is needed, as both the incidence of obesity and weight 
discrimination in America are increasing (Puhl, Moss-Racusin, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2008). 
Exploring reactions to the plaintiff in a malpractice case may help address other gaps in the jury 
decision making literature (e.g., the need to increase focus on civil jurors and on malpractice 
cases in particular; examining extra-legal factors related to plaintiffs rather than to defendants). 
 In addition, this research will explore the effects of deliberations on juror decisions and 
attributional processes. Jury decision-making research is often criticized for examining the 





incorporation of deliberations in the current research is critical to its generalizability. Generally, 
research has shown that deliberations attenuate the biasing effects of a variety of extra-legal 
factors (London & Nunez, 2000; Patry; 2008; Sommers, 2006), though there are some cases in 
which deliberations may actually exacerbate the influences of extra-legal factors on jurors’ 
decisions (Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 1999; MacCoun, 1990). With respect to the current 
research, it is expected that deliberations will minimize any individual biases stemming from the 
plaintiff’s weight. Findings also may illuminate more general effects of deliberations on juror 
decisions in malpractice cases. 
 This research is guided by the Culpable Control Model (CCM), an attributional 
framework focusing on the effects of emotion and motivation on blame ascriptions (Alicke, 
2000). Briefly, the CCM proposes that negative reactions to an event and the actors involved 
bias processing of attributional information (i.e., information about causality, intention, and 
foresight), which in turn lead to blame judgments that cohere with these initial negative 
reactions (Alicke, 2000). As the CCM assigns a central rather than a peripheral role to bias in the 
attributional process, it is highly applicable to an investigation of the effects of extra-legal 
influences on jury decision making (Nadelhoffer, 2006). Moreover, the CCM can help account for 
the influences of affect and motivation on juror decisions (e.g., via biased processing of evidence 
or by directly impacting blame ascriptions; Alicke, 2000). A relatively new model, the CCM has 
not been comprehensively tested, and has only been applied to jury decision making in one 
published study (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008). Thus, the current research can further 
both theory and practice by examining the assumptions of the CCM and expanding this model 
into psycho-legal arenas. 





 Chapter 2 discusses the extent and nature of weight-stigmatization to support the 
contention that jurors in the current study will be influenced by plaintiff weight. Evidence of 
prejudice and discrimination against the overweight and obese is reviewed, as are the potential 
underpinnings of anti-fat bias. Chapter 3 advances Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003) Justification-
Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM) as the most plausible framework for understanding 
weight-related prejudice and its expression. Though all aspects of the JSM will not be explicitly 
tested in the current research, results can help substantiate its main tenets. Ultimately, this 
theory will help guide predictions in the current study regarding the likelihood that jurors will 
express their weight-related prejudices (overtly or covertly) via their individual judgments and 
during deliberations. Further, the principles of the JSM are highly consistent with those of the 
CCM, which grounds the current research. 
 Chapter 4 describes how extra-legal factors can influence juror decisions, specifically 
focusing on the documented and anticipated effects of the extra-legal factors most relevant to 
the current research. This chapter aims to illustrate the complexity of the effects of extra-legal 
factors on trial outcomes. Multiple case-related features (including case and offense type, 
decision rules, characteristics of trial participants, etc.) may interact with juror characteristics 
(e.g., demographics, personality, ideology, attitudes and beliefs) when impacting juror decisions. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of how extra-legal factors are expected to influence 
juror decision making in the current research. 
 The current research will measure and compare judgments of individual and 
deliberating jurors. Chapter 5 discusses how deliberations can both attenuate and exacerbate 
juror bias. Information and normative processes are implicated as the primary psychological 





concluded that deliberations in the current study will most likely attenuate the effects of anti-fat 
bias on juror decisions (such that jurors who deliberate will be less affected by plaintiff weight 
than will individual jurors). However, deliberating jurors may still be influenced by plaintiff 
weight, particularly if the jury is relatively homogenous. 
 Chapter 6 introduces the Culpable Control Model, the attributional framework 
grounding the current research. This chapter summarizes the main tenets of the CCM and 
relevant literature. Specific emphasis is placed on the CCM’s applicability to the current research 
(as opposed to other attributional frameworks) and the merits of conducting a thorough test of 
the model. Predictions for the current research will be described in terms of the CCM and its 
relationship to the JSM. 
 Chapter 7 presents an overview of the study, highlighting its purpose, design, general 
methodology, and expected findings. Specific hypotheses and research questions are advanced. 
Chapter 8 describes methodology in further detail and includes information on participants, 
procedures, and all measures and materials used in this research. Chapter 9 details data coding, 
scoring and scale development. In addition, Chapter 9 describes data screening procedures and 
presents the results of preliminary analyses exploring verdict distribution and participant 
characteristics across conditions. Chapter 10 presents all results from analyses addressing 
hypotheses and research questions that pertain to the non-deliberating sample, and Chapter 11 
presents all results from analyses and research questions pertaining to the deliberating sample 
and to comparisons between non-deliberating and deliberating samples. The implications of 
these findings for theory and practice are discussed in Chapter 12, as are the limitations of the 






Chapter 2: Weight Stigmatization 
 
  The incidence of obesity in America has increased dramatically in recent years. As of 
2010, approximately 67% of adults were overweight or obese, and 35.7% of these were 
classified as clinically obese (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). Despite the 
prevalence of obesity, research suggests that weight-related stigma is actually intensifying (Puhl 
et al., 2008). Now more than ever before, there is a need for research focusing on how weight 
stigmatization operates in unexplored contexts, such as in the legal system.  
 This chapter explores several facets of weight stigmatization as a foundation for 
understanding its potential influence on juror decision making, particularly with respect to 
medical malpractice cases. First, it reviews literature examining anti-fat attitudes, beliefs, and 
emotions, and how these constructs translate into behaviors (i.e., discrimination against the 
overweight). Second, it describes the likely underpinnings of and moderators of anti-fat bias. 
Taken together, this research suggests that anti-fat bias may indeed affect jurors’ decisions and 
attributions. The manifestation of weight-related prejudice in jury decision-making contexts will 
be discussed further in Chapter 3, which focuses on the applicability of Crandall and Eshleman’s 
(2003) justification-suppression model (JSM) to the current research. 
Scope and Nature of Anti-fat Bias 
 
 Researchers have argued that the obese are among the few remaining socially 
acceptable targets of prejudice and discrimination in an increasingly “politically correct” 
environment (see Latner, O’Brien, Durso, Brinkman, & MacDonald, 2008; Puhl & Brownell, 
2003). Indeed, an extensive body of literature has demonstrated the near-ubiquity of anti-fat 
bias in America. Pervasive negative attitudes and beliefs about the obese have been 





employers, educators, close family members and friends of the obese, and those who suffer 
from obesity themselves (see Puhl & Heuer, 2009, for a review). Not only do these negative 
attitudes and beliefs lead to harmful psychological consequences for many obese individuals, 
but they also promote weight discrimination (Bannon, Hunter-Reel, Wilson, & Karlin, 2008). 
   Stereotypes about the overweight and obese are highly consistent. This population is 
commonly characterized as lazy, unmotivated, lacking in self-discipline, incompetent, sloppy 
(Puhl & Heuer, 2009), unintelligent (Puhl et al., 2008) and unlikeable (Weiner, Perry, & 
Magnusson, 1988). Though medical professionals should better understand the causes and 
nature of obesity than many laypersons, they too share many of these perceptions. More than 
half of 620 primary care physicians believed obese patients to be awkward, unattractive, and 
noncompliant (Foster et al., 2003). Other studies examining attitudes and beliefs in samples of 
over 500 physicians have found that roughly one-third of participants viewed obese patients as 
lazy and self-indulgent (Bocquier et al, 2005; Campbell, Engel, Timperio, Cooper, & Crawford, 
2000). Such beliefs also are common among other medical professionals such as nurses (Brown, 
Stride, Psarou, Brewins, & Thomspon, 2007) and dieticians (Berryman, Dubale, Manchester, & 
Mittelstaedt 2006), as well as among elementary and secondary school teachers (Greenleaf & 
Weiller, 2005; Puhl & Latner, 2007).  
  Numerous researchers have assessed more comprehensive attitudes toward the 
overweight, most commonly via scales targeting a combination of cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral components of anti-fat attitudes (see Allison, Basile, & Yuker, 1991; Latner et al., 
2008; Wrench & Knapp, 2008); some also have measured implicit attitudes toward the 
overweight and obese (Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Teachman et al., 2003). Consistent with 





suggests that anti-fat attitudes are pervasive and widespread across a variety of populations 
(e.g., college students, non-student adults, close friends and family members of obese 
individuals, medical professionals; Bannon et al., 2008; Puhl & Brownell, 2003; Teachman & 
Brownell, 2001). Such general negative evaluations of obese targets are often accompanied by 
negative affective responses such as anger, disgust, and discomfort (Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & 
Hesson-McInnis, 2004; Weiner et. al., 1998). 
 More specific examinations of attitudes toward the overweight and obese illuminate the 
unique nature of anti-fat bias. Most notably, research consistently reveals that overweight 
individuals are equally likely to express anti-fat attitudes as their thinner counterparts (Bannon 
et al. 2008; Latner et al., 2008; Teachman et al., 2003; Quinn & Crocker, 1999); they seem to lack 
the protective ingroup identification characteristic of other stigmatized groups such as ethnic 
minorities, religious minorities, and gays (Latner et al., 2008). This may be in part attributed to 
the “temporary” nature of obesity; obese individuals may anticipate losing weight and escaping 
their marginalized status (Puhl & Brownell, 2003). In addition, close contact with obese 
individuals or knowledge of the multiple causes of obesity does not appear to significantly 
attenuate negative attitudes towards the overweight or obese, as medical professionals and 
close family members and friends of obese individuals often exhibit strong anti-fat attitudes 
(Puhl & Brownell, 2003; Puhl & Heuer, 2008; Puhl et al., 2008). This diverges from other findings 
that frequent contact with members of marginalized groups often attenuates negative attitudes 
and stereotypes about these groups (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003; 
Haider-Markell & Joslyn, 2008).  
 Though anti-fat bias is profound, expressing prejudice against the overweight may not 





Implicit attitude tests typically yield more negative evaluations of the obese than do explicit 
attitude tests (Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Teachman et al., 2003), and higher scores on 
measures of social desirability predict more benign explicitly expressed attitudes toward the 
obese (Latner et al., 2008). Research has indicated that prejudice against obese persons is 
considered “moderately acceptable”- more appropriate than prejudice against ethnic and 
religious minorities, but less appropriate than prejudice against smokers, alcoholics, and 
homeless people (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Thus, though prejudice against the 
overweight may indeed be more “politically correct” than that against some other marginalized 
groups, its expression is still socially sanctioned. 
  Social norms sometimes prohibit the expression of prejudice against the obese, but the 
aforementioned negative beliefs, attitudes, and emotions do often result in discrimination 
against this population. Participants were less willing to assist an obese target (via personal 
assistance or endorsement of charitable interventions) than a normal weight target (Weiner, 
2006; Weiner et al., 1988); they also distance themselves (e.g., via requesting an alternative 
interaction partner) from obese confederates (Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007; Pryor et 
al., 2004). Interpersonal research has indicated that men are significantly less willing to pursue a 
dating relationship with obese females than with normal weight females (Smith, Schmoll, Konik, 
& Oberlander, 2007), and are more willing to date a woman with a history of drug abuse than an 
obese woman (Sitton & Blanchard, 1995). 
  Discrimination also exists in employment settings. Large-scale survey data indicate that 
obese workers earn significantly less than their thinner counterparts, despite controlling for 
multiple confounds such as socioeconomic status, familial variables, and health limitations 





with employees’ weight, and are more pronounced among female workers (Baum & Ford, 2004; 
Maranto & Stenoien, 2000). Employees’ weight also may affect a variety of other job-related 
outcomes. For instance, experiments have revealed that participants were significantly less 
likely to “hire” obese applicants and evaluated overweight employees more negatively than 
normal weight employees (see Roehling, Roehling, & Pichler; 2007, for a review).   
   Furthering the notion that close contact with obese individuals fails to reduce prejudice 
toward this group, Crandall (1991, 1995) found that overweight female college students  were 
significantly less likely to report that their parents helped pay for their college education than 
normal weight female students. Though Crandall (1991, Study 1) found some evidence of similar 
discrimination against overweight male college students, this effect was not replicated in a 
different sample obtained from the same University (Crandall, 1991, Study 2). The relationship 
between female college students’ weight and parents’ financial contributions persevered after 
controlling for ethnicity, number of children in the family, parents’ income and education, and 
other potential confounds; however, it was more pronounced among conservative families. 
Interestingly, conservative families contribute more to their daughter’s college education 
overall, suggesting that this bias toward overweight daughters stems from a more complex 
interplay between ideology and behavior (i.e., conservative parents are not less inclined to pay 
for their daughter’s college in general; Crandall, 1995). This discrepancy may be partially 
attributable to conservatives’ heightened tendency to endorse weight-related stereotypes (see 
Crandall, 1994; Crandall et al., 2001). For instance, conservatives may be more likely to believe 
that obese persons are unintelligent and unmotivated than are liberals, and therefore may 
subconsciously perceive funding their overweight daughter’s college education as wasteful. 





propensity to blame the obese for their situation impact their decisions regarding college 
financial support. 
  Evidence of discrimination against the obese in health care settings is primarily 
obtained via self-report (e.g., Anderson & Wadden, 2004; Thompson & Thomas, 2000) or 
secondary data. Examining videos of first-time primary care physician visits, Bertakis and Azari 
(2005) found that physicians spent less time providing health-care education to obese patients 
than to normal weight patients. However, comparisons between obese and normal weight 
Veteran’s Health Administration patients and medical beneficiaries failed to detect differences 
in the quality of care as measured by a few specific indicators (i.e., whether patients received 
recommended tests, screenings, and vaccinations; Chang, Asch, & Werner, 2010). More 
research is needed to determine whether obese patients are subject to lower-quality care in 
other areas, or if physicians are largely able to separate anti-fat attitudes from their behaviors 
and decisions in practice.  
 In sum, weight stigmatization is a powerful and widespread force in America. It is unique 
from other forms of stigma in several respects. Typically, the targets of stigmatization are 
members of minority groups, but weight stigmatization has become more pervasive even 
though most Americans are overweight or obese (Puhl et al., 2008). Close contact with obese or 
overweight individuals does not appear to minimize anti-fat bias (see Puhl et al., 2005; Puhl & 
Heuer, 2009). In fact, even obese and overweight individuals themselves frequently harbor anti-
fat attitudes and endorse some forms of weight discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1994; Quinn & 
Crocker, 1999). Social norms may often prohibit the blatant expression of weight-related 





is quite possible that jurors’ anti-fat sentiments may indeed influence their decisions as a 
function of plaintiff weight.   
Underpinnings of Weight Stigmatization  
 
 The potential foundations and moderators of anti-fat bias have been relatively well-
studied. There is a general consensus among researchers that weight stigmatization ultimately 
stems from the tendency to blame obese individuals for their condition (Bannon et al., 2008; 
Puhl et al., 2008; Teachman et al., 2003). Two main lines of research dominate the 
understanding of the foundations of weight stigmatization: One retains its primary focus on the 
attributions for obesity (Weiner et al., 1988; Weiner, 2006), whereas the other gives more 
consideration to ideological variables that affect such attributions (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & 
Martinez, 1996; Crandall et al., 2001). Both help to explain the growing strength and scope of 
anti-fat bias; however, there may be additional components of weight stigmatization that are 
not yet well understood.  
 Weiner’s (2006) motivational model of attribution helps illuminate the basic 
foundations of anti-fat bias. Though this framework has been used to explain attributions across 
a variety of contexts (e.g., in employment and educational settings), it was initially developed to 
account for reactions to stigmatized groups such as the homeless and those who suffer from 
both mental and physical illnesses (Weiner et al., 1988). Like many other attribution theorists, 
Weiner proposed that when confronted with a situation (e.g., a stigma, an illness, a negative 
outcome), observers first search for its underlying cause. The belief that a condition or situation 
was caused by factors outside of an individual’s control (e.g., genetics, situational features, 
random misfortune) minimizes ascriptions of responsibility and elicits affective responses such 





distance” between perceivers and actors, and an increased willingness to assist the target. The 
belief that a condition or situation was caused by factors largely within an individual’s control, 
however (e.g., behavioral choices), increases ascriptions of responsibility as well as feelings of 
anger and contempt. Such negative affective responses lead to less favorable evaluations and 
minimized willingness to interact with or assist members of the group in question. According to 
Weiner’s framework, then, the pervasive American belief that weight is highly controllable is 
responsible for weight-related prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, research demonstrates 
solid relationships between perceptions of weight controllability, responsibility attributed to the 
overweight, resulting emotions, and attitudes/behavioral responses in the predicted directions 
(Weiner et al. 1988, Weiner, 2000).   
 Attributions of responsibility help to explain prejudice against the overweight, but there 
are likely more complex social, cultural, and psychological factors underpinning anti-fat bias. 
Though the majority of Americans are overweight, an intense “fear of fat” perseveres (Puhl & 
Brownell, 2003). One study found that 24% of women and 17% of men reported that they would 
give up three or more years of their lives to achieve their ideal weight (Garner, 1997). In 
addition, many Americans develop eating disorders or smoke cigarettes in an effort to remain 
thin (Puhl & Brownell, 2003). It is unlikely that individuals would risk their lives on the basis that 
obesity is merely a “blameworthy” condition; further, those who develop illnesses resulting 
from the aforementioned behaviors (e.g., lung cancer, bulimia) are also widely perceived as 
responsible for their situation (Bannon et al., 2008; Pryor et al, 2004). Moreover, presenting 
obesity as largely uncontrollable typically does not attenuate anti-fat bias (see Bannon et al., 





 Crandall (1994) argued that anti-fat bias is a product of attributions of responsibility and 
their links to more deep-seated American values. Specifically, Crandall and Martinez (1996) 
proposed that a vast ideological network founded on the Belief in a Just World (i.e., that life is 
ultimately fair and people get what they deserve) and the Protestant Ethic (i.e., that anyone can 
achieve success through hard work and determination) guides attributions of blame for obesity, 
leading to the social rejection of fat people. Thus, much like the concept of symbolic racism 
(Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980; Kinder & Sears, 1981), prejudice against the obese may be 
considered “symbolic fatism” and function to reinforce one’s worldview (Crandall, 1994). 
Ultimately, in order to dislike obese people, one must have a cultural preference for thinness 
and also believe that weight is highly controllable (Crandall & Martinez, 1996). This contention is 
supported by findings that negative attitudes towards the obese are highly correlated with the 
Belief in a Just World (BJW), Belief in the Protestant Work Ethic (BPWE), authoritarianism, and 
conservatism (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996). Further, Crandall and colleagues 
(2001) found that attributions of controllability and cultural values exerted a multiplicative 
effect on anti-fat attitudes, but only in individualist countries such as the U.S. and Australia. 
Adding to Weiner’s (2006) framework, Crandall and Martinez’s (1996) meditational analyses 
support the assumption that individualistic values lead to blame, which in turn foster anti-fat 
bias. 
  Researchers also have illuminated likely moderators of weight-related prejudice and 
discrimination. Though anti-fat sentiments are pervasive across multiple sectors of the American 
populace, some individuals are more inclined to express prejudice against the obese than 
others. As indicated by Crandall (1994) and Crandall and colleagues (1996; 2001), individuals 





authoritarianism, BJW, and BPWE express stronger anti-fat attitudes than those with lower 
scores on these assessments; they also may be more likely to discriminate against the 
overweight (Crandall, 1991, 1995).  
Men have more pronounced anti-fat attitudes than do women (Latner et al., 2008; Puhl 
et al., 2005), and also are more likely to discriminate against the overweight or obese (Bannon 
et al., 2008; Graziano et al., 2007). The single published study examining the effects of 
defendant weight on mock jurors’ decisions in a criminal case suggests that men’s greater 
tendency to discriminate against the obese may occur in legal contexts (Schvey et al., 2013). In 
this study, participants were led to believe the defendant was either a normal weight male, and 
obese male, a normal weight female, or an obese female. The case scenario involving check 
fraud charges remained the same across all conditions. Defendant weight and gender had no 
impacts on female mock jurors’ decisions. In addition, the weight of the male defendant did not 
impact male mock jurors’ decisions. However, when the defendant was female, male mock 
jurors were significantly more likely to find her guilty when she was depicted as obese (Schvey 
et al., 2013).  
These gender discrepancies may be attributable to a combination of factors. Throughout 
the past several decades, women have been significantly more likely to be overweight or obese 
than men. This gender gap has recently closed, with significant gender differences in the 
prevalence of obesity in America existing in 2007 but not in 2010 (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2012). Despite this current finding, men lose weight at a faster rate than 
women, perhaps because of metabolic and physiological differences (Dasinger, Gleason, Griffith, 
Selker, & Shaefer, 2005; Hollis et al., 2008). This may be why men are significantly more likely 





their situation (Bannon et al., 2008), which in turn may exacerbate anti-fat attitudes. Further, 
studies indicate that overweight and obese men do not experience the same level of 
stigmatization as their female counterparts (Crandall, 1991; Puhl et al., 2009; Schvey et al., 
2013). Thus, men may simply be less sympathetic than women toward the overweight and 
obese. 
 As previously discussed, several studies have shown that overweight and obese 
individuals often express anti-fat attitudes and sometimes even approve of discrimination 
against members of their own ingroup (Bannon et al., 2008; Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; 
Crocker & Major, 1994). However, there is some evidence that those with higher Body-Mass 
Indexes (BMIs, a reliable indicator of body fatness; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2011) are more inclined to sympathize with the obese and less likely to endorse weight-related 
stereotypes than those with lower BMIs (Teachman et al., 2003). The only published study to 
date examining the effects of plaintiff weight on jurors’ decisions revealed that adult community 
members expressed more favorable opinions and judgments regarding an obese plaintiff than 
did college students (Reichert et al., 2011). Though participants’ weight was not assessed, 
Reichert and colleagues proposed that community members (who varied widely in age) were 
more likely to have struggled with their weight than college students. Thus, many community 
members likely identified with the obese plaintiff on some level, which decreased their 
perceptions of patient responsibility for a negative medical outcome (and increased perceptions 
of physician responsibility). It should be noted, however, that Schvey et al. (2013) found that 
female participants’ BMI did not affect their judgments in a criminal case regardless of 





the obese female defendant met the criteria for her charged offense and would be a repeat 
offender than male participants with higher BMIs.  
 The relationships between the aforementioned individual differences and anti-fat 
attitudes are well established, but more evidence is needed to determine when and how these 
differences influence motivations, decision making, and behaviors. For instance, the behavioral 
outcomes of anti-fat attitudes among obese and overweight individuals are not well 
understood. They may be similarly prone to discriminate against the overweight as their thinner 
counterparts. Alternatively, some self-protective mechanism may be engaged that minimizes 
harmful behavioral responses toward members of their own ingroup, despite pre-existing anti-
fat bias. Reichert et al.’s (2011) findings suggest that the weight of civil jurors may bias their 
decision making such that they are more lenient towards obese plaintiffs than normal weight-
plaintiffs, but Schvey et al.’s (2013) findings suggest that the opposite effect may occur among 
male jurors. However, both predictions are speculative. Reichert et al. (2011) did not establish a 
direct relationships between participants’ weight and decisions, and Schvey et al. (2013) 
examined the effects of participant BMI on judgments in a criminal case rather than in a civil 
case. More research is needed to determine how individual differences linked to anti-fat bias 
operate in applied contexts. The current study will explore the impact of individual differences 
such as gender, BMI, and personality variables (BPWE, BJW) on juror decisions in malpractice 
cases involving both normal weight and obese plaintiffs. 
 Though individual differences can exacerbate or attenuate anti-fat bias, few Americans 
are immune to negative weight-related stereotypes and attitudes. Anti-fat attitudes are highly 
resistant to change, as evidenced by the failure of educational interventions designed to depict 





Moreover, anti-fat attitudes are intertwined with multiple related ideologies and beliefs 
(Crandall, 1994; Crandall et al., 2001). Such embededness should increase the stability of anti-fat 
attitudes, as changing the attitude would require significant modification and reorganization of 
the entire ideological network upon which it is founded (Petty & Wegener, 1998). As these 
attitudes are often affectively-based, it is probable that many malpractice jurors will be unduly 
influenced by a plaintiff’s weight. The justification-suppression model of the expression and 
experience of prejudice (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) may help elucidate the conditions 



































Chapter 3: Antecedents and Consequences of Weight-Related Prejudice: 
 
 The Justification-Suppression Model 
 
Understanding stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination has long been a primary 
concern in social psychology. Multiple theories of prejudice were advanced throughout the past 
several decades (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005). Despite the recognition of “new” targets 
(e.g., homosexuals, religious minorities), most extant frameworks of prejudice focus on race and 
ethnicity. The JSM is unique in that it is an all-encompassing theory of prejudice, and 
consequently has been used to account for anti-fat attitudes and behaviors. Though recently 
advanced and somewhat inconsistent with prior notions regarding the underpinnings of anti-fat 
bias, the JSM is the most appropriate model for explaining when and how weight-related 
prejudice may influence juror decisions and attributional processes.  
 Popular race-centered models of prejudice include system-justification theory (see Jost 
& Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The 
former contends that that stereotypes and prejudices exist to maintain the status quo and 
legitimize existing social arrangements (Jost et al., 2004). Aversive racism involves more covert 
forms of prejudice and discrimination, proposing that many American Whites hold egalitarian 
values but remain uncomfortable and fearful around Blacks, which in turn subconsciously affects 
their behaviors and decision making (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Neither of these frameworks 
adequately describe weight-related prejudice. System-justification theory ultimately rests upon 
socio-economic concerns, and there is little evidence that the obese are subordinated at the 
expense of maintaining a social hierarchy (though values thought to promote anti-fat bias do 





experience significant discomfort or guilt with regard to their anti-fat attitudes, rendering 
aversive racism an unlikely explanation of anti-fat bias. 
 Though similarly focused on racial prejudice, symbolic racism (Sears & Kinder, 1971) is 
more applicable to anti-fat bias. Symbolic racism asserts that prejudice against Blacks is driven 
by a combination of “anti-black affect” and beliefs that Blacks violate traditional American 
values such as individualism and BPWE (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Weight-related prejudice is 
correspondingly believed to be a product of “anti-fat affect” (or a cultural preference for 
thinness) and the perception that the obese are responsible for their situation (Crandall & 
Martinez, 1996; Crandall et al., 2001). As previously mentioned, Crandall (1994) has explicitly 
likened anti-fat bias to symbolic racism, and the correlates of each (i.e., strong BPWE, GBJW; 
political conservatism; see Crandall; Kinder & Sears; 1981) are strikingly similar. Yet, symbolic 
racism provides little insight regarding how and when weight-related prejudice may be 
expressed, or how such prejudices may color jurors’ decisions and attributions.  
 Crandall and Eshleman’s JSM (2003) not only helps account for weight-related prejudice, 
but also elucidates the conditions under which these prejudices may be expressed and 
subsequently affect jurors’ decisions. As its name implies, the JSM is a model for the expression 
of prejudice rather than for the mere existence of prejudice. It posits that all individuals hold 
genuine prejudices, that is, inherent and unmanaged negative reactions to devalued group 
members. Genuine prejudices may be effortlessly acquired through a variety of social 
psychological processes (e.g., family influences, cultural dissemination, social categorization 
processes; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). According to the JSM, genuine prejudices are powerful 
motivational forces grounded in affect, but are rarely expressed in true form. Rather, the 





efforts. People may suppress their prejudices for a variety of reasons: to comply with social 
norms, to present oneself favorably in front of an audience, or to reinforce one’s self-conception 
as a caring and unprejudiced individual.  
 As genuine prejudice is a source of energy and negative affect, its suppression heightens 
psychological tension. In addition, suppression is an active, effortful process that usurps 
cognitive resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Thus, release and expression of 
underlying prejudices is both psychologically and cognitively rewarding. The JSM identifies 
justifications as the primary mechanisms whereby genuine prejudices are released. Broadly, 
justifications are “any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express 
genuine prejudice without suffering internal or external sanction” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, 
p. 425).  
 Justifications may assume numerous forms. Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argue that 
many seemingly “inherent” and “stable” beliefs, values, and personality traits serve as 
justifications for the expression of prejudice. For instance, strong beliefs in a just world allow 
individuals to justify prejudice against the poor or other disadvantaged groups on the premise 
that “people get what they deserve,” and Social Darwinists may release their prejudices through 
the belief that social inequalities are natural and inevitable (i.e., survival of the fittest). Similarly, 
prejudices may be justified through stereotypes. Beliefs that certain racial minorities are lazy or 
dishonest may minimize any guilt related to harboring prejudice towards these groups or help 
substantiate discriminatory behavior. Most pertinent to the proposed research, the JSM posits 
that attributions and attributional processes may function as justifications for prejudice. This is 
evidenced by the widespread tendency to “blame the victim.” Presumably, discomfort 





responsible for their own suffering, thereby justifying prejudice and discrimination (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003).   
 The notion that attributions may serve to justify prejudice illustrates the uniqueness of 
the JSM. Most theories of prejudice and attribution maintain that the factors the JSM 
conceptualizes as justifications are causes rather than consequences of prejudice. Conversely, 
the JSM posits that many beliefs, values, stereotypes, and attributions develop in response to 
existing prejudice. This perspective seems antithetical to Crandall and colleagues’ (1996, 2001) 
earlier research on weight-related prejudice suggesting that beliefs about the controllability of 
weight are causes rather than effects of anti-fat bias. However, Crandall and Eshleman (2003) 
concede that prior attributional beliefs may foster prejudicial attitudes in some cases, as 
predicted by many classic attribution theories (e.g, Kelly, 1973; Shaver, 1985; see Moskowitz, 
2005). They further argue that pre-existing prejudices can determine the course of attributions, 
and that these attributions in turn function to strengthen and release underlying prejudice. 
Thus, individual differences likely serve both causal and justificatory roles with respect to anti-
fat bias. Though interesting, the precise underpinnings of weight-related prejudice are less 
relevant to the current research than understanding the mechanisms guiding its expression. 
Prior JSM Studies 
 The JSM has not yet received significant empirical attention, nor has it been applied to 
psycho-legal issues. However, the JSM has been examined with respect to prejudice against the 
overweight and obese. Consistent with prior research (Teachman et al., 2003), Hegarty and 
Golden (2003) found that presenting obesity as a highly uncontrollable condition failed to 
attenuate anti-fat attitudes. Further, participants scoring higher on measures of anti-fat 





the controllability manipulation than those with more benign attitudes. Hegarty and Golden 
(2003) argued that these results cohere with the JSM because they suggest that prejudice 
precedes attributions (i.e., responsibility for one’s weight) and demonstrate the tendency for 
individuals with strong prejudices to justify their negative attitudes.  
 Others have used the JSM to account for differences in the expression of prejudice 
toward the overweight. King and colleagues (2006) found that “removing” common 
justifications for weight-based prejudice minimized covert forms of discrimination against obese 
shoppers. In a series of studies, overweight confederates either dressed professionally or 
casually, informed the salesperson that they were dieting or mentioned their unwillingness to 
exercise, and drank a high-calorie or diet beverage. These manipulations served as proxies for 
the degree of controllability confederates exerted over their appearance and responsibility 
assumed for their weight. Overweight confederates dressed professionally or dieting and 
drinking a diet beverage were subject to less covert discrimination (e.g., time elapsed before the 
salesperson approached the confederate, the salesperson’s body language) than the other 
overweight confederates. Similarly, providing participants with a justification for prejudice (i.e., 
confederates purportedly expressed negative attitudes toward the participants’ university) 
increased covert discrimination against the obese but not normal weight confederates (Graziano 
et al., 2007).  However, participants scoring low in Agreeableness expressed prejudice both in 
the presence and absence of justifications, whereas those high in Agreeableness expressed 
prejudice only when provided with a justification. Interestingly, those high in Agreeableness 
expressed more prejudice toward the obese target than those low in Agreeableness in the 





These findings suggest that the expression of prejudice may be related to individual factors (e.g., 
self-presentational concerns) in addition to the strength of genuine prejudice. 
  The JSM provides a more parsimonious account of weight-related prejudice than do 
most extant theories, which tend to focus on ethnic prejudices and its specific causes (see 
Dovidio, Gluck, & Rudman, 2005). Rather than attempting to disentangle all of the precise 
underpinnings of weight-related prejudice, the JSM simply posits that such prejudices exist for a 
variety of reasons, and that their affective force motivates expressive and justificatory 
processes. This motivational component of genuine prejudice helps substantiate the proposition 
that anti-fat bias will affect juror decisions and attributional processes. 
Applicability of the Justification-Suppression Model to the Proposed Study 
 
 The JSM can help guide predictions regarding the effects of plaintiff weight on juror 
decision making and attributional processes. Though this model will not be explicitly tested in 
this research, results may support the overall framework and its more specific contentions (e.g., 
that genuine prejudices can directly affect attributions). In addition, the JSM shares its critical 
assumptions with the culpable control model (CCM), an attribution theory that will be tested in 
the current study. The relationships between the JSM and the CCM will be discussed further in 
Chapter 6. 
 Ultimately, the JSM suggests that individuals will release their genuine prejudices if they 
can provide a justification for such prejudices and/or they are in an environment in which they 
believe it is safe to do so (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In the current research, both of these 
conditions are satisfied among individual jurors. Upon encountering an obese plaintiff, 
participants will likely experience negative affective responses (e.g., anger, disgust) and a 





feelings. Though the JSM predicts that genuine prejudice will have a relatively direct impact on 
blame attributions, it should be noted that blame also could be impacted indirectly via biased 
interpretation of various pieces of evidence and testimony. That is, jurors motivated to blame 
the obese plaintiff for her negative outcome may be more inclined to implicate the plaintiff 
when considering various case facts related to the allegation of medical malpractice, which 
would in turn affect verdicts. With respect to the current research, the covert expression of 
prejudice against obese plaintiffs may emerge in verdict judgments, in measures of attributions 
of responsibility to the plaintiff and defendant, and/or in the amount of damages awarded to 
successful plaintiffs. Moreover, individual jurors will report their judgments anonymously, which 
heightens their susceptibility to anti-fat bias in rendering case decisions.  
 The JSM further suggests that the influence of anti-fat bias may be attenuated (but 
perhaps not eliminated) among deliberating jurors. Though prejudice against the overweight is 
more “politically correct” than prejudice against other groups (e.g., ethnic and religious 
minorities), its expression is still socially sanctioned (e.g., see Crandall et al., 2002; Graziano et 
al., 2007). Thus, jurors rendering judgments as a group should suppress their weight-related 
prejudice more than jurors making anonymous judgments. Deliberating jurors also may be more 
motivated to offer logical and “correct” interpretations of the case evidence and facts to 
support their conclusions than individual jurors, who need not provide a public explanation for 
their decisions (London & Nunez, 2000; McCoy, Nunez, & Danmeyer, 1999). Such self-
presentational concerns can help minimize case-based justifications for blaming the obese 
plaintiff for her situation (e.g., via biased evidence interpretation and or weighing of evidence). 
Exposure to other jurors’ perspectives and additional consideration of case facts during 





1999). It should be noted, however, that the attenuating effects of deliberations are often 
contingent on jury composition and other case features (McCoy et al. 1999, Sommers, 2006). 
These factors will be discussed further in Chapter 5, which specifically focuses on the effects of 
deliberations on juror decisions.  
Social psychologists generally agree that all individuals harbor prejudices, which in turn 
affect people’s judgments and behaviors. Prejudice as directed toward a trial participant (i.e., 
the alleged victim or defendant) is a primary means whereby extra-legal factors impact juror 
decisions. In addition to individual biases, jurors are susceptible to a variety of other extra-legal 
influences. The following chapter reviews some of the most common extra-legal influences on 


















Chapter 4: Influence of Extra-Legal Factors on Juror Decisions 
 
 Extra-legal influences on juror decisions may be placed into two broad categories. First, 
jurors may be inappropriately influenced by a multitude of factors related to a specific case. 
Documented case-specific influences include but are not limited to case/offense type (Gordon, 
1990; Jones & Kaplan, 2003), pre-trial publicity (Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 1999; Ruva, 
McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007), inadmissible evidence (Lieberman, Arndt, & Vess, 2009; London & 
Nunez, 2000) decision rules (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Sommer, Horowitz, & Burgeois, 
2001), case event outcomes (e.g., type/severity of injury incurred; Bornstein, 1998; Feigenson, 
Salovey, & Park, 1997), and characteristics of victims and defendants (see Devine & Caughlin, 
2014; Mazella & Feingold, 1994, for a review). Second, characteristics of the jurors themselves, 
or individual differences, might affect their decision making. Such individual differences include 
demographic characteristics (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Vinson, Costanzo, & Berger, 2008), 
personality variables (Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Seib, 2004), ideology (Freeman, 2006; Visher, 
1987) and personal beliefs (Lynch, 2009; Vidmar, 1995).  
 As the literature in this area is extensive, this chapter focuses on the extra-legal factors 
most relevant to the current research. However, in doing so, it illustrates the complexity 
involved in clarifying the relationships between case factors, juror characteristics, and juror 
decisions. Much of the literature examining the influence of various extra-legal factors on juror 
decision making has yielded conflicting or inconclusive results (see Greene & Bornstein, 2003; 
Lieberman & Olson, 2009). Ultimately, juror bias is likely best understood by considering 





Evidence Strength and the Liberation Hypothesis 
Evidence strength is by far the most powerful predictor of jury decision-making 
(Lieberman & Olson, 2009). As instructed, jurors typically render liable or guilty verdicts when 
admissible evidence favoring the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s case is strong, and render not liable 
verdicts or acquit in the absence of strong, high-quality evidence (Devine et al., 2004; Feigenson, 
2000). Though a definitively “legal” factor and the factor that jurors should primarily rely on in 
their decision-making, evidence strength may predict the extent to which jurors incorporate 
extra-legal factors into their decisions. Specifically, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) advanced the 
“liberation hypothesis,” or the contention that jurors are most susceptible to extra-legal 
influences when case evidence is contradictory and/or ambiguous. That is, strong evidence 
presented by either side should effectively guide jurors’ decisions, but when the evidence 
presented by both sides is equally convincing or difficult to interpret and reconcile, jurors will be 
“liberated” from their role as neutral fact-finders and increase their reliance on various extra-
legal factors facilitate their decision-making in a difficult case. 
 The liberation hypothesis is intuitive and supported by social psychological theory (see 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Yet, it has received surprisingly little empirical attention, with only two 
published studies to date specifically examining the interaction between case evidence strength 
and the incorporation of extra-legal factors into jurors’ decisions. Reskin and Visher (1986) 
found that trial participants’ demographics (e.g., those of the victim and defendant) exerted a 
stronger influence on jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts when the case against the defendant was 
weak or evidence presented by both sides was ambiguous. A more recent study revealed that 
verdicts rendered by deliberating juries were significantly more likely to be influenced by extra-





(Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & Stolle, 2009). However, these juries only 
considered case-related extra-legal factors in ambiguous cases such as pre-trial publicity and 
charge severity; they did not rely on extra-legal factors pertaining to trial participants. 
Most criminal and civil charges are settled out of court, especially when extant facts and 
evidence strongly favor either side (Brodsky, 2009). High-stakes civil cases and medical 
malpractice cases in particular are especially likely to be considered “close” or ambiguous when 
actually tried by a jury due to the more relaxed “preponderance of evidence” standard applied 
to civil cases (Feigenson, 2000). Further, medical providers and practitioners, as well as many 
corporate defendants, will typically seek to settle a viable case against them rather than risk 
further loss (Vidmar, 2005). Thus, jurors may be particularly susceptible to extra-legal influences 
in cases like the one featured in the current study.  
Victim and Defendant Characteristics 
 
 Much of the jury decision making literature has explored the relationships between trial 
participants’ characteristics and case judgments. In general, mock jurors are more lenient 
toward attractive defendants than unattractive defendants (Mazella, & Feingold, 1994; 
MacCoun, 1990; Patry, 2008), and one study found that male mock jurors were more lenient 
when the defendant was normal weight than when she was obese (Schvey et al., 2013). Obese 
persons, and obese females in particular, are perceived as significantly less attractive than their 
thinner counterparts (Grant & Mizzi, 2014), thus, manipulating the weight of a female trial 
participant may replicate the effects of manipulating her attractiveness. However, there are 
differences between perceptions of attractiveness and obesity. An individual can be perceived 





perceived as attractive (Rothblum, Miller, & Garbutt, 1988). In addition, weight may be viewed 
as more controllable than attractiveness.  
 There is a large body of evidence indicating that both actual and mock jurors are more 
punitive towards Black defendants than White defendants (see Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & 
Meissner, 2005). This influence becomes more pronounced when the defendant’s ethnicity 
“matches” stereotypes regarding the crime (e.g., that Blacks and Hispanics are more inclined to 
commit violent crimes than Whites; Bodenhausen, 1998; Jones & Kaplan, 2003). Mock jurors are 
more likely to convict White defendants accused of “white collar” crimes (e.g., extortion, fraud) 
than those accused of “blue collar” crimes (e.g., armed robbery, theft; Jones & Kaplan, 2003). 
However, numerous studies have failed to detect relationships between defendant ethnicity and 
juror judgments (see Mazella & Feingold, 1994, for a review). 
 Less attention has been paid to the influences of victim characteristics on jurors’ 
decisions. Mock jurors are more punitive toward defendants accused of sexual assault/domestic 
violence when the victim is female (Burt & Demello, 2002; Seelau, Seelau, & Poorman, 2003) 
and heterosexual (White & Kurpius, 2002). Others have found no effects of victim ethnicity on 
mock jurors’ decisions across multiple case types (Bagby, Parker, Rector, & Kalemba, 1994; see 
Mazella & Feingold, 1994, for a review). 
  Though the influence of victim weight on juror decisions is most pertinent to the current 
research, only one published study to date has explored this topic (Reichert et al., 2011, Study 
2). Specifically, Reichert and colleagues examined the effects of plaintiff weight (obese vs. 
normal) on mock jurors’ judgments of responsibility and liability in a hypothetical malpractice 
case involving allegations of a surgical error. No significant effects emerged for plaintiff weight 





the reason for surgery. However, gastric bypass patients in Study 1 (Reichert et al.) were held 
more responsible for the surgical error than any other group (i.e., nasal reconstruction, breast 
reduction, and corrective eye surgery patients). Study 1 did not manipulate plaintiff’s weight, 
but participants may have inferred that the patient was obese based on the surgery type, which 
in turn biased judgments of patient responsibility. Thus, obese patients whose weight is 
interpreted as a causal factor in their illness and/or surgery may have a stronger effect on jurors’ 
decisions. 
 Despite the lack of effects of plaintiff weight on verdicts, Reichert et al. (2011) did 
document some influence of this variable on jurors’ perception of plaintiff responsibility for the 
negative medical outcome. However, this effect was in the unexpected direction, and only 
emerged for certain types of jurors. Student mock jurors’ perceptions of responsibility were 
unaffected by plaintiff weight, whereas actual jurors (recruited from a Michigan court) were 
significantly less likely to attribute responsibility to the obese plaintiff than to the normal weight 
plaintiff. Reichert and colleagues proposed several explanations for this surprising finding, most 
notably that actual jurors are more likely to be overweight than student jurors and thus more 
inclined to sympathize with the obese patient and perhaps engage in defensive attributional 
processes (see Shaver, 1970).  
 Though findings are inconclusive, they suggest that characteristics of trial participants 
can influence juror decisions. In examining the influence of plaintiff weight on juror decisions 
and attributional processes, the current research aims to address some of these gaps and to 
further clarify Reichert et al.’s (2011) findings. Jurors’ individual differences often moderate the 





Characteristics of the Juror: Individual Differences  
 Most research examining the relationships between individual difference variables and 
juror decisions has been conducted using criminal trials, though some studies have focused on 
civil jurors’ verdicts (Greene & Bornstein, 2003). In both types of cases, individual differences 
account for a small proportion of variance (e.g., 2% - 10%, even with several individual 
difference variables combined) in verdicts (see Greene & Bornstein, 2003, and Lieberman & 
Olson, 2009, for a review). Yet, some individual differences are more powerful predictors than 
others. Specific attitudes and beliefs are generally better predictors than personality variables, 
whereas personality variables are generally better predictors than demographic characteristics 
(Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Lieberman & Olson, 2009). Again, a comprehensive review of the 
relationships between jurors’ characteristics and decisions is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
This section describes the individual differences most relevant to the current research to 
demonstrate the complexity of relationships between extra-legal factors and juror judgments. 
 Juror gender. As with most demographic characteristics, gender effects on juror 
decisions are often contingent upon the type of case and offense, as well as on characteristics of 
the victim and/or defendant (see Lieberman & Olson, 2009, for a review). Yet, some research 
has highlighted a general tendency for punitiveness among men. In examining a large database 
of criminal jurors’ verdicts, Eisenberg and colleagues (2005) observed that juries composed of 
mostly men were more likely to deliver guilty verdicts than those that were not. Men are also 
more likely than women to favor the death penalty, and may be more inclined to sentence a 
defendant to death than women with similar death penalty attitudes (Miller & Hayward, 2008; 
Stack, 2000). Though this gender difference is essentially case-specific (e.g., to death penalty 





in general; those strongly supporting the death penalty are overall more likely to convict 
defendants than those expressing weaker support (Lynch, 2009). There are some instances, 
however, in which women may be more punitive than men. For instance, women are 
significantly more conviction prone in cases involving sexual assault (Grubb & Harrower, 2009), 
domestic violence (Seelau, Seelau, & Poorman, 2003), child abuse, insanity pleas, and drug-
trafficking charges (see Lieberman & Olson, 2009, for a review). 
 The few studies exploring relationships between gender and civil jurors’ decisions have 
yielded conflicting findings. Snyder (1970) found that male-only juries were significantly more 
likely to award the amount of damages requested by the plaintiff than mixed-gender juries, 
though others have found that female mock jurors award higher damages than males 
(Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998). Female jurors in medical malpractice cases may be 
more inclined to side with the defendant and to award fewer damages when rendering a liable 
verdict. It should be noted, however, that this tendency was primarily documented in case 
studies rather than in empirical investigations (Vidmar, 1995). 
 Perceived similarity to trial participants. Disentangling the relationships between of 
juror gender and trial outcomes is indeed challenging, particularly because many studies have 
yielded minimal or no effects of these demographics on juror decisions (see Greene & Bornstein, 
2003; Lieberman & Olson, 2009). Among studies that have documented effects, however, a 
common theme emerges: Jurors generally are lenient towards defendants who share their 
gender, ethnic background, and other physical characteristics (e.g., attractiveness; Abwender & 
Hough, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2005). Jurors also may be more punitive towards defendants in 
cases involving victims who they perceive as similar to themselves (see Burt & DeMello, 2002; 





via the similarity-leniency hypothesis, which purports that individuals side with trial participants 
most similar to them primarily because they are more inclined to like them (consistent with the 
liking-similarity effect; see Greene & Bornstein, 2003). It should be noted that the black sheep 
hypothesis predicts that the similarity-leniency hypothesis will only persevere when trial 
participants (most notably the defendant) are perceived in accordance with the norms of the 
particular group to which they and the respective jurors belong (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 
1988). The black sheep effect occurs when jurors are more likely to convict a defendant who is 
viewed as deviant and a poor representation of their shared group (Kerr et al., 1995). This effect 
only has been documented in deliberation contexts, and will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
 Alternatively, jurors’ preference for trial participants who are similar to themselves may 
be accounted for by defensive attribution theory (DAT; Shaver, 1970). DAT proposes that 
individuals are naturally motivated to blame victims of negative outcomes. In doing so, 
perceivers are reassured that they are not at risk for experiencing a similar misfortune. 
However, individuals are often unable to maintain psychological distance from victims they 
perceive as highly similar to themselves; they fear that they too will be blamed should a similar 
outcome befall them. As a result, perceived similarity can actually attenuate blame towards 
victims, whether these victims are conceptualized as the targets or alleged perpetrators of crime 
(Herzog, 2008; Shaver, 1970). Belief in a Just World (BJW) and other related personality 
variables can also affect jurors’ propensity to blame trial participants. 
 Personality Variables. A variety of personality variables have been studied with respect 
to juror decision making, including BJW, locus of control, authoritarianism, dogmatism, political 





control, conservatives, and those high in authoritarianism and dogmatism are more conviction-
prone than their counterparts (see Lieberman & Olson, 2009, for a review), whereas those high 
in NFC are less conviction-pone and less likely to recommend the death penalty than those 
lower in NFC (Butler & Moran, 2007).  
BJW is similar (though not identical) to all of the aforementioned constructs with the 
exception of NFC (Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008). Those high in BJW tend to believe 
that the world is a fair and just place and that people get what they deserve; ultimately, BJW 
helps people make sense of unfortunate events (Lerner & Miller, 1978). As with most 
demographic variables, however, such research has generally yielded weak and contradictory 
effects (Lieberman & Olson, 2009). 
 BJW is a complicated variable with respect to juror decisions because it may motivate 
blame towards both alleged victims and perpetrators. On one hand, those high in BJW should be 
particularly inclined to punish defendants, who have purportedly exercised choice in the 
decision to transgress against an innocent other. Indeed, mock jurors higher in BJW are typically 
more likely to find defendants guilty and impose more severe sentences than those lower in 
BJW (see Freeman, 2006; Lieberman & Olson, 2009). On the other hand, those high in BJW may 
be motivated to consider the victims’ role in their misfortune (on the basis that people get what 
they deserve), leading to more leniency toward the defendant if victims can be perceived as 
responsible for their situation. To illustrate, Visher (1987) found that those high in BJW were 
more lenient towards defendants accused of sexual assault when the victim was characterized 
negatively (i.e., as having extra-marital affairs and engaging in “risky” behaviors prior to the 
alleged assault) than when she was characterized more positively. Mock jurors with strong just 





of higher SES, presumably because low SES indicates negative character within the BJW 
framework (Freeman, 2006). Conversely, Correia and colleagues (2001) found no interactions 
between BJW and manipulations of the victim’s innocence on victim blame, though those with 
stronger just world beliefs were more likely to hold the victim responsible for her situation than 
were those with weaker beliefs. 
 Very few studies have explored relationships between civil jurors’ personality 
characteristics and their decisions. In a study examining mock jurors’ decisions in four different 
hypothetical trials, BJW predicted verdicts in only one case, such that jurors higher in BJW were 
more likely to find an insurance company liable in a lawsuit involving a corporate defendant 
than were those lower in BJW (Vinson et al., 2008). Reichert et al. (2011, Study 2) found that 
participants high in BJW as well as authoritarianism were more likely to return liable verdicts in 
a malpractice case than were participants lower in BJW and authoritarianism. These results 
cohere with literature suggesting that criminal jurors high in BJW, authoritarianism, and related 
constructs (e.g., BPWE, conservatism, see Lieberman & Olson, 2009) are particularly inclined to 
punish defendants; however, much more research is needed.  
 Attitudes and beliefs. Attitudes and beliefs are typically better predictors of decision 
making and behavior than are other individual difference variables, both within and outside of 
the courtroom (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Feigenson, 2000). Generally, as the relevance of an 
attitude or belief to a particular case increases, so does its influence on juror decisions (Brodsky, 
2009; Feigenson, 2000). However, some case-specific attitudes may predict juror decisions 
across a broader spectrum of trials.  
 A wide variety of case-specific attitudes and beliefs have been studied within the 





certain circumstances) are more inclined to render guilty verdicts in capital cases and to 
sentence convicted defendants to death than are jurors who are not death-qualified (see Lynch, 
2009). Further, supporters of the death penalty are more conviction prone in general than 
opponents (Lynch, 2009). 
 Other case-specific attitudes and beliefs examined within the criminal context include 
those regarding rape victims and sexual assault allegations, drug use, lawyers, psychiatrists, and 
the insanity defense (see Lieberman & Olson, 2009, for a review). When effects are 
documented, these variables typically operate as expected. Negative attitudes towards rape 
victims translate into a pro-defendant bias (Grubb & Harrower, 2003); negative attitudes 
towards drug users are predictive of guilty verdicts on drug-related charges (Moran, Cutler, & 
Loftus, 1990); and those who are skeptical of psychiatrists and the insanity defense in general 
are particularly inclined to find defendants who plead insanity guilty (Cutler, Moran & Narby, 
1992; Poulson, Brondino, Brown, & Braithwaite, 1998). 
  One specific belief that has been relatively well-studied in the civil arena is the belief in 
a litigation crisis, which is the notion that there are too many frivolous lawsuits perpetrated by 
greedy plaintiffs, and that civil litigation and jury awards are “spiraling out of control” (Vidmar, 
1995). Thus, those with stronger beliefs in a litigation crisis are generally more lenient towards 
civil defendants and award lower damages than those with weaker beliefs (Hans & Lofquist, 
1994). Belief in a litigation crisis has predicted mock juror decisions (pro-defendant) in high-
stakes civil cases (Vinson et al., 2008) and in medical malpractice cases (Reichert et al., 2011). 
Jurors with stronger beliefs in a litigation crisis award fewer damages in civil negligence cases 
(Hans & Lofquist, 1992) and are less likely to find defendants liable for punitive damages (see 





that individuals with stronger just world beliefs were less likely to believe in a litigation crisis 
than those with weaker just world beliefs. Additional research is needed substantiate this 
relationship between BJW and belief in a litigation crisis and to illuminate the effects of BJW on 
civil jurors’ decisions in general. 
 Research suggests that beliefs and attitudes about physicians play a role in the 
outcomes of medical malpractice trials (Feigenson, 2000; Vidmar, 1995). Most Americans have 
positive perceptions of physicians and other medical practitioners, which may partially account 
for the low success rate of malpractice plaintiffs relative to other types of plaintiffs. Some 
qualitative research (juror interviews, observations of deliberations) has indeed linked beliefs 
about physicians and their responsibilities to verdicts (Feigenson, 2000; Vidmar, 1995). In 
addition, participants expressing more negative attitudes toward physicians were significantly 
more likely than those with more positive attitudes to find the (physician) defendant liable 
(Reichert et al., 2011).   
 As this review demonstrates, multiple juror characteristics may affect decision making in 
both criminal and civil trials. However, such effects are usually minimal and may not be powerful 
enough to influence actual verdicts (though they may influence perceptions of responsibility and 
damage awards; Greene & Bornstein, 2003). Again, potential influences of jurors’ individual 
differences must be considered within the context of case features. Effects of demographic 
characteristics such as gender are often contingent upon the offense in question, and may be 
further complicated by jurors’ personality traits and perceived similarity to the victim or 
defendant. Not surprisingly, case-specific attitudes and beliefs are stronger predictors of juror 
decision making, though these variables also may interact with other case aspects (most 





The next section describes how case features (primarily plantiff weight) and juror individual 
differences may operate in the proposed research. 
Influence of Extra-Legal Factors in the Current Study 
 
 Consistent with most medical malpractice cases tried before a jury (Vidamar, 2005), the 
hypothetical case presented to participants will be fairly “close” and ambiguous, with multiple 
evidence components favoring each opposing side. The descriptions of opposing evidence and 
testimony included in the trial summary should foster jurors’ incorporation of extra-legal factors 
in their decision making according to the liberation hypothesis (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Plaintiff 
weight is the key extra-legal factor expected to influence juror decisions in the current research. 
Considering the substantial evidence of widespread prejudice and discrimination against the 
overweight and obese in America (see Crandall, 1994, 1995; Puhl & Heuer, 2009; Puhl et al., 
2008), it is conceivable that mock jurors will be less inclined to find the defendant (physician) 
liable in a malpractice case involving an obese plaintiff than in an identical case involving a 
normal weight plaintiff. If plaintiff weight does not directly impact verdicts, it may likely affect 
participants’ perceptions of plaintiff and physician responsibility and the amount of damages 
awarded to a successful plaintiff. Though Reichert et al. (2011) found no effects of plaintiff 
weight on juror decisions, this relationship merits re-examination in light of the increasing 
prevalence and strength of anti-fat bias. 
 Juror individual differences also are expected to impact decision making in the current 
research, primarily via their interactions with plaintiff weight. As case-specific attitudes are the 
most reliable predictors of juror judgments (Lieberman & Olson, 2009), those with stronger anti-
fat attitudes should be more inclined to blame the obese plaintiff for her situation than those 





plaintiff weight on juror decisions, such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, 
conservatism, BJW, and BPWE. These variables are closely related yet conceptually distinct 
(Christopher et al., 2008). The current study focuses on BJW and BPWE, as these ideologies in 
particular are implicated in the development, maintenance, and justification of weight-related 
prejudice (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Endorsement of BJW and BPWE should 
foster more negative perceptions of the obese plaintiff, which may in turn increase jurors’ 
tendency to “blame the victim.” 
 As described earlier, gender is generally a weak and inconsistent predictor of juror 
decisions (Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Lieberman & Olson, 2009). However, the influence of 
gender may be more pronounced in certain types of cases and further depend upon victim 
and/or defendant characteristics (Abwender & Hough, 2001; Cutler, Moran, & Narby, 1992). 
Men are more prone to anti-fat bias than women and may be more likely to act in accordance 
with such bias (Bannon et al., 2008; Graziano et al., 2007; Puhl & Heuer, 2009; Schvey et al., 
2013). Thus, it is anticipated that males will hold the obese plaintiff more responsible for her 
negative medical outcomes than will females. Further, males may have difficulty identifying with 
the obese plaintiff, as they are less likely to have struggled with their weight and to have been 
targets of weight-related prejudice than females (Bannon et al., 2008; Crandall, 1995).  
 Jurors’ own weight may play a role in their judgments of obese plaintiffs. Schvey and 
colleagues (2013) found that participants’ weight only mattered among males, with leaner 
males expressing more negative beliefs about the defendant than heavier males. These negative 
beliefs, however, did not appear to affect guilt judgments. Reichert and colleagues (2011) 
proposed that jurors’ weight (or experience with weight-related issues) may have been 





bias towards overweight targets, whereas younger student jurors were unaffected by plaintiff 
weight. As participant weight was not assessed, however, this effect could be related to 
geographic differences (student jurors were from Nevada; actual jurors were from a liberal 
Michigan town) or other disparities between the two participant groups.  
Juror BMI will be ascertained in the current study to determine the extent to which 
participants are overweight or obese. According to Reichert et al.’s (2011) analysis, in a medical 
malpractice case, jurors with higher BMIs should be less inclined to blame the obese plaintiff for 
her negative outcome than jurors with lower BMIs. This may be because overweight jurors have 
a unique understanding of weight-related issues and are thus more likely to sympathize with an 
obese plaintiff than are normal weight jurors.  Yet, it is important to note that overweight 
individuals generally exhibit similar levels of anti-fat bias as their normal weight counterparts 
and do not identify with their “ingroup” (i.e., that comprised of other overweight persons; 
Crocker et al., 1993; Crocker & Major, 1994). This lack of ingroup identification could function to 
minimize or eradicate any influences of jurors’ weight on their decisions in the current research. 
 The current research also will explore the relationships between individual differences 
and juror decisions in an identical case involving a normal weight plaintiff (i.e., the control 
condition). Such analyses are warranted considering the limited understanding of how jurors’ 
individual differences operate in civil trials and in medical malpractice cases in particular. 
Predicting the potential effects of individual differences variables on jurors’ decisions in the 
control condition is challenging due to the lack of research in this area. There is limited evidence 
that endorsement of just world beliefs increases jurors’ tendency to render liable verdicts in 
malpractice cases (Reichert et al., 2011). This coheres with findings that those higher in BJW are 





correspondingly should be more inclined to side with the plaintiff in malpractice cases. Thus, 
although endorsement of just world beliefs is expected to increase blaming of the obese 
plaintiff, it may decrease blaming of the normal weight plaintiff. BPWE may operate in a similar 
manner. Gender effects are especially unpredictable in the control condition. Vidmar’s (1995) 
observations suggest that women may be more likely to find the defendant liable than men, but 
the liking-similarity hypothesis yields the opposite prediction (because the plaintiff in the 
current research is female; Greene & Bornstein, 2003).  
 Though some specific hypotheses will be advanced regarding the relationships between 
individual differences and juror decisions, this aspect of the current research remains somewhat 
exploratory. The current study will examine both main and interactive effects (i.e., with plaintiff 
weight) of individual differences on juror decisions to further build a foundation for the study of 
the influence of extra-legal factors on civil trial outcomes. It is critical to recognize, however, 
that jurors’ propensity to consider extra-legal factors often is affected by deliberations (e.g., 
Miller et al., 2011; Patry, 2008; Sommers, 2006). The next chapter describes the ways in which in 





















Chapter 5: Effects of Deliberations on Juror Decisions and Susceptibility to Bias 
 
 The notion that groups produce more sound judgments than individuals is a hallmark of 
the American jury system (Monahan & Walker, 2006). Jury members are instructed to discuss 
case evidence and testimony (and their respective interpretations) with the objective of 
reaching a collective agreement on defendant guilt/liability and damage awards (Feigenson, 
2000). Yet, much of the jury decision making literature focuses on the decisions of individual 
jurors, rather than those of juries (Bornstein, 1999). Using individuals rather than groups as the 
unit of analysis in jury decision making research often may be attributable to practical and 
methodological concerns (e.g., limited participant samples, statistical challenges); yet, this 
practice has been subject to much criticism (Bornstein, 1999).  
 Individual and group decision making processes often differ; yet, group decisions are not 
always more valid than individual ones (see Moskowitz, 2005). The same principle applies to 
comparing the judgments of individual jurors with those of juries. Individual juror and jury 
judgments cohere in the majority of cases (75 - 90% of the time; Eisenberg et al., 2005; Hastie et 
al., 1999). In many of these instances, both jurors and juries likely arrived at rational conclusions 
based on the case facts and evidence. Yet, consensus among jurors and juries does not 
necessarily imply correctness. A substantial body of literature demonstrates that juries are 
susceptible to the same cognitive errors and biases in decision making as are individual jurors 
(e.g., Feigenson, 2000; Greene, Johns, & Bowman, 1999; Smith & Greene, 2005). 
 Research has generally supported the notion that deliberations can help attenuate the 
effects of juror biases and judgment errors on jury decisions (London & Nunez, 2000; Miller et 
al., 2011; Patry, 2008). Under certain circumstances, however, deliberations may actually 





MacCoun, 1990). Many psychological processes combined likely influence jury deliberations 
(Sommers, 2006), but informational and normative processes in particular play a key role in 
both the attenuation and exacerbation of bias in juries. This chapter first discusses how these 
two processes can influence jury decision making in different contexts (e.g., with respect to jury 
composition and evidence strength). Next, it explores potential normative and informational 
influences on jury decisions in the current study.  
Informational Influences 
 
 One of the primary ways deliberation is believed to attenuate juror biases is through the 
sharing of multiple case-related perspectives and information. In “close” cases with substantial 
evidence favoring both parties, jurors may be especially likely to rely on pre-existing biases to 
help them make a difficult decision (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; see MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). 
However, individual jurors vary in their perspectives, experiences, and cognitive abilities. During 
deliberations, such differences can promote information sharing, recall of case-related facts, 
and the development of alternative explanations of a crime (Kaplan, 1984). When engaged in 
such discussions, jurors may be less prone to cognitive errors and biases. Further, the enhanced 
recall and consideration of case-relevant information increases the likelihood that the jury will 
render a verdict in line with the facts.  
 A heightened tendency towards acquittal among criminal jurors (as compared with the 
verdicts of individual jurors and judges) is perhaps the most widely documented outcome of 
deliberations (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; see MacCoun & Kerr, 1988, for a review). This “leniency 
effect” is most commonly attributed to informational influences (MacCoun, 1990), whereby pro-
acquittal jurors present arguments for reasonable doubt that likely were not previously 





in civil cases, which rest upon preponderance of evidence rather than reasonable doubt 
(MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). 
As it is challenging to observe and measure information sharing during deliberations, 
many researchers have simply hypothesized that informational influences may be responsible 
for the attenuating effects of deliberations in their studies (e.g., Kaplan & Miller, 1978; London 
& Nunez, 2000; Miller et al., 2011). However, some studies have shown that deliberations do 
indeed enhance jurors’ reasoning skills, leading to less extreme (and presumably more 
“correct”) case-related judgments. For instance, McCoy and colleagues (1999) found that 
deliberating jurors made more counterarguments and were more likely to consider alternative 
theories of a crime than individual jurors; deliberating jurors’ verdicts also were less variable 
and more consistent with case evidence. Further, Kaplan and Miller found that deliberating 
jurors were both less susceptible to situational biases and more likely to make evidence-
consistent judgments than were individual jurors.   
 Importantly, deliberations may not only increase information sharing, but may also 
affect individual jurors’ processing of case-related evidence. Numerous researchers (e.g., 
London & Nunez, 2000; McCoy et al., 1999; Sommers, 2006) have proposed that the anticipation 
of deliberations increases jurors’ sense of accountability; that is, jurors who expect that they will 
have to justify their position to others will be more inclined to attend to case evidence and facts. 
Such accountability may elicit a more rational or central mode of information processing in 
deliberating jurors, whereby they process evidence carefully and deliberately, arriving at more 
reasonable conclusions (see Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992). Conversely, individual 
jurors only accountable to themselves may use a more experiential or peripheral mode of 





which allows for the incorporation of bias into their judgments. Though no published studies 
have compared the processing modes of individual and deliberating jurors, it is likely that 
differential information processing prior to deliberations helps eliminate bias in juries. 
Though deliberations should typically enhance recall and discussion of alternative 
perspectives, this is not always the case. The level of information sharing during deliberations 
may largely depend on jury composition. In general, it is assumed that heterogeneous juries will 
be more likely to consider multiple perspectives than homogenous juries (Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Indeed, Sommers (2006) found that diverse juries (composed of four White members and two 
Black members) deliberated longer and cited more case-related facts than juries composed of all 
White members. Diverse juries also were more likely to discuss the defendant’s race. This 
informational influence was mainly attributable to White jurors, who were more inclined to 
discuss case aspects as well as the potential for race-related biases.  
In some cases, informational influences can exacerbate bias in juries. Exacerbation 
should be most common in homogenous juries, when case evidence is strong, or when the 
majority of pre-deliberation verdicts (i.e., 2/3) indicate the same verdict preference (Kerr et al., 
1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985). If individual jurors harbor similar motivations, they may be equally 
likely to process evidence in the same biased manner. Thus, evidence favoring the majority of 
jurors’ preferred conclusions may be given disproportionate attention during deliberations. This 
can result in group polarization or the “risky shift” phenomenon, whereby the average of group 
(i.e., jury) members’ individual responses becomes more extreme in the same direction 
following a group discussion of those responses (Kaplan, 1984). In manipulating decision criteria 
for a civil negligence case, Sommer and colleagues (2001) found that deliberations in cases with 





not occur in cases with comparative or strict negligence rules. Presumably, jurors were more 
motivated to find for the plaintiff in the contributory negligence case so that the plaintiff could 
receive some kind of compensation for her injuries. Because this motivation was common, 
jurors engaged in similar biased evidence-seeking processes, which maximized the likelihood of 
a pro-plaintiff verdict.  
Arguably, Sommer et al.’s (2001) findings represent an instance of jury nullification, 
which occurs when a jury disregards their instructions and/or case evidence to render a verdict 
inconsistent with the applicable law (Finkel, 1995). Legal scholars believe that nullification is 
most often motivated by jurors’ disagreement with a particular law or special circumstances 
surrounding a law’s application (Noah, 2001). For example, Finkel (1995) notes that Northern 
juries often nullified in trials related to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, returning not guilty verdicts 
for abolitionists accused of helping slaves escape. More recently, nullification has been 
documented in experimental studies involving euthanasia (Meissner, Brigham, & Pfeifer, 2003) 
and suggested as a factor in acquittals of marijuana charges by various media outlets (e.g., 
Cubbison, 2013; Hanson, 2012). In civil trials, nullification is believed to most commonly occur 
when jurors believe that the plaintiff should recover some damages, but this recovery would be 
prohibited by specific decision rules if the jury were to adhere to their instructions and case 
evidence (Noah, 2001). For instance, when the contributory negligence standard is applied, 
plaintiffs cannot recover any damages if the jury determines that they have contributed to their 
injuries in any way (Sommer et al., 2001). Most U.S. states currently use the modified negligence 
rule, whereby plaintiffs can only recover damages if the jury determines the defendant to be at 
least 51% at fault for the incident, which is exemplified by the “preponderance of evidence” 





The extent of jury nullification is difficult to ascertain, though both field and 
experimental studies suggest that it is quite rare (see Finkel, 1995; Noah, 2001). As the charges 
advanced in the current study are not a recent “hot topic” of debate and the plaintiff is not 
requesting an exorbitant amount in damages, it is unlikely that mock jurors will nullify on such 
bases. The possibility exists, however, that mock jurors’ decisions will be impacted by their 
desire to have the plaintiff recover some damages in this hypothetical case which invokes the 
modified negligence rule. Though there is little empirical evidence documenting the processes of 
jury nullification, it has been suggested that a jury can nullify through informational influences 
(e.g., sharing biased interpretations of the instructions and case evidence) as well as through 
normative influences (e.g., one or more jurors convincing other jury members that a particular 
law or a law’s application is unjust; Finkel, 1995).    
Normative Influences 
 
Deliberations also introduce the potential for normative influences. Normative 
influences may encompass jurors’ desire for acceptance, motivations to appear unbiased, or 
group pressures to conform to the majority (Kaplan, 1984). Many group decision making 
phenomena commonly attributed to informational influence also can be explained by normative 
influence. For instance, group polarization has been widely documented in the jury decision 
making research (see Feigenson, 2000; Kaplan, 1984; Kaplan & Miller, 1978). Though 
informational influence is typically cited as the basis for this effect, group polarization also may 
result from individual jurors’ desire for social acceptance or from the simple heuristic that 
consensus implies correctness.  
 Uncovering direct evidence for normative influence is even more challenging than 





stated that their final vote resulted from majority pressure and intimidation (see Bowers, 
Steiner, & Sandys, 2001). Yet, jurors rarely concede that their vote was motivated by a desire for 
social acceptance or to appear non-prejudiced. Instead, normative influence may often operate 
at a more covert level, and jurors may unconsciously suppress their pre-existing biases in their 
efforts at conformity. Extrapolations from related research suggest that normative influence 
during deliberations can impact verdicts.  
 The effects of normative influence on jury decisions are perhaps best illustrated by a 
“boomerang effect.” This is evidenced when juries are more punitive toward a socially desirable 
defendant or victim than toward one who is socially undesirable (or, correspondingly, when they 
are more lenient toward a socially undesirable defendant/victim). For example, Patry (2008) 
found that mock jurors were more likely to acquit an attractive defendant than a plain-looking 
defendant. The opposite effect emerged for deliberating jurors: they were more likely to convict 
the attractive defendant than the plain defendant. This effect cannot be explained by 
informational influence alone; deliberating jurors were likely aware of the potential biasing 
influences of the defendant’s attractiveness and overcompensated in an effort to appear 
unbiased. Though such overcompensation is not typical, investigators have proposed that this 
mechanism may be partially responsible for the attenuating effects of deliberations in their 
research (e.g., Miller et al., 2011; Sommers, 2006). 
 Studies examining the effects of the expectancy of deliberations also support the notion 
that self-presentational concerns can mitigate juror bias. Mock jurors in Sommers’ study (2006) 
were introduced to their fellow “jury” members prior to receiving the trial summary. Members 
of heterogeneous juries (comprised of two Black members and four White members) showed 





juries comprised of all White members. Presumably, the knowledge that they would be 
deliberating with Black jurors increased White jurors’ motivations to suppress any related 
prejudices, leading to more lenient judgments of a Black defendant. However, the knowledge of 
their jury composition also may have increased accountability among members of 
heterogeneous juries, causing them to interpret the evidence in a more careful and rational 
manner. Kerr and colleagues (1995) demonstrated that anticipation of deliberations could 
actually lead to a black sheep effect whereby jurors show more bias toward a defendant who is 
similar to them. Specifically, these researchers found that mock jurors were more lenient 
toward a defendant who shared their minority status (i.e., Jewish religious affiliation). However, 
minority jurors (i.e., African-American) who were led to believe that they would engage in 
deliberations with Caucasian jury members were actually more punitive toward an African-
American defendant than toward a Caucasian defendant. Kerr et al. (1995) attribute this effect 
to minority jurors’ desire to appear unbiased in the presence of majority members. However, an 
archival analysis of 419 criminal cases examining the relationships between defendant ethnicity, 
jury ethnic composition, and strength of evidence failed to uncover any evidence of the black 
sheep effect (Taylor & Hosch, 2004). 
 As this review demonstrates, normative and informational processes may attenuate or 
exacerbate juror bias during deliberations. Though attenuation is a more common result of 
deliberations, exacerbation may occur when jurors are exposed to the similar biased 
perspectives of fellow jury members or overcompensate for their biases in an effort at political 
correctness. Most jury decisions are likely the product of numerous psychological phenomena, 





effects of deliberations, however, may be improved upon considering jury composition, the 
strength of case evidence, and a variety of other case-related factors. 
Influence of Deliberations in the Current Study 
 
  The current study will examine the decisions of both individual and deliberating jurors. 
Such an investigation is warranted for several reasons. First, incorporating deliberations should 
enhance ecological validity and generalizability of the study’s findings. Second, few studies have 
compared individual jurors’ and juries’ decisions in civil trials (but see Greene et al., 1999; Hastie 
et al., 1999). Additional research is needed to determine whether the “leniency effect” is 
specific to criminal cases, or if it also may emerge in civil cases despite less stringent decision 
rules (Macoun & Kerr, 1988). Third, no published studies to date have compared individual and 
deliberating jurors’ decisions in a malpractice case. Finally, this research can help determine 
whether anti-fat bias, like racial or religious biases, may be attenuated by deliberations.     
 Extant research supports the notion that deliberations will attenuate anti-fat bias if 
such biases do indeed affect individual jurors’ decisions. Though weight-related prejudice is not 
socially prohibited to the same extent as racial and religious prejudices (Crandall, 1994), its 
expression is not as socially acceptable as some researchers have assumed (Crandall et al., 
2002). Further, there is substantial evidence of the suppression of weight-related prejudice in 
both public and private contexts (Graziano et al., 2007; King et al., 2006; Teachman et al., 2003). 
Jurors may simply “self-censor” to a greater extent during deliberations in an effort to appear 
unbiased, or they could actually overcompensate for anti-fat bias by showing more leniency 
toward the obese plaintiff. Deliberating jurors also may actively work to suppress their 





rational and balanced consideration of the case evidence and facts. The presence of one or 
more overweight jury members may further increase the likelihood of attenuation effects. 
 Despite these arguments, anti-fat bias may persevere regardless of deliberations. Mock 
juries in the current study will likely be more homogenous than typical juries, as they will be 
largely comprised of college undergraduates. Moreover, anti-fat attitudes are often stronger 
among college-aged individuals than in older adults (Teachman et al., 2003). If student jurors 
perceive their fellow jury members as similar to themselves, they may not make substantial 
efforts to suppress their weight-related prejudices when interpreting and discussing case 
evidence. Exacerbation effects may even emerge among homogenous juries in which all 
members hold strong anti-fat attitudes.    
 Deliberations may have little or no impact on case-related judgments in the normal 
weight condition, as the primary expected source of bias is removed. Extant jury nullification 
research suggests that juries may be more likely to find the defendant liable than warranted by 
juror instructions and/or the case facts and evidence so that the plaintiff may recover some 
damages (Noah, 2001; Sommer et al., 2001). Though the case utilized in the current study 
invokes the modified negligence rule, the potential for juries to find the defendant liable despite 
applicable law in order for the plaintiff to recover damages should be considered; this partial 
nullification could occur among non-deliberating jurors as well.  For reasons discussed earlier, 
however, it remains important to explore the potential influences of deliberations in civil trials 
in general and in malpractice trials in particular. Whether a salient source of bias (e.g., socially 
undesirable trial participants, pre-trial publicity, etc.) is present or absent, deliberations can 
affect individuals’ attributional processes and subsequent attributions of blame and 





attributional processes in more detail, specifically focusing on the applicability of the Culpable 














































Chapter 6: Juror Bias and Attribution Theory: The Culpable Control Model 
 
 During the past 60 years, social psychologists have advanced numerous theories aimed 
at explaining attributions and attributional processes (Shaver, 1985). Classic attribution theorists 
(e.g., Heider, Kelley) focused on individuals’ judgments regarding the cause of events and 
behaviors (see Moskowitz, 2005, for a review). More recent theories (Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 
1985; Weiner, 2006) expanded the definition of attributions to encompass not only perceivers’ 
assessments of causality, but also their judgments of responsibility and blameworthiness for an 
event. From this more contemporary perspective, attribution and its underlying processes are 
critical in understanding juror decisions. Specific decision rules vary according to trial type, but 
civil jurors are ultimately tasked with assigning blame for a negative event (Feigenson, 2000).  
Despite its relevance, attribution theory is seldom evoked in the jury decision making 
literature. This may be because many extant attribution theories are not well-suited to empirical 
examination in general and to studies of juror decisions in particular. This chapter advances 
Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control Model (CCM) as the most appropriate grounding theory for the 
current research and for understanding the effects of juror bias on case-related judgments in 
general.  
Applicability of Prior Attributional Frameworks to Jury Decision Making 
 
 Many studies of jury decision making are more practical than theoretical. This may 
account for the lack of discourse on the suitability of extant attributional frameworks to jury 
decision making research and the need to advance more relevant theories. A model applicable 
to jury decisions must include, at minimum, three components. Juror and jury decisions are 
susceptible to bias, and understanding how such biases operate is a primary objective of jury 





study of jury decision making must incorporate or account for sources of juror bias, such as 
motivations, emotions, and various social cognitive processes. Such a framework also must 
allow perceivers to apportion blame among multiple actors, as jurors are required to consider 
the behaviors and intent of at least two parties. Finally, an appropriate model must be 
empirically testable in applied realms. 
  The shortcomings of extant attributional theories in explaining jury decision making are 
readily apparent. Classic theories such as Heider’s (1958) Naïve Analysis of Action, Jones and 
Davis’ (1965) Theory of Correspondent Inference and Kelly’s (1973) “Cube” and ANOVA models 
only consider the behaviors of a single actor. Moreover, these theories solely focus on 
perceivers’ perceptions of the cause of an event or behavior, which are dichotomized as 
dispositional (originating within the actor) or situational (attributable to the actor’s 
environment). Jurors do typically make attributions regarding the cause of a negative event, but 
these causal attributions do not necessarily equate to judgments of guilt or liability. For 
instance, a physician’s actions may be the primary cause of a patient’s injuries. Yet, if the 
physician followed the reasonable standard of care, they cannot be held legally responsible for a 
negative medical outcome (Feigenson, 2000). Thus, jurors’ judgments in general and in 
malpractice cases in particular are more akin to ascriptions of responsibility and blame than to 
causality.  
  Building on these classic decision-stage models, Shaver (1985) differentiates between 
attributions of causality, responsibility, and blame, outlining the mechanisms whereby 
perceivers make judgments about each of these constructs. Shaver’s theory also allows for the 
analysis of multiple actors’ contributions to an event. Yet, due to the detail of Shaver’s theory in 





is not applicable to real-world settings. This limitation is evidenced by the lack of empirical 
research testing the model. More importantly, Shaver’s model and all of its predecessors 
assume that humans are rational decision-makers. They ignore any effects of emotion, 
motivation, or other cognitive biases on attributions and attributional processes, rendering 
them unsuitable frameworks for the analysis of jury decision making. 
 Weiner’s (2006) motivational model of attribution (see Chapter 2), is a significant 
departure from philosophical decision-stage theories. Emotional reactions play a central role in 
this framework, which is commonly applied to “real world” situations to explain attitudinal and 
behavioral responses towards an actor experiencing a negative outcome (Martinko & 
Thompson, 1988; Weiner, 2006). Yet, Weiner’s framework offers little insight into the ways in 
which generalized negative reactions toward an obese plaintiff may further affect jurors’ case 
decisions. In addition, the model cannot account for the contributing role of multiple actors to a 
negative outcome or explain perceivers’ judgments about complex events. Thus, despite its 
incorporation of emotion and motivation, Weiner’s theory is not well-suited to investigations of 
the effects of extra-legal factors on juror decisions. 
 Ultimately, none of the theories mentioned above include all three basic criteria 
necessary for examining juror attributions and attributional processes. However, a relatively 
recent framework, the CCM, does incorporate these criteria (see Alicke, 2000). The remainder of 
this chapter focuses on the CCM: its tenets, studies testing the framework, and its applicability 
to the current research.   
Principles of the Culpable Control Model 
 The CCM adopts many of its key features from extant attribution theories. Like Weiner’s 





personal control over an event. Consistent with Shaver’s (1985) theory, the CCM maintains that 
perceivers consciously and deliberately assess criteria related to intention, causation, and 
foresight in ascribing blame. However, the CCM differs from extant theories in two key respects. 
First, unlike classic decision-stage models, the CCM assigns a central role to perceivers’ 
motivation, emotion, and judgmental biases in attribution (Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 
2008). Second, in contrast with Weiner’s model, the CCM elucidates the processes whereby 
such phenomena may affect cognitive processes and blame ascriptions.  
 The CCM posits that blame attributions are predicated by affective reactions to a 
negative event and the actors involved (Alicke, 2000). Alicke refers to these responses as 
“spontaneous evaluations,” (SEs) and argues that they may be elicited by extra-legal factors 
such as an actor’s physical or social attractiveness as well as perceptions of an actor’s intentions, 
behaviors, and an event’s outcomes. According to the CCM, perceivers are motivated to blame 
the actor in any given situation who arouses the most negative affect. Occasionally, these 
affective responses or SEs may directly impact blame ascriptions (e.g., a juror assumes that a 
socially unattractive defendant is guilty without considering the evidence or case facts). In most 
cases, however, SEs color perceivers’ structural linkage assessments (SLAs; the criteria 
perceivers consider when assigning or justifying blame). Appendix A includes the abbreviations 
and the definitions for the components of the CCM pertaining to this study, as well as full terms 
and definitions for other abbreviations used commonly throughout this manuscript. 
 Perceivers may consider three types of structural linkages when ascribing blame. The 
“mind to behavior” link includes information about volitional behavioral control, or 
intentionality. Actors who behave purposefully and knowingly should be perceived as more 





Accordingly, volitional behavioral control may be diminished by perceptions of capacity or 
situational constraints. For instance, beliefs that actors “did the best they could” or behaved as 
expected given the circumstances should absolve them of blame for a negative outcome. 
Whether such mitigation occurs depends on perceivers’ SEs (Alicke, 2000). Perceivers should be 
more likely to excuse the actions of a socially attractive actor than the actions of a socially 
unattractive actor who elicits negative affective responses, even if both actors’ behaviors and 
the event are identical (Alicke & Zell, 2009). 
 The “behavior to consequence” link refers to perceptions of causal control (i.e., 
causality), that is, whether an actor’s behavior produced a harmful outcome. Clear and proximal 
connections between an individual’s actions and event outcomes should heighten ascriptions of 
blame, whereas the presence of multiple or distal potential causes should attenuate blame 
(Alicke, 2000). Assessments of causality also involve considerations of alternatives to a harmful 
outcome, or effective causal control (Alicke, 2000). Effective causal control is minimized when a 
harmful outcome would have occurred despite an actor’s intervention. The notion of effective 
causal control is relevant to the use of counterfactuals in ascribing blame. If mentally “undoing” 
an individual’s actions has no impact on the outcomes of an event, the actor should not be 
blamed. Individuals may be blamed, however, if undoing their actions would have prevented the 
negative outcome; blame should increase when these actions are perceived as unique and 
proximal causes of the outcome (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008). The CCM maintains 
that SEs can bias assessments of causal control in several different ways. Perceivers may be 
(unconsciously) motivated to focus on an unlikeable actor’s causal contributions to an outcome 





equally responsible. Negative SEs also may increase reliance on counterfactuals even if they are 
not proximal or unique to an event’s outcome (Alicke et al., 2008).  
 Finally, the “mind to consequence” link includes information about volitional outcome 
control, or foresight. Perceivers who believe that an actor desired or anticipated harmful 
outcomes should find the actor more blameworthy than those who believe that an actor had 
little knowledge of the potential consequences of their behaviors. Actors also may be blamed if 
perceivers believe that they should have anticipated negative outcomes. Again, SEs can 
influence beliefs about an actor’s foresight (Alicke, 2000). An actor with undesirable traits or an 
event with a particularly disturbing or severe outcome may promote reliance on hindsight bias, 
facilitating the belief that the actor “should have known better” (Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 
2004). 
 Ultimately, the CCM proposes that perceivers process and evaluate attributional 
information according to their preferred conclusions, which are based on initial and often 
unconscious reactions to an event and its participants. In addition to biased interpretations of 
specific SLAs, this may be more generally accomplished by lowering evidential standards for 
blame (e.g., requiring less evidence to convict a defendant; Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008) 
or by engaging in biased information searches. In some cases, perceivers’ SLAs may be relatively 
logical; in others, they may be heavily construed and prone to judgment errors. Alicke (2000) 
maintains that immediate reactions to an event and the actors involved nearly always color 
attributional processes, even if this influence is minimal. Thus, the CCM allows for gradations in 
structural linkage and blame assessments (i.e., perceivers may assign varying degrees of blame 





is maximized when all three structural linkages are fulfilled; yet, blame may still be ascribed in 
the absence of some or even all of these criteria (Alicke, 2000). 
  The CCM is unique in that it elucidates different attributional pathways perceivers may 
follow in assigning blame (Alicke, 2000; see Figure 1). Indirect SE effects (Path 2) occur when 
SLAs (i.e., consideration of the criteria used in assigning blame) fully mediate the relationship 
between SEs and blame. Alternatively, both direct and indirect SE effects may occur, such that 
SEs affect both blame ascriptions and SLAs directly, but SLAs remain a partial mediator between 
SEs and blame (Path 3). In some cases, SEs may directly impact blame, with consideration of 
structural linkages occurring after the blame ascriptions as a means of justifying a preferred 
conclusion (Path 1B). However, the CCM fails to specify factors that may promote the use of one 
attributional pathway over another; it merely proposes that such pathways are possible. In 
addition, the CCM offers little insight into if and how attributional processes and blame 
ascriptions may differ in individual (juror) and group (jury) decision making contexts. Further 
limitations of research grounded in the CCM are discussed next. 
Support for the Culpable Control Model 
 
 To date, only a handful of studies have tested elements of the CCM. This may be 
partially due to the recent development of the CCM, but also is likely attributable to its 
complexity. The CCM is characterized by broad constructs that may be difficult to measure, and 
elucidating precise attributional pathways poses further challenges. Despite these 
disadvantages, the CCM is indeed testable, and much more applicable to real-world settings 
than most of extant attributional frameworks. This section highlights findings supporting the 
CCM, as well as the limitations of such research. The CCM assumes that humans are not rational 





demonstrates that: 1) Perceivers’ perceptions of the actors involved in an event can indeed 
influence blame ascriptions; and 2) Perceivers’ perceptions of actors sometimes (but not always) 
exert this influence on blame via interpretation of attributional information, or SLAs. 
 Prior to the formal advancement of the CCM, Alicke (1994) conducted two studies to 
examine the effects of an actor’s disposition on judgments of causation and blame for an 
unfortunate event. Results indicated that participants were significantly less likely to blame 
“socially attractive” actors (e.g., actors characterized as a responsible “good person”) than 
“socially unattractive” actors (e.g., those characterized as irresponsible, reckless, or 
unsympathetic) for a negative outcome, though the details of the event and outcome remained 
constant. In Study 1, characterization of the actor influenced blame but not judgments of 
causality, indicative of a relatively direct attributional pathway as illustrated in Figure 1 (1A). 
Characterizations of the actor affected both causal and blame judgments in Study 2, however, 
and casual judgments partially mediated the relationship between the characterization 
manipulation and blame ascriptions. Thus, Study 2 supports the attributional pathway illustrated 
in Figure 1 (Path 3). 
 Mazzocco and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that the characterization of victims can 
affect blame assigned to an alleged perpetrator. Participants read a vignette in which a 
homeowner shot and fatally wounded a purported intruder, who was either described as a 
career criminal or as an innocent victim (the homeowner’s daughter’s boyfriend). Blame ratings, 
perceived negligence, and recommended sentence severity were significantly higher for the 
homeowner who mistakenly killed an innocent victim. Moreover, perceived negligence partially 
mediated the relationship between victim characterization and blame ratings. This further 





of negligence most closely correspond to judgments of volitional causal control or intent (e.g., 
whether the actor behaved as a reasonable person would under identical circumstances; Alicke, 
2000). 
To account for the partial (rather than full) mediating effect of perceived negligence, 
Mazzocco et al. (2004) conducted a follow-up study exploring the relationship between BJW, 
perceived negligence, and blame ascriptions. BJW did not significantly impact blame ratings or 
perceived negligence in either condition. Interestingly, however, perceptions of negligence only 
mediated the relationship between victim characterization and blame ascription among those 
low in BJW. Thus, those with strong and weak just world beliefs were equally likely to modify 
perceptions of negligence on the basis of actor characterization, but only those with weak 
beliefs actually used this information in rendering a final judgment of blame. This remains the 
only published study exploring individual differences within the context of the CCM. Though not 
explicitly stated by the authors, this study also offers some rationale for differences in 
attributional pathways. Those low in BJW appear to have followed pathways 2 or 3 in Figure 1, 
whereas those high in BJW may have followed pathways more akin to 1A (whereby SLAs were 
not considered) or 1B (whereby SLAs were modified in response to a desired blame ascription). 
 As evidenced by this review, most research supporting the CCM has been conducted by 
Alicke (1994) and colleagues (Alicke et al., 2008; Alicke et al., 1994; Alicke & Zell, 2009; 
Mazzocco et al., 2004), and employs the same general methodology. Nadelhoffer (2006) 
emphasized the applicability of the CCM to explaining juror bias; yet, only one published study 
to date actually applied the CCM to juror decision making (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008). 
These researchers examined the effects of gruesome photographic evidence (hypothesized to 





read a trial summary describing a murder case and were presented with either gruesome 
photographs, neutral photographs, or no photographs. Those exposed to gruesome 
photographs were more likely to find the defendant guilty and to rate the prosecution’s 
evidence as sufficient than were those exposed to no photographs; they also scored higher on a 
measure of negative affective response than participants in the other two groups. Mediational 
analyses revealed that attributional processes in the gruesome photographs condition were 
consistent with the main tenets of the CCM. That is, gruesome photographs elicited negative 
affective response (anger), leading to biased evidence processing (lowering evidential standards 
for blame) which in turn increased guilty verdicts (see Figure 1, Path 3). Interestingly, although 
jurors in the neutral photograph condition were more likely to convict the defendant than those 
in the no photograph condition, this relationship was not mediated by emotional response or 
ratings of evidence sufficiency.  
In sum, results from several studies support the main tents of the CCM. However, many 
aspects of the model have been overlooked in prior research. Alicke (2000) conceptualizes SEs 
as emotional responses to event stimuli, but these only have been measured in one published 
study to date (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008). SEs may be elicited by multiple features of 
an event and an events’ actors (including actors’ physical characteristics such as race and 
attractiveness; Alicke, 1994), yet CCM researchers have primarily focused on attributions 
stemming from character manipulations. Extant research also has largely ignored the effects of 
SEs on specific SLAs and the factors that may influence attributional pathways. In applying the 
CCM to juror decision making in a malpractice case, the current research will address some of 






Figure 1. Potential Attributional Pathways as Specified by the CCM 
Path 1: Direct Spontaneous Evaluation Effects:  
A) Spontaneous evaluations (SEs) elicited by the plaintiff and/or other case features impact 
blame ascriptions without influencing structural linkage assessments (SLAs). 
Plaintiff and Case Features                SEs                   Blame (Case-related Judgments)  
Example: A juror experiences anger and disgust when she sees that the plaintiff is severely obese. These 
negative emotions (SEs) motivate the juror to directly blame the plaintiff for her negative outcome without 
considering case evidence and testimony and how they pertain to elements of intention, causality, and 
foresight (SLAs). 
 
B) SEs directly impact blame ascriptions, leading to modifications in SLAs to justify blame (blame 
is a full mediator between SEs and SLAs).            
 
Plaintiff and Case Features                  SEs                   Blame                  SLAs               
 
Example: A juror responds to the obese plaintiff with anger and disgust. These emotions motivate the juror 
to directly blame the plaintiff for her negative outcome. After the juror has decided that the plaintiff is to 
blame, he or she evaluates case evidence/testimony and SLAs in a based manner in order to support this 
attribution. 
     
Path 2:  Indirect Spontaneous Evaluation Effects:  Spontaneous evaluations (SEs) of the plaintiff 
and case features impact structural linkage assessments (SLAs), which then lead to blame 
ascriptions. 
 
Plaintiff and Case Features                  SEs                    SLAs                      Blame  
 
Example: A juror responds to the obese plaintiff with anger and disgust. These emotions in turn motivate 
the juror to interpret case evidence/testimony and SLAs in a manner consistent with their preferred 
conclusion, which is to find the plaintiff responsible and blameworthy for the negative outcome. 
Path 3: Direct and Indirect Spontaneous Evaluation Effects: SEs both directly and indirectly 
impacts blame ascriptions through SLAs (SLAs partially mediate the relationship between SEs 
and blame). 
             SLAs   
 
Plaintiff and Case Features                  SEs                                                      Blame       
 
Example: A juror responds to the obese plaintiff with anger and disgust. These emotions motivate the juror 
to blame the patient directly, but also motivate biased interpretations of evidence/testimony and SLAs 











Applicability of the Culpable Control Model to the Current Research 
 
 As the above review demonstrates, the CCM is the most appropriate attributional 
framework for understanding the influences of extra-legal factors on juror decision making. It is 
the only model that considers perceivers’ motivational biases, emotions, and social cognitive 
processes while allowing for graded judgments of responsibility for multiple actors. Despite its 
limitations, the CCM is flexible enough for use in applied settings and may explain how reactions 
towards stigmatized targets can further color attributions in other contexts (e.g., how initial 
reactions to a plaintiff’s weight can subsequently affect judgments in a malpractice case). 
 The CCM may be particularly useful in illuminating how anti-fat bias may construe juror 
judgments in a malpractice case involving an obese plaintiff. There are numerous reasons to 
believe that an obese plaintiff will elicit negative SEs, causing jurors to attribute more 
responsibility to the plaintiff and less responsibility to the physician for a negative outcome. 
First, obese targets often evoke anger among perceivers, who assume that the obese are 
responsible for their condition (Wiener et al., 1988). Second, obese individuals are commonly 
perceived as unlikeable and associated with a host of other negative characteristics (Puhl et al., 
2008). Third, there is likely a motivational component to anti-fat bias, as Crandall (1994) argued 
that prejudice against the overweight functions to re-affirm cultural worldviews based on belief 
in the Protestant Ethic. Not only do obese individuals elicit negative emotions and attitudes, but 
perceivers may be motivated to blame them for a negative medical outcome, even if the 
plaintiff’s weight is legally irrelevant. This contention is further supported by the JSM, which 
suggests that individuals are motivated to express genuine prejudices, or negative affective 





2003). Genuine prejudices may be likened to negative SEs in the CCM, and justifications often 
take the form of attributions for responsibility and blame (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).  
 Negative SEs may affect jurors’ attributional processes in a variety of ways. CCM 
research suggests that negative SEs elicited by an obese plaintiff may lead jurors to assess 
structural linkages in a manner supportive of anti-plaintiff judgments. This may be accomplished 
thorough biased processing of linkages related to the plaintiff’s behaviors, the defendant’s 
(physician’s) behaviors, or both. For example, jurors may be more likely to view the physician’s 
actions as compelled (e.g., the physician performed a risky surgery because he had no other 
choice) than freely chosen (e.g., the physician performed a risky surgery because he would be 
viewed favorably in the medical community if successful). More generally, jurors may 
exaggerate exculpatory evidence and dismiss inculpatory evidence, or heighten or lower 
evidential standards for blaming the defendant to support their preferred conclusion (Alicke, 
2000). Referring to Figure 1, these processes correspond to pathway 2 or pathway 3 (for cases in 
which SEs directly impact both SLAs and blame ascriptions). 
 Alternatively, if jurors’ anti-fat bias is particularly strong, they may immediately blame 
the obese plaintiff without any consideration of SLAs (see Figure 1, Path 1A). That is, they may 
automatically render an anti-plaintiff judgment on the basis of her weight while effectively 
ignoring the evidence and case facts. Finally, according to the CCM, some jurors may render 
immediate case judgments on the basis of plaintiff weight, and then modify their SLAs to cohere 
with these judgments (Path 3). This latter scenario is most consistent with the JSM, which posits 
that individuals release prejudices by blaming victims or members of disadvantaged groups for 
their situation and subsequently develop and express additional justifications to account for this 





 Ultimately, the CCM can be used to both account for juror bias and explain how such 
bias operates. Many studies have documented the influence of various extra-legal factors on 
juror decisions, but studies illuminating the processes responsible for this influence are less 
common (but see, e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008; Horowitz, 
Bordens, Victor, Bourgeios, & ForsterLee, 2001). As the CCM proposes that all attributions are 
subject to emotional, motivational, and cognitive biases, it can be used to enhance the 
understanding of juror decisions in a variety of cases, which may not necessarily involve a salient 
source of bias (e.g., the current study’s control condition involving a normal weight plaintiff). 
Such an understanding may not only help advance theory, but also may be valuable to legal 































Chapter 7: Overview of Study, Hypotheses, and Research Questions 
 
 The effects of anti-fat attitudes on behaviors and decision making concerning obese 
targets are well-documented (Crandall, 1995; Graziano et al., 2007; King et al., 2006; Puhl & 
Heuer, 2009). Thus, it is conceivable that jurors’ reactions to an overweight plaintiff may impact 
the outcome of a medical malpractice trial. Such influence may occur despite judicial 
admonitions to consider only case facts and evidence (see Chapter 4). Like other extra-legal 
factors, the impact of anti-fat bias on juror decision making may be relatively complex. The 
primary purpose of this research is to illuminate both the effects of plaintiff weight on juror 
decisions and the mechanisms (i.e., attributional processes) underlying these decisions. This 
investigation is appropriately grounded in the CCM and will be among the first to provide a full 
test of the model. In addition, this research will explore the impact of deliberations and juror 
characteristics on attributions and attributional processes in malpractice cases involving both 
obese and normal weight plaintiffs. 
 The design for this study will be a 2 (Plaintiff Weight: obese vs. normal) x 2 (Decision 
Context: individual vs. deliberating) factorial. All mock jurors will review a trial summary 
concerning allegations of medical malpractice during an ophthalmic surgery- specifically, a LASIK 
surgery intended to correct the plaintiff’s nearsightedness. Plaintiff weight will be manipulated 
by a photograph (purportedly of the plaintiff) on the trial summary cover sheet. Mock jurors in 
the “individual” condition will subsequently complete questionnaires designed to assess each 
component of the CCM. SEs will be measured by affective responses to the case and general 
perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant; SLAs will be measured via ratings of plaintiff and 
defendant foresight, causality, and intention, as well as by ratings of witness credibility. Case-





assessments will serve as a proxy for blame. It is expected that individual jurors in the obese 
plaintiff condition will render more anti-plaintiff judgments (as evidenced by attributions of 
responsibility to the plaintiff and defendant, verdicts, and damages awarded) than will those in 
the normal weight plaintiff condition. The CCM measures will be used in identifying the 
attributional pathways jurors follow in arriving at case conclusions. For instance, mediation 
analyses can help determine whether negative SEs elicited by the plaintiff or other case features 
affect interpretation of the evidence and other SLAs, which may in turn influence blame 
ascriptions (see Figure 1). 
 Participants assigned to the deliberating condition will review the trial summary 
independently, and then deliberate the case in groups of 4-6. Each jury will provide a group 
verdict and award damages if the defendant is found liable. Next, deliberating jurors will 
independently complete the same questionnaires as those in the individual condition to assess 
the effects of deliberation on individual attributional processes and case judgments. It is 
expected such that deliberations will attenuate (but perhaps not ameliorate) any effects of 
plaintiff weight on case-related judgments emerging among individual jurors; these attenuating 
effects may be present in both the group and independent judgments of deliberating jury 
members.  
 Finally, this study will explore the potential moderating effects of several individual 
differences on mock juror’s decisions and attributional processes. According to prior research 
(see Chapter 2), mock jurors scoring higher on measures on BJW, BPWE, and Anti-Fat Attitudes 
(AFAs) should be particularly inclined to render anti-plaintiff judgments in the obese condition. 
Such effects will likely be most pronounced in the individual juror condition, as these 





of anti-fat bias and need not justify their decisions to their peers. However, personality variables 
may influence independent case judgments among deliberating jurors, and may even impact 
group verdicts if several jury members have similar scores on measures of BJW, BPWE, and 
AFAs. As males tend to have stronger anti-fat attitudes than women and behave in accordance 
with those attitudes (Bannon et al., 2008; Graziano et al., 2007) it also is expected that men will 
render more anti-plaintiff judgments in the obese condition than will women.  
 Studies indicate that anti-fat attitudes among the overweight and obese are similar to 
those of their thinner counterparts (Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Teachman et al., 2003). Yet, it is 
unknown if such attitudes among this population translate into actual behaviors or even impact 
decision making. In rendering a critical decision impacting the life of an overweight plaintiff, 
overweight or obese jurors may be motivated to sympathize with the similarly overweight 
plaintiff despite their pre-existing AFAs. Recent research supports this possibility, finding that 
adult jurors (who presumably had higher BMIs or had struggled with their weight) were more 
likely to support an overweight plaintiff than were student jurors (who presumably had lower 
BMIs and had not experienced as many weight-related problems; Reichert et al., 2011). Thus, in 
the current research, it is anticipated that individual jurors with higher BMIs in the obese 
condition will render more pro-plaintiff judgments than will jurors with lower BMIs.  
The effects of mock jurors’ BMIs on case judgments may be more complex in the 
deliberating condition. Deliberating jurors’ susceptibility to bias often depends on the 
composition of their jury, especially if fellow jury members are similar to the target of potential 
bias (e.g., in the same ethnic or religious minority group; Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 
1995; Sommers, 2006). Based on this research and the principles of the JSM (Crandall & 





individuals should be more cognizant of anti-fat bias as it pertains to the case, leading to 
suppression of anti-fat attitudes during deliberation. This in turn will result in more pro-plaintiff 
judgments among such juries, which also may persevere in deliberating jurors’ independently 
rendered case judgments. Importantly, the effects of plaintiff weight still may be attenuated in 
juries comprised of normal weight individuals, as it is typically not socially permissible to openly 
express anti-fat bias (Crandall et al., 2002).   
Hypotheses and Research Questions Regarding Non-Deliberating Jurors 
 
 H1: There will be a main effect for the weight manipulation on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case 
judgments. Compared to participants in the normal weight condition, those in the obese 
condition will: 
 1A) Score higher on affective measures of negative SEs. 
1B)  Express more positive overall perceptions of the defendant and less positive overall 
perceptions of the plaintiff (measurements of general SEs). 
1C) Score lower on “pro-plaintiff” SLA measures higher on “pro-defendant” SLA 
measures. That is, they will be less likely to believe that the defendant intended, caused, 
and foresaw the negative outcomes of the ophthalmic surgery, and more likely to 
believe that the plaintiff intended, caused, and foresaw these negative outcomes (as 
evidenced by the general SLA measures). Further, those in the obese condition will rate 
the defense witnesses’ testimony as more convincing and the plaintiff witnesses’ 
testimony as less convincing. 
1D) Attribute more responsibility to the plaintiff and less responsibility to the defendant 
for the plaintiff’s situation. 





1F) Award fewer economic and non-economic damages if finding the defendant liable 
than those in the normal condition. 
H2: There will be an interaction between the weight manipulation and individual personality 
differences on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case judgments. Specifically, in the obese condition, 
increased scores on measures of BJW, BPWE and Anti-Fat Attitudes will result in: 
 2A) Higher scores on affective measures of negative SEs. 
 
2B) More positive overall perceptions of the defendant and less positive overall 
perceptions of the plaintiff. 
 2C) Lower “pro-plaintiff” and higher “pro-defendant” scores on SLA measures. 
 
2D) Increased attributions of responsibility to the plaintiff and decreased attributions of 
responsibility to the defendant for the plaintiff’s situation. 
 2E) Decreased likelihood of finding the defendant liable for medical malpractice. 
 
 2F) Decreased economic and non-economic damage awards if the defendant is found 
liable. 
 H3: There will be an interaction between the weight manipulation and gender on measures of 
SEs, SLAs, and case judgments. In the obese condition, compared to women, men will:  
 3A) Score higher on affective measures of negative SEs. 
 3B) Express more positive overall perceptions of the defendant and less positive overall  
 
 perceptions of the plaintiff. 
 
 3C) Score lower on “pro-plaintiff” and higher on “pro-defendant” SLA measures. 
 
3D) Attribute more responsibility to the plaintiff and less responsibility to the defendant 
for the plaintiff’s situation. 






 3F) Award fewer economic and non-economic damages if finding the defendant liable. 
H4: There will be an interaction between the weight manipulation and BMI on measures of SEs, 
SLAs, and case judgments. Specifically, increased participant BMI in the obese condition will 
result in: 
 4A) Lower scores on affective measures of negative SEs. 
4B) Less positive overall perceptions of the defendant and more positive overall 
perceptions of the plaintiff. 
 4C) Higher “pro-plaintiff” and lower “pro-defendant” scores on SLA measures. 
 
4D) Decreased attributions of responsibility to the plaintiff and increased attributions of  
 
responsibility to the defendant for the plaintiff’s situation. 
 
 4E) Increased likelihood of finding the defendant liable for medical malpractice. 
 
 4F) Increased non-economic damage awards if the defendant is found liable.  
 
RQ 1:  Does the weight manipulation moderate the attributional pathways followed in assigning 
blame? 
RQ 2: Do individual differences (scores on measures of BJW, BPWE, and AFAs; gender, BMI) 
affect measures of SEs, SLAs, and case judgments in the normal weight condition? 
RQ 3: Do individual differences moderate the effects of the weight manipulation on attributional 
pathways followed in assigning blame? 
Hypotheses and Research Questions Comparing Deliberating and Non-Deliberating Jurors and 
Juries 
H1: There will be an interaction between the weight manipulation and decision context: In the 





deliberating jurors at both the group and individual level. 
1A) Deliberating juries will be more likely to find the defendant liable (as indicated by 
group-level verdicts) than will non-deliberating jurors. 
 1B) Deliberating juries rendering liable verdicts will award higher economic and non- 
 
 economic damages than will non-deliberating jurors. 
1C) Deliberating jurors will be more likely to find the defendant liable (as indicated by 
individual-level verdicts obtained following submission of the group level verdict) than 
will non-deliberating jurors. 
1D) Deliberating jurors rendering liable verdicts will award higher economic and non-
economic damages than will non-deliberating jurors. 
1E) Compared to non-deliberating jurors, deliberating jurors will attribute more 
responsibility to the defendant and less responsibility to the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s 
situation.  
RQ 1) Do group level and individual level case judgments (i.e., verdicts and damage awards) 
differ among deliberating jurors? 
RQ 2) In the normal weight condition, are there differences between deliberating and non-
deliberating jurors on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case judgments? 














 A total of 460 undergraduate students (61. 8% female; mean age = 21.13 years, SD = 
7.53). participated in this study. As is required of actual jurors, students had to be at least 18 
years of age to participate. Participants were enrolled in courses offering credit for participation 
in social science research at one of four colleges: University of Nevada, Reno (UNR) Truckee 
Meadows Community College (TMCC), Western Nevada Community College (WNC), and 
University of South Florida (USF). Nearly half of the total sample was comprised of UNR students 
(48.5%, n = 223), followed by students at TMCC (32.2%, n = 148); USF (11.7%; n = 54); and WNC 
(7.6%, n = 35). Participants’ ethnic background was reported as follows: White/Non-Hispanic 
(58.2%); Hispanic/Latino(a) (15.3%); Black/African-American (9.4%); Multi-Ethnic (8.3%); 
Asian/Asian-American (4.8%); Native American (1.5%); Other (1.3%); and Pacific Islander (1.1%). 
A breakdown of demographic and condition assignment frequencies by participant college is 
displayed in Table 1. 
 According to G*Power, a power analysis program that can be used to calculate 
adequate sample sizes (http://www.psycho.uni-duesseldorf.de/aap/projects/gpower/), a 
minimum of 36 juries comprised of an average of 4.5 members is required to detect a medium 
effect for the proposed analyses (i.e, a series of regressions with up to three predictors). Thus, a 
minimum of 324 participants total (162 per Decision Context: individual vs. deliberating 
conditions) were needed to meet the basic objectives of the current research. More intensive 
statistical procedures such as mediation and path analyses may require a larger sample; thus, 





 A total of 203 participants were assigned to the non-deliberating condition, with 52.2% 
(n = 106) receiving the normal weight plaintiff manipulation and 48.7% (n = 97) receiving the 
obese plaintiff manipulation. The remaining 257 participants were assigned to the deliberating 
condition, which included a total of 53 jury groups, with 28 juries receiving the normal weight 
plaintiff manipulation and 25 receiving the obese plaintiff manipulation. The mean number of 




Variable               n/% of Non-Deliberating sample        n/% of Deliberating sample          Total N/% 
 
Weight Condition 
   Normal                                    106/52.2%                    134/52.1%                             240/52.2% 
   Obese                                        97/47.8%                                 123/47.9%                             220/47.8% 
 
College                                         
   UNR                                        120/59.1%                                  103/40.1%                             223/48.5% 
   TMCC                                        53/26.1%                                    95/37.0%                             148/32.2% 
   WNC                                            0/0%                                         35/13.6%                                35/07.6%   
   USF                                            30/14.8%                                    24/09.3%                               54/11.7% 
 
Gender                                          
   Female                                   123/60.9%                                   160/62.5%                            283/61.8% 
   Male                                         79/39.1%                                     96/37.5%                             175/38.2% 
 
Ethnicity 
   White/Caucasian                   116/57.4%                                 150/58.8%                             266/58.2% 
   Hispanic/Latino(a)                   25/12.4%                                    45/17.6%                               70/15.3% 
   Black/African American          25/12.4%                                    18/07.0%                               43/09.4% 
   Asian/Asian American               9/04.5%                                    13/05.1%                               22/04.8% 
   Multi-Ethnic                              19/09.4%                                    19/07.5%                              38/08.3% 
   Other                                            8/04.0%                                    10/04.0%                              18/02.9% 
 
Note. Total N = 460. Adding figures from non-deliberating and deliberating samples reported for 
demographic variables may be fewer than 460 due to missing data. Total sample age M = 23.13 
years, SD = 7.53. Non-deliberating sample age M = 23.97, SD = 8.13. Deliberating sample age M 






participants on each jury was 4.85 (SD = .82), with 22 four-member juries, 17 five-member 
juries, and 14 six-member juries. Table 2 displays demographic and weight condition assignment 
frequencies by decision context (i.e., deliberating vs. non-deliberating participants).    
Procedure 
 
 Recruitment and condition assignment. Participant recruitment procedures varied 
across colleges. All UNR participants were either recruited electronically or in-person by the 
primary researcher. Electronic recruitment occurred via a UNR sponsored website (the SONA 
system) which informs UNR undergraduates of various research participation opportunities. 
Individuals accessing this site were given a brief description of the study’s purpose, procedures, 
and compensation. Those choosing to participate scheduled a one hour session at a secure lab 
on campus via the SONA system. Upon obtaining permission from instructors, the primary 
researcher also visited select UNR undergraduate classes to inform students of this research 
participation opportunity. UNR participants recruited in-person either scheduled a session at the 
researchers’ laboratory or chose to participate in their classroom (which was reserved for 
privacy) following their class.  
 Recruitment procedures for TMCC participants were similar to the UNR procedures, 
except that TMCC students cannot participate in SONA electronic recruitment. Instead, TMCC 
instructors forwarded an email invitation to participate to their students, who then contacted 
the primary researcher to schedule a participation session at the secure laboratory on the UNR 
campus. Upon obtaining permission from administration and instructors, the primary researcher 
also visited select TMCC classes to offer students the opportunity to participate in the study 





 The primary researcher sought permission to conduct the study from one WNC and one 
USF instructor, who then informed their students of the opportunity to participate in exchange 
for extra credit during an upcoming scheduled class period. Students electing to participate 
reported to their classroom at the normal scheduled class time for their session. WNC sessions 
were conducted by the primary researcher, and USF sessions were conducted by a CITI certified 
research assistant supervised by the USF course instructor. Telephone training sessions were 
held between the primary researcher and the USF course instructor and research assistant to 
ensure that study protocol and procedures were followed during the USF sessions. Permission 
was sought and obtained from the University of Nevada, Reno Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
to conduct the study at all four locations, and no separate approval was required from the USF 
IRB. Across institutions, all students were assured that their participation was completely 
voluntary and were offered an alternate opportunity to earn course credit (e.g., reading and 
summarizing a research article) if they decided not to participate in this study. Students were 
informed that the study would last between 45-60 minutes. As conducted, all study sessions 
lasted between 30-60 minutes. 
 Due to recruitment challenges, random assignment to non-deliberating and deliberating 
conditions was not possible. In general, participants were assigned to the deliberating condition 
when an adequate amount of participants were present to form deliberating groups, and were 
assigned to the non-deliberating condition when fewer than four participants arrived at each 
scheduled session. There were some exceptions to this rule. In study sessions conducted at 
TMCC, for example, some large sessions (e.g., > 20 participants) were assigned to the non-
deliberating condition and completed all measures individually whereas other groups of similar 





juries. This was done in an effort to ensure representativeness of both non-deliberating and 
deliberating participants in the community college sample. Yet, most deliberating jurors 
participated with several others in a private classroom setting, and most non-deliberating jurors 
participated in the UNR laboratory simply due to convenience and recruitment issues.   
 After assignment to the “decision context” condition (i.e., non-deliberating vs. 
deliberating), individual participants or juries were randomly assigned to either the 
obese/normal plaintiff condition using the Research Randomizer (http://www.randomizer.org/) 
, an online tool that assists researchers in preparing research materials for random assignment 
based on the particular study design and estimated number of participants. Juror questionnaire 
packets were pre-assembled in a specific order based on research randomizer output and were 
coded as “ND/N, ND/O, D/N, and D/O” according to condition (ND = Non-deliberating, D = 
Deliberating, O = Obese Plaintiff, N = Normal weight plaintiff) and then distributed to 
participants in the randomized order. Deliberating packets also included a letter code (e.g., Jury 
A, Jury K) that represented a jury group. All deliberating packets with the same letter code also 
included the same weight manipulation, so that all members of a particular jury either viewed 
the normal weight or obese plaintiff. During large classroom deliberating sessions, the 
deliberating packets were shuffled and distributed so that members of a jury group were spread 
throughout the classroom, rather than composed of students who chose to sit next to each 
other. 
 Study sessions. All participants first received an information sheet targeting individual 
(see Appendix B) or deliberating jurors (see Appendix C), depending on their condition. These 
information sheets are largely identical in describing the purpose, procedures, and 





further explains that participants will be asked to discuss the case and render a verdict in a small 
group. Participants were given a few minutes to review the information sheet, ask questions, 
and withdraw their participation if they desired (no participants withdrew over the course of 
this study). After reviewing the information sheet, each participant received their juror 
questionnaire packet, which included all individual questionnaires, the weight manipulation, and 
the trial summary. An adhesive “Juror ID” tag was attached to the top of each packet. These tags 
displayed an individualized code used for questionnaire identification and matching purposes. 
Tags for non-deliberating participants displayed a numeric code (e.g., Juror # 101, Juror # 102), 
whereas tags for deliberating participants included a letter code corresponding to their jury 
group as well as a unique numeric identifier (e.g., Juror # J-102). Participants were instructed to 
wear these tags during their study session because actual jurors often wear identification tags. 
The tags also helped deliberating participants identify other members of their jury group in 
larger sessions. The final page of the juror packet questionnaire instructed participants to 
remove their adhesive tag and affix it to that page so that each packet was marked with a 
unique but anonymous participant and jury group identifier. 
 The Juror ID Tags also were used by the investigators to match respondents’ observed 
body type with their questionnaire responses. Though participants were asked to report their 
height and weight in a demographics questionnaire, self-estimates of height and weight in 
particular may not be accurate. Thus, when possible, the experimenters surreptitiously recorded 
participants’ body shape using a figural scale that corresponds with individuals’ actual BMI (Bulik 
et al., 2001; see Appendix D). At any point during a study session, the experimenter entered the 
code displayed on the participants’ Juror ID Tag followed by the figural scale code that most 





figural scale code could then be matched to participants’ reported height and weight to 
determine whether self-reported BMI data adhered to experimenter observations. It should be 
noted that the experimenters were only able to code and record participant body shape during 
certain sessions, which were most often conducted in the UNR laboratory with no more than six 
participants. Surreptitiously coding and recording body shape proved to be too difficult for most 
classroom sessions.     
  Participants were told not to “look ahead” in their juror questionnaire packets and to 
wait for experimenter instructions before continuing with any particular section. The first part of 
the packet was comprised of two questionnaires designed to assess “their beliefs about people 
and the world in general” (i.e., the BJW and BPWE measures, see Appendix E). These 
assessments were obtained first in accordance with MacKinnon’s (2008) recommendation that 
potential moderating variables be measured prior to anticipated main effects if possible. 
 After completing the BJW and BPWE measures, all participants were asked to carefully 
read a trial summary detailing allegations of medical malpractice prior to, during, and following 
LASIK eye surgery. The summaries included different instructions for non-deliberating (see 
Appendix F) and deliberating (see Appendix G) jurors. All participants were permitted to take 
notes regarding the information presented, as is commonly allowed during civil trials (American 
Judicature Society, 2009). Photographs of the plaintiff and defendant appeared on the cover of 
the trial summary; the plaintiff’s photograph was digitally altered so that she either appeared to 
be obese (see Appendix H) or at a normal weight (see Appendix I). 
  Upon reviewing the trial summary, participants in the non-deliberating condition were 
instructed to take 15 minutes to think about the case  and encouraged to write down any 





intended to ensure that any differences emerging between non-deliberating and deliberating 
jurors were in fact due to the deliberation process, rather than to the passage of time or less 
cognitive engagement among non-deliberating jurors (see McCoy et al., 1999). After this 15-
minute time period elapsed, non-deliberating jurors were told to continue and complete the 
remaining pages in their juror packet, which included a series of questionnaires regarding their 
reactions to and judgments about the case. The majority of these items also were designed to 
assess attributional processes and attributions in accordance with the CCM. Participants first 
responded to items regarding their emotional reactions to the case and their overall evaluations 
of the plaintiff and defendant (proxies for spontaneous evaluations; see Appendix J). Next, they 
completed a series of items targeting their interpretation of the information provided in the trial 
summary and their perceptions of the degree to which the plaintiff and defendant intended, 
caused, or foresaw the negative medical outcome (proxies for SLAs, see Appendix K). Non-
deliberating jurors then rendered case judgments (see Appendix L) regarding responsibility of 
the plaintiff and defendant for the negative outcome, liability, and damages awarded to the 
plaintiff.  
 After individually reviewing the trail summary, participants in the deliberating condition 
conferred with their fellow “jury members,” or other participants assigned to the same jury 
group. Groups were instructed to deliberate as actual jurors and discuss the available evidence 
and case facts until they reached a conclusion. Deliberating groups were allowed 30 minutes to 
agree on verdict and damages judgments. Juries unable to render a verdict after 30 minutes 
were given an additional 5 minutes and encouraged to reach a collective decision; if no decision 
was reached, they were declared a hung jury. This is similar to a “dynamite charge,” which is a 





Allen (1896). Each “jury” submitted a collective verdict form assessing liability and damages 
awarded to the plaintiff if the defendant is found liable (see Appendix M). After submitting the 
collective jury verdict form, each jury member then independently responded to a series of 
questionnaires identical to those distributed to participants in the non-deliberating condition in 
order to obtain a better understanding of their individual case perspectives. Importantly, 
deliberating jurors received verbal and written instructions to draw on their own personal 
perceptions and judgments about the case when responding to these items, rather than on the 
perspectives of other jurors shared during deliberations or their jury’s collective case decisions. 
 In the last phase of the study, all participants completed the short form of the Fat 
Phobia Scale (Bacon, Scheltema, & Robinson, 2001; see Appendix N), a measure of anti-fat 
attitudes and beliefs. This individual difference measure was administered at the end rather 
than the beginning of the study to help minimize response bias in the CCM and case judgments 
measures. Finally, participants provided demographic information, including height and weight 
to calculate BMI (see Appendix O). They were thanked for their participation, encouraged to 
contact the researchers with any questions or concerns, and received a debriefing form further 
explaining the purpose of the study (see Appendix P).    
Materials 
 
 Independent and individual difference variables. 
  
 Trial summary and photographs. All participants reviewed the same medical 
malpractice trial summary involving plaintiff allegations of physician negligence prior to, during, 
and following LASIK eye surgery (see Appendices E-F).The trial summary was adapted from an 
actual claim filed against an eye surgeon, with additional details added to facilitate tests of the 





ensure participant comprehension and that the case was relatively balanced in favor of the 
plaintiff and defendant. The first pre-test included 20 participants, with 35% (n =7) finding the 
defendant liable and 65% (n = 13) finding the defendant not liable after reading the first trial 
summary draft. This draft was then modified to make the defendant appear more at fault and 
again pre-tested on a group of 33 participants, with 54.5% (n = 18) rendering a verdict of liable 
and 45.5% (n = 15) rendering a verdict of not liable. This was considered an adequate verdict 
distribution and all participants indicated that they understood the information presented. 
Consequently, the trial summary and was not further modified.  
 A cover sheet was attached to each summary that displayed the case name, case 
number and photographs of both the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant’s photograph 
remained constant across conditions. The plaintiff’s photograph, however, was digitally altered 
according to condition, making her appear “normal” (see Appendix H) or obese (see Appendix 
G). 
 BJW measure. Participants’ belief in a just world was measured using the BJW-Other 
scale (BJW-O; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996), which was developed from Lipkus’ earlier GBJW 
scale (1991). This scale is designed to asses individual’s beliefs that others around them “get 
what they deserve and deserve what they get” (Lipkus et al., 1996, p. 665), rather than the 
belief that the word is just or unjust for oneself. The BJW-O scale is appropriate for the current 
research as it examines how just world beliefs affect jurors’ attributions of trial participants’ 
responsibility, focusing on the influence of the plaintiff’s characteristics in this process. It 
consists of 8 items with responses occurring on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = Strongly 
Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. Responses to all items are averaged so that higher scores 





research (Bennett, 2008), and is a robust measure with an average Cronbach’s alpha of .84 
(Lipkus, 1996).   
 BPWE measure. The Protestant Ethic Scale (PES; Katz & Hass, 1988), a shortened version 
of Mirels and Garrett’s (1971) measure, assessed the degree to which participants endorse the 
protestant work ethic. Participants indicate their level of agreement with a series of 11 
statements using a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree. 
Responses are averaged so that higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of the PWE. This 
scale is often employed in research examining the correlates of anti-fat bias (e.g., Crandall, 
1994; Quinn & Crocker, 1999), with a reported reliability of ∝ = .76 (Katz & Hass, 1988).  
 Anti-fat attitudes. Participants completed the 14-item Fat Phobia Scale (FPS; Bacon, 
Scheltema, & Robinson, 2001), which is designed to assess anti-fat attitudes and beliefs. This 
semantic differential 5-point scale presents participants with two bipolar adjective and instructs 
participants to place an “x” near the adjective which they feel best describes fat people. Items 1, 
2, 8, 11, 13, and 14 are reverse-scored, with the total responses averaged so that higher scores 
indicate stronger anti-fat attitudes. The FPS is highly reliable with reported Chronbach’s alphas 
ranging from .87 - .91 (Bacon et al., 2001) and is routinely used in investigations of anti-fat bias 
(e.g., McClure, Puhl, & Heuer, 2011; Puhl, Warton, & Heuer, 2009; Poon & Tarrant, 2009).  
 Demographics. This brief questionnaire asks participants to report their gender, age, 
ethnicity, weight, and height. In addition, it also asks participants whether they have had LASIK 
surgery or a similar procedure and whether they or anyone close to them has been the victim of 
medical malpractice. Those answering “yes” to either question are prompted to elaborate on 
their experience. Responses to this questionnaire were used to detect any significant individual 





examine the impact of prior experience with eye surgery on jurors’ judgments. Potential main or 
moderating effects of participants’ BMI (a reliable measure of body fatness, obtained from 
reported height and weight; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011) and gender also 
were explored. 
 Body type. When possible, researchers visually assessed participants’ body type using 
the Stunkard Figural Rating Scale (SFRS; Stunkard, Sorensen, & Shulsinger, 1983). This scale 
consists of nine numbered figures representing female body shapes and nine figures 
representing male body shapes, which each correspond to a BMI range. Lower numbers indicate 
a thinner body shape, whereas higher numbers indicate an overweight or obese body shape. For 
women, a rating of 1 = underweight; ratings of 2-4 = healthy weight, a rating of 5 = overweight, 
and ratings of 6 or greater = obese. For men, ratings of 1-4 = healthy weight, ratings of 5-6 = 
overweight, and ratings of 7 or greater = obese (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2011). The SFRS has proven a valid and reliable means of visually assessing body shape and BMI 
since its inception (Lynch, Liu, Wei, Spring, Kiefe, & Greenland, 2008) with reported Cronbach’s 
alphas ranging from .83-.90 (Bulik, Wade, Heath, Martin, Stunkard, & Eaves, 2001; Thompson & 
Altabe, 1991). 
 Dependent variables. 
 
 Spontaneous evaluation measures. Alicke (1994; 2000; 2008) asserted that 
spontaneous evaluations may encompass both affective responses to an event and/or the 
actors and involved and general perceptions of actors. To date, there are no validated, 
published measures of SEs within the context of the CCM. Thus, this research used participants’ 
affective responses to the case and their overall perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant as 





the extent to which they experienced each in reaction to the case using a 5-point Likert scale 
where 1  = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely. These affective descriptions and response 
scales were adapted from the Positive and Negative Affective Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) and the Juror Negative Affect Scale (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). Some of these 
items are intended as “filler” material (i.e., “surprised,” “relaxed”), whereas items 2 (“angry”), 4 
(“disgusted”) and 6 (“resentful”) describe common emotional reactions toward obese targets 
(Pryor et al., 2004; Weiner et al., 1988; Weiner, 2006). Next, participants indicated their overall 
perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant using a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = extremely 
negative and 7 = extremely positive (adapted from Reichert et al., 2011). Importantly, such 
negative emotional responses and perceptions of trial participants are common among medical 
malpractice jurors (Feigenson, 2000; Vidmar, 1995). These negative SEs may occur in both the 
obese and normal weight conditions and be used to help understand attributional processes and 
attributions accordingly; however, more pronounced negative SEs in the obese condition would 
be attributable to the weight manipulation. 
 Structural Linkage Assessments (SLAs). Aside from basic assessments of causal 
attributions, there are currently no published or established measures of SLAs in terms of the 
CCM. Consequently, 17 items were developed to measure participants’ SLAs regarding the 
allegation of medical malpractice in this study. The first set of 12 items are designed to measure 
the three specific SLAs pertaining to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s actions (6 parallel items for 
each actor) related to the surgical error and resulting patient complications, with responses 
occurring on a 7-point (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) Likert scale. For both actors, 
items 1 and 6 correspond to participants’ perceptions of causal control, 2 and 5 correspond to 





According to Alicke (2000), SEs can affect SLAs more generally by altering perceivers’ 
perceptions of case evidence and testimony. Thus, participants also were asked to rate the 
witnesses’ testimony (5 items) using a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = Not Convincing and 7 = 
Very Convincing.  
 Jury Case Judgments. Following deliberations, each jury rendered its collective decision 
regarding liability and damage awards via a “jury verdict form;” responses were approved by all 
members of the jury (see Appendix I). The jury indicated whether they found the defendant 
liable for medical malpractice (yes or no). If the defendant was found liable, the jury was asked 
to select the amounts awarded in economic and economic damages from a series of 18 options 
ranging from $0.00 to $450,000.00, separated by $25,000.00 increments. Actual juries provide 
their own unique damage awards rather than selecting awards from a series of options, though 
the plaintiff’s attorney will typically specify appropriate damage awards (Feigenson, 2000). For 
the purposes of the current study, however, juries were asked to indicate their awards using a 
scale to avoid the irregular data that often result from open-ended damage assessments.  
 Individual Juror Case Judgments. All participants (deliberating and non-deliberating) 
provided their own personal judgments about the case, which may or may not align with their 
jury’s case-related judgments. First, participants indicated the degree to which they believed 1) 
the physician and 2) the patient are responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries using a 7-point Likert 
scale where 1= Not at all responsible and 7 = Completely responsible. These measures were 
included because Alicke (2000, 2008) asserted that responsibility attributions are a product of 
SEs, SLAs, or both, and similar but not equivalent to blame attributions. In addition, these 
measures allowed for more precise assessment of plaintiff/defendant responsibility attributions 





case judgments are similar to those appearing on the jury verdict form; jurors were asked to 
render an individual verdict (the defendant is/is not liable for medical malpractice) and, if 













































Chapter 9: Scoring and Pre-Analyses 
 
Coding of IVs and “Nominal Groups” 
 Within the “weight manipulation” variable, participants in the normal weight condition 
were assigned a code of “0,” and participants in the obese condition were assigned a code of 
“1.” Similarly, those in the non-deliberating condition were assigned a code of “0” pertaining to 
this variable, whereas, those in the deliberating condition were assigned a code of “1.”  
 Deliberating participants were assigned a numeric “Jury ID” code (ranging from 1-53) 
representing the jury group to which they belonged. Non-deliberating participants also were 
assigned to “nominal groups,” or imaginary jury groups so that statistical comparisons could be 
made between deliberating and non-deliberating participants within a nested context. That is, 
each non-deliberating participant was assigned to a hypothetical jury and received a 
corresponding Jury ID code (ranging from 60-102). In assigning non-deliberating participants to 
hypothetical jury groups, participant data were first separated according to their college and 
weight condition so that individuals were only assigned to a jury group if fellow members were 
from the same institution and received the same weight manipulation. The Research 
Randomizer was again used to assign non-deliberating participants to nominal “jury” groups 
within colleges and weight conditions. Though efforts were made to replicate the same 
proportion of jury members per group as in the deliberating sample, this proved difficult with 
the restraints of creating nominal groups by college and weight condition. The mean number of 
non-deliberating participants in each nominal jury group was 4.83 (SD = .75), with 19 four-
member juries, 15 five-member juries, and 7 six-member juries. The non-deliberating nominal 
jury groups were only used in comparisons between non-deliberating and deliberating 





Scoring of Individual Difference Variables 
 Gender was simply coded as 0 = female and 1 = male. Participants’ total scores on the 
BJW-O scale, BPWE scale, and FPS were obtained by averaging responses to all individual scale 
items, accounting for the reverse-coded items in the FPS. Participants with missing data for 
more than two items in each item scale were assigned a missing value for their total scale score 
and excluded from further analyses. For each measure, higher scores indicate a stronger 
tendency toward the personality or belief variable in question (i.e., belief in a just world, belief 
in the protestant ethic, anti-fat attitudes). Cronbach’s alphas calculated for each measure using 
the current sample yielded reliability estimates as follows: BJW-O α = .69; PES α = .77; FPS α = 
.86. All estimates fell within the acceptable range of ≥.70 except for BJW-O, which was 
sufficiently close to the cutoff point given sample size to be included in analyses without any 
modifications (John & Benet-Martínez, 2000). 
 Participants’ BMI was calculated using the following formula: Reported Height in 
Inches2/Reported Weight in lbs x 703 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Higher 
BMI scores indicate increased body fat. Specific BMI categorizations are as follows: < 18.5 = 
Underweight, 18.5 – 24.9 = Normal weight, 25 – 29.9 = Overweight, and ≤ 30.0 = Obese (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). In the current study, BMI is treated as a continuous 
variable.  
 Surreptitiously coding the body type of participants using the SFRS (see Appendix D) 
proved to be more challenging than anticipated, especially during larger study sessions. It was 
difficult to view Juror ID tags from a distance in classroom, and most participants remained 
seated except for when they moved to deliberate with their assigned groups, which did not 





investigator to submit their questionnaire packets, their ID tags had already been removed and 
affixed to the packet. Because of these issues, SFRS ratings were obtained for only 40.9% (n = 
188) of the total sample. These participants received a code of 1 – 9 based on the degree to 
which their observed body shape matched the figural stimuli corresponding to each number. 
Lower ratings represent thinner figures and higher ratings represent overweight or obese body 
figures. SFRS ratings and BMIs were very strongly correlated, r(185) = .92, p < .01. Though SFRS 
ratings will not be used as an independent variable in subsequent analyses, they do help support 
the validity of BMI estimates based on participants’ self-reported height and weight.      
Scoring of Dependent Variables and Scale Development 
  
 Spontaneous evaluations. Participants’ reported levels of anger, disgust, and 
resentment experienced in response to the trial summary indicate the magnitude of their 
negative SEs elicited by case aspects and/or actors involved. Scores on these three measures 
were summed and averaged to create a negative SE scale, α = .74, with higher scores indicating 
more negative SEs. Though participants’ overall perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant were 
significantly correlated, r(457) = -.42, p < 01., these are considered as separate but related 
measures of SEs, with lower scores indicating more negative reactions to each trial participant, 
respectively. 
 SLA scale development. As described in the Measures section, a twelve item scale with 
two subsets of six parallel items for the plaintiff and defendant was developed to assess 
participants’ perceptions of the criteria commonly considered when ascribing blame (SLAs). 
Because no one has attempted to test the specific SLAs proposed by the CCM, these items were 
developed based on theory and examples of each structural link provided by Alicke (2000, 





to which this scale represented the three SLAs (behavior control, causal control and outcome 
control) proposed by the CCM. 
 First, a reliability analysis was conducted including all 12 scale items (with items reverse-
coded as necessary), and item-total correlations were obtained. This initial analysis yielded a 
Chronbah’s alpha of .78, and indicated that all items were positively correlated with one 
another except for item 2 in the defendant subscale, which had a negative correlation. Scale 
reliability increased to α = .80 after this item was removed and all subsequent analyses were 
conducted using the 11 remaining items. 
 Initial exploratory analyses (i.e., correlations, reliabilities calculated using various groups 
of items hypothesized to represent the same underlying constructs, confirmatory factor 
analyses examining the items by target and decision context) suggested that the scale may be 
unitary rather than representative of three distinct factors. Thus, a principal components 
analysis extracting a single factor was conducted. All factor loadings exceeded .34 with the 
exception of item 1 in the plaintiff subscale, with a loading of .24, suggesting a unitary measure 
(Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  
 Because the CCM suggests that all SLAs are related (Alicke, 2000) and because 
correlational analysis indicated that most scale items were in fact positively and significantly 
related, a factor analysis using principal axis factoring and promax rotation was then conducted 
with the 11 SLA scale items. This analysis yielded two factors with eigenvalues >1, with the first 
factor accounting for 38.52% of the variance and the second factor accounting for 15.78% of the 
variance. Factor loadings were not consistent with the theoretical proposition of unique SLA 
groups, because different items intended to measure the causal, behavioral, and outcome links 





the factors were highly correlated at .63, and correlations > .51 indicate a unitary scale (Floyd & 
Widaman, 1995). Thus, these 11 items were summed and averaged to create a single SLA scale 
(α = .80) with plaintiff items 1, 2, 5, and 6 reverse coded and defendant items 3 and 4 reverse 
coded. Participants answering fewer than 9 of the 11 items were not included in the SLA scale. 
The scale ranged from 1-7, with higher scores indicating more pro-plaintiff attributions and 
lower scores indicating more pro-defendant attributions.   
 Ratings of witness testimony (additional SLA measures). The three items measuring the 
plaintiff’s witnesses’ convincingness were averaged to create a Plaintiff Witness Ratings 
measure, α = .84. Possible values range from 1-7, with higher scores indicating more positive 
perceptions of plaintiff witnesses and lower scores indicating more negative perceptions. 
Similarly, the two items measuring the defendant’s witnesses’ convincingness were averaged to 
create a defendant witness ratings measure, α = .68. Though reliability for the defendant 
witness ratings measure was slightly below the commonly accepted cutoff point of .70, both 
items were positively and significantly correlated, r(456) = -.52, p < .01, which justified the 
combination of these two items into a single measure (John & Benet-Martínez, 2000). 
 Case-related judgments. Case-related judgments were conceptualized as measures of 
blame within the context of the CCM for both deliberating and non-deliberating jurors and jury 
groups. Individual verdicts for both deliberating and non-deliberating jurors were coded as 0 = 
not liable and 1 = liable. Jury verdicts, representing the verdict agreed upon by the entire jury 
and considered in analyses as a group level variable, were coded as 0 = not liable, 1 = liable, and 
2 = hung. Damages awarded at the group level (agreed upon by the entire jury) and individual 





amount chosen from the options provided. It should be again noted that only juries and jurors 
finding the defendant liable were instructed to award damages.  
 Individual jurors’ assessments of plaintiff and defendant responsibility, with higher 
scores indicating more responsibility attributed to each actor, also were used as a CCM outcome 
measure (a proxy for blame) per Alicke’s (2000) recommendation. It was initially anticipated 
that these assessments might not be complementary (i.e., participants may assign substantial 
responsibility to both the plaintiff and defendant). However, when the plaintiff responsibility 
item was reverse coded, Cronbach’s alpha for the two responsibility items was .82, and both 
items were strongly correlated, r(453) = .70, p < .01. Thus, these two items were summed and 
averaged to yield a total responsibility measure ranging from 1-7, with lower scores indicating 
more responsibility assigned to the plaintiff and higher scores indicating more responsibility 
assigned to the defendant.  
Data Screening and Transformations 
 Prior to exploring the hypotheses and research questions, the data were examined using 
SPSS to ensure that the basic assumptions of all planned statistical tests were satisfied. All 
dependent and   individual difference variables were assessed for normality both independently 
and with weight condition and decision context as factors. These assessments included visual 
inspection (e.g., histograms, Q-Q plots), descriptives, and tests for normality (i.e., skew, kurtosis, 
Kolomgorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests). The vast majority of dependent and individual 
difference variables appeared to be normally distributed across all conditions, with two 
exceptions (participant age and BMI). Aside from these two aforementioned individual 
difference variables, skew and kurtosis values fell between -1 and 1, and no substantial outliers 





(e.g., the FPS, plaintiff and defendant Witness measures, and the total responsibility measure). 
However, all other indicators suggested that these variables were normally distributed and no 
corrective procedures were applied. 
 Two individual difference variables clearly violated normality assumptions. Exploration 
of the age variable revealed a skew value of 2.98 and a kurtosis value of 10.22; moreover, the 
boxplot identified numerous “extreme outliers,” or cases with values more than three times the 
height of the box. Given the high skew value, an inverse transformation was applied to the age 
variable. Though the newly transformed age variable did not meet all requirements for 
normality, it was substantially improved with a skew value of 1.34 and kurtosis value of 1.43. 
Though several outliers remained, all extreme outliers were eliminated by this procedure. The 
newly transformed age variable was then multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation of results. 
Similarly, exploration of the BMI variable revealed substantial positive skew (1.20), a kurtosis 
value of 1.49, and several extreme outliers. A logarithm transformation was applied, which 
decreased the skew and kurtosis values to .70 and .18, respectively, and also eliminated all 
extreme outliers. 
   Multivariate normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity were assessed via examination 
of bivariate scatterplots and residuals plots (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005); no severe deviations 
were noted. For each analysis conducted, steps were taken to ensure that all appropriate 
assumptions were met. Unless otherwise noted, all Tolerance values exceeded .10 and all VIF 
values were less than 5, indicating the absence of multicollinearity (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). 
Mahalanobis and Cook’s distances were saved to identify any cases that may have a 
disproportionate influence on results. If Mahalanobis and/or Cook’s distances exceeded 





question was conducted a second time with the violating cases removed. Removing such cases 
did not substantially impact results in any case, and all reported results include all applicable 
cases. 
Exploring Individual Differences across Conditions 
 A series of chi-square analyses and two-way ANOVAs with plaintiff weight and decision 
context as factors were conducted to detect any significant differences in demographic and 
other individual difference variables across conditions. Chi-square analyses revealed no 
significant differences pertaining to gender and condition assignment (χ 2 = .12, p = .73). As 
illustrated in Table 2, all WNC participants were assigned to the deliberating condition for 
convenience purposes (i.e., to ensure that an adequate sample of deliberating participants was 
obtained to conduct the study) thus creating non-equivalence across conditions. After excluding 
WNC participants, chi-square analyses also revealed that TMCC participants were significantly 
more likely to be assigned to the deliberating condition than were UNR and USF participants, χ 2 
(2, N = 425) = 13.06, p = .01.  
 Due to small cell sizes, the ethnicity variable was collapsed into two categories to 
examine differences in condition assignment (White/Non-Hispanic vs. Other Ethnicity). Chi-
square analyses indicated a significant difference in assignment to weight condition, χ 2 (1, N = 
457) = 6.12, p = .01. Within the obese plaintiff condition, 64.5% (n = 140) of participants 
identified as White/Non-Hispanic, whereas 35.8% identified with other ethnic backgrounds (n = 
78). The proportion of participants in the normal weight condition was more balanced 







Table 2. Condition Assignment and Demographics of Participants by College 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable                                    UNR n/%                   TMCC n/%                 WNC n/%                  USF n/% 
                                                  (N = 223)                    (N = 148)                    (N = 35)                     (N = 54)   
 
Decision context 
   Non-Deliberating                120/53.8%                 53/35.8%                 35/100.0%                30/55.6% 
   Deliberating                         103/46.2%                 95/64.2%                   0/0%                        24/44.4% 
 
Weight Condition 
   Normal                                 122/54.7%               79/53.4%                 12/34.3%                  27/50.0% 
   Obese                                   102/45.3%                 69/46.6%                  23/65.7%                  27/50.0% 
 
Gender                       
   Female                                 138/62.2%                  99/67.3%                  22/62.9%                 24/44.4% 
   Male                                       84/37.8%                  48/32.7%                  13/37.1%                 30/55.6% 
 
Ethnicity 
   White/Caucasian               146/65.8%                  80/54.8%                  21/60.0%                  19/35.2% 
   Hispanic/Latino(a)               26/11.7%                  26/17.8%                    7/20.0%                  11/20.4% 
   Black/African American     13/05.9%                  10/06.8%                     1/02.9%                  19/35.2% 
   Asian/Asian American        18/08.1%                    3/02.1%                     1/02.9%                    0/0% 
   Multi-Ethnic                         14/06.3%                  20/13.7%                     1/02.9%                    3/05.6% 
   Other                                       5/02.4%                    7/04.9%                      4/10.7%                   2/02.8% 
 
Note. Adding figures reported for demographic variables may be fewer than the total N by 
college due to missing data. Total sample age M = 23.13 years, SD = 7.53. UNR sample age M = 
22.30, SD = 6.91; TMCC sample age M = 24.71, SD = 9.08; WNC sample age M = 23.78, SD = 8.27; 
USF sample age M = 21.79, SD = 2.25. 
 
 Two way ANOVAs revealed no differences no significant differences in scores on the FPS 
and in participant BMI across conditions (Fs < 1.25, ps > .10). There was a small but significant 
difference in BPWE scores within the weight condition (F [1, 458] = 4.20, p = .04, ηp2 = .01), such 
that participants exposed to the obese plaintiff had slightly higher BPWE scores (M = 4.65, SE = 
.53) than those exposed to the normal weight plaintiff (M = 4.50, SE = .50). Conversely, those 





than those exposed to the normal weight plaintiff (M = 2.84, SD = .51), F(1, 458) = 4.50, p = .04, 
ηp2 = .01. There was also an interaction between condition assignment and BJW-O scores, with a 
greater difference in scores between weight conditions for deliberating participants 
(Deliberating/Obese M = 2.66, SD = .54; Deliberating/Normal M = 2.87, SD = .48; Non-
deliberating/Obese M = 2.79, SD = .54; Non-deliberating/Normal M = 2.79, SD = .56), F(1, 458) = 
4.72, p = .03, ηp2 = .01 .  
 Because all participants completed the BJW and BPWE measures first, these differences 
cannot be a result of condition assignment and are likely due to chance. With the exception of a 
disproportionate number of WNC students in the deliberating condition, the variations in 
participant characteristics across conditions are negligible. Yet, these differences should be 
noted and considered in interpreting study results. 
Verdicts 
 A relatively “split” verdict distribution was needed to conduct meaningful analyses of 
the impacts of plaintiff weight, individual differences, and attributional processes on verdicts. 
Pre-tests indicated such a split distribution, with 54.5% finding the defendant liable; however, 
these data were obtained from a small sample (N = 23). Verdict choices varied in the current 
sample depending on assignment to non-deliberating or deliberating conditions. Among those in 
the non-deliberating group, 63.1% (n = 128) found the defendant liable for medical malpractice, 
and 36.9% (n =75) did not. The majority of deliberating juries, however, found the defendant not 
liable (58.5%; n = 31). Sixteen (30.2%) deliberating juries found the defendant liable, and an 
additional six (11.3%) were unable to reach a unanimous decision after 30 minutes of 
deliberation and were declared hung juries. After deliberations, deliberating jurors were asked 





these verdicts were consistent with the group jury decisions, with 62.4% (n = 159) of the 255 
deliberating jurors rendering individual verdicts of not liable, and 37.6% (n = 96) rendering 
verdicts of liable. The differences in verdicts between non-deliberating and deliberating jurors 
will be discussed further in the following chapter. However, these basic frequencies illustrate 
that there was enough discrepancy in verdict responses to detect any significant impacts of 
independent variables or individual differences, even though they differ from pre-test results. 
Correlations between Individual Difference Variables 
 In addition to examining multicollinearity indicators, Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficients were obtained to explore relationships between the individual 
difference variables. There were no notable differences in correlations between individual 
difference variables in the non-deliberating and deliberating samples; thus, coefficients 
computed using the entire sample are reported. As Table 3 shows, scores on the BJW-O and 
BPWE scales were positively and significantly correlated, r(455) = .334, p < 01. Such a 
relationship is consistent with prior research indicating that these constructs are related but 
represent nuanced personality facets (Christopher et al., 2008).  There was a small but 
significant positive relationship between scores on the BJW-O scale and those on the FPS, r(442) 
= .107, p < .05 and stronger positive relationship between BPWE and FPS scores, r(442) = .255, p 
< 01. There also was a small but significant negative correlation between participants’ BMI and 
FPS scores, r(446) = -.111, p < .05, such that those with higher BMIs tended to score lower on 
the FPS (indicating less negative attitudes and beliefs towards obese persons) than those with 
lower BMIs. Importantly, the findings from these correlation analyses suggest that all individual 
difference variables as assessed in this study should be treated as separate predictors of the 





used as predictor variables (e.g., negative SEs, perceptions of plaintiff and defendant) will be 
reported in the results section as they pertain to specific models tested. 
Table 3. Correlations between Individual Difference Variables in the Total Sample.  
 
Variables                    Gender                    BJW-O                    BPWE                     FPS                      BMI 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Gender                             -                            .047                        .062                      .039                     .095 
BJW-O                           .047                            -                           .334**                  .107*                 - .025 
BPWE                            .062                         .334**                       -                         .255**                -.039 
FPS                                .039                         .107*                      .255**                      -                       -.111* 
BMI                               .095                        - .025                      -.039                     -.111                       -   
______________________________________________________________________________ 



















Chapter 10: Results Addressing Hypotheses and Research Questions Regarding Non-
Deliberating Jurors 
 Hypotheses regarding non-deliberating jurors involved testing the effects of the weight 
manipulation, individual difference variables, and interactions between the weight manipulation 
and individual difference variables on each dependent variable pertaining to SEs (negative SE 
scale, perceptions of the plaintiff, perceptions of the defendant), SLAs (SLA Scale, plaintiff 
witness ratings, defendant witness ratings) and case-related judgments (total responsibility 
scale, verdict, economic damages, non-economic damages). Research Question 2 initially sought 
to explore the effects of individual difference variables on the aforementioned DVs in the 
normal-weight condition only. Upon executing analyses, it became clear that limiting this 
exploration to the normal-weight condition only was unnecessary; tests of interactive effects 
between weight condition and individual differences could determine how individual differences 
operated in each weight condition and in the total sample of non-deliberating jurors. Thus, the 
scope of RQ 2 was expanded to explore the effects of individual differences on measures of SEs, 
SLAs, and case judgements in the entire non-deliberating sample. Recall that a summary of key 
abbreviations used throughout the results sections and their definitions is presented in 
Appendix A. Appendix Q briefly summarizes the findings of analyses conducted to test all 
hypotheses and research questions proposed in this study. 
 The main and interactive effects of the weight manipulation and individual difference 
variables on each DV were explored through a series of “comprehensive” and individual, more 
targeted regression models. The comprehensive models included plaintiff weight (obese vs. 
normal), all individual difference variables, and interaction terms between plaintiff weight and 





only plaintiff weight, one individual difference variable, and the corresponding interaction term 
as predictors of each DV. This approach was taken in order to understand the individual effects 
of each predictors controlling for other individual difference variables while acknowledging that 
small but meaningful effects of a specific predictor may be obscured in a regression model 
involving several predictors (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). After all analyses were 
conducted, it became apparent that the effects emerging in both the comprehensive and the 
less inclusive, individual models were similar and that the comprehensive models contributed 
little to the understanding of the “overall picture” of how plaintiff weight and individual 
differences may influence attributional processes and case judgments. Therefore, only results 
from the simpler models are presented here.  
  Logistic regression was used when examining effects on verdicts, which is a 
dichotomous variable. Linear regression was used when examining effects of the weight 
manipulation and individual difference variables on all other DVs, which are continuous. It 
should be noted that each analysis addresses multiple hypotheses as well as RQ 2. For instance, 
a regression including plaintiff weight, gender, and the interaction term between plaintiff weight 
and gender as predictors and verdict as the DV addresses H1 F, H3 E, and RQ 2. The implications 
of the results for the hypotheses and research questions are summarized after each main 
analysis series. 
Main and Interactive Effects of Weight Manipulation and Individual Differences on SE 
Measures  
  In this series of analyses, multiple linear regression models were executed for each 
individual difference variable (Gender, BJW-O, BPWE, FPS scores, BMI) with plaintiff weight, the 





and either scores on the negative SE scale, perceptions of the plaintiff, or perceptions of the 
defendant as the DV.  
 Findings revealed no significant effects of plaintiff weight or any other predictor on the 
negative SE scale (bs < .32, ps > .23). All models exploring the main and interactive effects of 
plaintiff weight and individual difference variables on perceptions of the plaintiff also were non-
significant (bs < .37, p >.09), with the exception of the model exploring the main and interactive 
effects of participant BMI (see Table 4). This overall model was significant, R2 = .058, F(3, 195) = 
4.04, p < .01, but participant BMI was the only significant individual predictor such that 
participants with higher BMIs had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff than participants 
with lower BMIs (b = 4.36, p < .01).  
  Further, analyses reveled that only BPWE impacted perceptions of the defendant; the 
coefficients for plaintiff weight, other individual differences, and their interaction terms in all 
other models executed were non-significant (bs <.39, ps > .10). The model with BPWE, plaintiff 
weight, and the corresponding interaction term as predictors with perceptions of the defendant 
as the DV was significant, R2 = .062, F(3, 197) = 4.36, p < .01. As indicated in Table 5, BPWE did 
not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight. However, those with stronger BPWE had more 
positive perceptions of the defendant than those with weaker beliefs (b = .39, p < .01). 
 Summary of regression models with SE measures as dependent variables. There were 
no significant main or interactive effects involving the weight manipulation in any of the models 
tested; thus, results do not support H1 A and B, which predict differences in non-deliberating 
participants’ scores on SE measures as a function of the weight manipulation. H2 A – H2 B, H3 A 
– H3 B, and H4 A – H4 B also were unsupported, as there were no significant interactions 





and BMI) in all models with SE measures as DVs. With regard to RQ 2, analyses revealed only 
two main effects of individual difference variables on SE measures in the total sample of non-
deliberating jurors: participant BMI was positively related to perceptions of the plaintiff, and 
BPWE was positively related to perceptions of the defendant. 
Table 4. Regression of Weight Condition and Participant BMI on Perceptions of Plaintiff in Non-
Deliberating Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                           t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                 .14                         .17                       .06                      .42                       .80 
BMI                                       4.36                       1.53                      .27                   > .01                     2.85 
Weight condition x           -1.40                       2.27                     -.06                      .54                      -.62  
BMI       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5. Regression of Weight Condition and BPWE on Perceptions of Defendant in Non-
Deliberating Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                -.19                         .16                    -.08                       .23                     -2.00 
BPWE scores                         .36                         .15                     .27                     > .01                      2.70 
Weight condition x             -.65                         .20                    -.03                       .75                       -.33  
BPWE scores       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Main and Interactive Effects of Weight Manipulation and Individual Differences on SLA 
Measures. 
 The regression models executed for this series were identical to those executed in the 
prior series, except that scores on the SLA scale, plaintiff witness ratings, and defendant witness 
ratings were specified as the DVs. Results revealed no main or interactive effects of plaintiff 
weight, gender, FPS scores, and BMI on SLA scale scores (bs < 1.5, ps > .19). The model testing 





= .116, F(3, 198) = 8.67, p < .01 (see Table 6). Though the plaintiff weight and interaction term 
coefficients were non-significant, there was a significant main effect of BPWE on SLA scores (b = 
-.32, p < .01). This effect indicates that those higher in BPWE were more likely to interpret 
attributional information in a manner conducive to blaming the plaintiff and excusing the 
defendant than were those lower in BPWE.  
Table 6. Regression of Weight Condition and BPWE on the SLA Scale in Non-Deliberating Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                 .19                        .13                        .10                       .14                      1.49 
BPWE scores                        -.32                        .12                       -.27                   > .01                     -2.72 
Weight condition x             -.15                        .16                       -.09                      .35                       -.95  
BPWE scores       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The model including plaintiff weight, BJW-O scores, and the corresponding interaction 
term as predictors of SLA scale scores also was significant, though it accounted for a negligible 
portion of variance in SLA scale scores, R2 = .042, F(3, 199) = 2.91, p = .036. There were no 
significant main effects of plaintiff weight or BJW-O scores, but there was a small but significant 
interaction between weight condition and BJW-O on SLA scale scores (b = -.48, p = .05; see Table 
7 for regression coefficients). To further explore this interaction, simple slopes were calculated 
at -1 and +1 standard deviations of the mean of the centered BJW-O scale. SLA scale scores were 
similar in the normal weight condition regardless of BJW-O scores. In the obese plaintiff 
condition, however, SLA scale scores among participants with lower BJW-O scores increased (b = 
.35, p = .07), and there was a slight decrease in SLA scale scores among participants with higher 
BJW-O scores (b = -.18, p = .33). These findings, depicted in Figure 2, indicate that participants 
scoring lower on the BJW-O scales were particularly inclined to form “pro-plaintiff” attributions, 





the simple slopes were non-significant at the .05 level, this signifies that the slopes were not 
significantly different from zero and does not diminish the significance of the interaction itself 
(Preacher & Rucker, 2003). 
Table 7. Regression of Weight Condition and BJW-O Scores on SLA Scale in Non-Deliberating 
Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                 .08                        .13                        .04                      .54                       .61 
BJW-O                                   -.04                        .17                      -.02                     -.21                       .83 
Weight condition x             -.48                        .25                      -.19                       .05                   -1.98  
BJW-O       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The effects of plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings was moderated by BJW-O 
scores. The overall model examining the main and interactive effects of plaintiff weight and 
BJW-O scores on plaintiff witness ratings was non-significant, R2 = .025, F(3, 198) = 1.70, p = .17 
but yielded a significant coefficient for the interaction term between BJW-O and plaintiff weight 
(b = -.73, p = .03; see Table 8 for regression coefficients). Simple slopes indicated that those with 
lower BJW-O scores rated the plaintiff witnesses as more convincing in the obese condition as 
compared to the normal weight condition (b = .41, p =.06; see Figure 3). The opposite pattern 
occurred for those with higher BJW-O scores, who rated the plaintiff’s witnesses as less 
convincing when they were led to believe that the plaintiff was obese (b = -.39, p = .13). Again, 
the fact that simple slopes were non-significant does not necessarily invalidate this moderating 
relationship. There were no other notable main or interactive effects of plaintiff weight and 
individual difference variables on plaintiff witness ratings (bs < 1.8, ps > .59). Further, analyses 
revealed no significant main or interactive effects of plaintiff weight and any measured 





Figure 2. Interaction between Weight Manipulation and BJW-O Scores on SLA Scale in Non-






Table 8. Regression of Weight Condition and BJW-O Scores on Plaintiff Witness Ratings in Non-
Deliberating Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                 .01                        .18                       .003                    .96                       .05 
BJW-O                                    .24                        .23                       .10                      .30                      1.04 
Weight condition x             -.73                        .34                      -.21                      .03                    -2.18  






























Figure 3. Interaction between Weight Condition and BJW-O Scores on Plaintiff Witness Ratings in 




 Summary of regression models with SLA measures as dependent variables. This series 
of analyses examined the effects of plaintiff weight and individual difference variables on 
participants’ perceptions of attibutional information, or the criteria hypothesized by Alicke 
(2000) to be considered when assigning blame for a negative outcome. H1 C was unsupported, 
as there were no main effects of the weight manipulation on any of the SLA measures. H2 C 
predicted interactive effects between the weight manipulation and each ideological individual 
difference variable (BJW-O, BPWE, and FPS scores) on SLA measures. This hypothesis was 
partially supported by significant interactions between the weight manipulation and BJW-O 
scores on SLA scale and plaintiff witness measure scores. The interactive effects were similar for 
both dependent SLA measures, such that those with stronger BJW-O beliefs perceived 
attributional information as more “pro-defendant” (perceiving the defendant as less likely to 



































perceiving the plaintiff’s witnesses as less convincing) in the obese condition than in the normal 
weight condition. Yet, there were no other significant interactions between plaintiff weight and 
the other individual difference personality variables on SLA measures. Moreover, analyses 
revealed no significant interactions between the weight manipulation and gender or the weight 
manipulation and participant BMI on SLA measures, rendering H3 C and H4 C unsupported.  
 With regard to RQ 2, there was one main effect of an individual difference variable that 
emerged across weight conditions. Specifically, participants with stronger BPWE had lower 
scores on the SLA scale than those with weaker beliefs, indicating that they were more likely to 
interpret attributional criteria in a manner consistent with assigning blame to the plaintiff. This 
effect is understandable given the association between BPWE and the worldview that people 
are responsible for their own outcomes (Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008).    
Main and Interactive Effects of Weight Manipulation and Individual Differences on Blame 
Measures  
  Taken together, results of regression models revealed no significant main or interactive 
effects of plaintiff weight and individual difference variables on total responsibility scale scores 
(bs < 2.7, ps > .59). Although the overall model exploring the main and interactive effects of 
plaintiff weight and FPS scores on verdict was non-significant, the FPS was a significant predictor 
of verdict (b = -.77, OR = .46, p = .03; see Table 9 for a summary of regression coefficients). 
Participants with lower FPS scores were slightly more likely to find the defendant liable than 
their counterparts. Hosmer and Lemeshow test results indicated an acceptable fit (p > .09), but 
the percentage of cases correctly classified increased by a mere 1.1% from the baseline (62.4%) 
to the full model (63.5%). Moreover, Cox and Snell R square and Nagelkerke R squared 





variance of participants’ verdict decisions. All other logistic regression models examining the 
effects of plaintiff weight, each individual difference variable, and the corresponding interaction 
terms were non-significant (bs < 1.8, ps > .09). 
Table 9. Binary Logistic Regression of Weight Condition and FPS Scores on Verdict in Non-
Deliberating Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                    Wald                       p                        OR 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition                -.22                        .30                       .52                     .47                       .81 
FPS scores                            -.77                        .36                     4.71                     .03                       .46 
Weight condition x              .50                        .52                       .90                     .34                      1.64  
verdict       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Only cases with participants finding the defendant liable for medical malpractice (N = 
128) were included in analyses examining the impacts of plaintiff weight and individual 
differences on damage awards, as participants were instructed to award damages only if 
rendering a liable verdict. The full model testing the interactive effects of plaintiff weight and 
BJW-O on economic damage awards was non-significant [R2 = .057, F(3, 123) = 2.46, p = .07)], 
but yielded a significant interaction between BJW-O scores and plaintiff weight (b = -76618.61, p 
= .03). Regression coefficients for this analysis are presented in Table 10, and the interaction is 
depicted in Figure 4. Simple slopes indicated that there was little difference in economic 
damage awards as a function of plaintiff weight for those with lower BJW-O scores (b = 
15200.16, p = .58). As expected, those with higher BJW-O scores awarded higher economic 
damages in the normal weight condition than in the obese condition (b = -71825.12, p = .10). 
The simple slopes were non-significant but the coefficients do illustrate an effect of interest and 
that aligns with hypotheses. For all other predictor variables and their corresponding interaction 





224219.51 and ps > .10. All individual regression models with non-economic damage awards as 
the DV were non-significant (bs < 347713.64, ps > .79).   
Table 10. Regression of Weight Condition and BJW-O Scores on Economic Damages Awarded by 
Non-Deliberating Jurors 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Weight condition           -29834.30             19492.22                -1.35                    .13                     -1.53 
BJW-O                               43916.32              230395.54                 .22                    .06                      1.90 
Weight condition x        -76618.61              34539.17                 -.27                     .03                     -2.22   
BJW-O       
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between Weight Manipulation and BJW-O Scores on Non-Deliberating 




 Summary of regression models with blame measures as dependent variables. Contrary 
to H1 D – H1 F, there were no significant effects of plaintiff weight on blame measures. H2 D and 
E also were unsupported, as there were no significant interactions between plaintiff weight and 





























significant interaction between BJW-O scores and plaintiff weight such that those with higher 
BJW-O scores awarded fewer economic damages in the obese condition partially supported H2 
F. However, there were no other significant interactions between plaintiff weight and any of the 
individual difference personality variables on non-economic damage awards. Further, H3 D – H3 
F and H4 D – H4 F were unsupported, as analyses revealed no significant interactions between 
plaintiff weight, participant gender, and participant BMI on any of the blame measures. 
 In addressing RQ 2, analyses revealed that the majority of individual difference variables 
did not impact blame measures, regardless of weight condition. Yet, there was a small but 
significant effect of FPS scores on verdicts, such that those with stronger anti-fat biases (i.e., 
negative attitudes, beliefs toward obese persons) were less likely to find the defendant liable 
than their counterparts overall.  Further commentary and interpretation of this outcome will be 
provided in the Discussion section.  
Summary of Results of Analyses Addressing Hypotheses 1-4 and Research Question 2 
 This series of regression analyses indicated that, most of the time, mock jurors’ 
attributions and attributional processes in the non-deliberating sample were not significantly 
influenced by the extra-legal factors considered in this study. Plaintiff weight, in and of itself, did 
not significantly impact any measures pertaining to components of the CCM and thus H1 was 
completely unsupported. H2 proposed interactions between plaintiff weight and the individual 
difference personality variables of BJW-O, BPWE, and FPS scores on the dependent measures of 
each component of the CCM. There were no significant interactions between plaintiff weight 
and BPWE and plaintiff weight and FPS scores on any of the DVs. H2 was partially supported 
though significant interactive effects between plaintiff weight and BJW-O scores on two SLA 





blame measure. These three interactive effects were consistent with one another and with 
hypotheses. Compared to those in the normal weight condition, participants with stronger BJW-
O in the obese condition were more likely to interpret attributional information in a manner 
conducive to blaming the plaintiff and awarded fewer economic damages to the plaintiff when 
finding the defendant liable; the opposite effects occurred for participants with weaker BJW-O. 
H3 and H4 were completely unsupported, such that gender and participant BMI scores did not 
interact with plaintiff weight to influence CCM measures. 
    In the entire non-deliberating sample, CCM measures were mostly unaffected by 
individual difference variables. The significant effects that did emerge were quite variable and 
can be summarized as follows: 1) Participants with higher BMIs had more positive perceptions 
of the plaintiff than did those with lower BMIs 2) Those with stronger BPWE had more positive 
perceptions of the defendant than did those with weaker beliefs; 3) Those with stronger BPWE 
interpreted attributional information in a manner more consistent with assigning blame to the 
plaintiff than those with weaker BPWE; and 4) Those with lower scores on the FPS were more 
likely than their counterparts to deliver liable verdicts.     
Elucidating Attributional Pathways in the Non-Deliberating Sample: Analyses Addressing 
Research Questions 1 and 3 
 One of the primary objectives of this research is to obtain a better understanding of the 
attributional processes underlying mock jurors’ decisions. In doing so, it aims to elucidate the 
attributional pathways participants followed in assigning blame and determine if these 
pathways differ as a function of the weight manipulation or individual differences. All of the 
following analyses were guided by the CCM and involve assessment of the relationships 





attributional pathways perceivers may follow in assigning blame are depicted in Figure 1. Mplus 
Version 7 statistical software was used to conduct a series of path analyses examining these 
proposed relationships. 
  Eliminating plaintiff weight as a moderator of attributional pathways. Research 
Question 1 aimed to explore ways in which the weight manipulation may moderate the 
attributional pathways participants followed in assigning blame. There were no main effects of 
the weight manipulation on any of the dependent variables used to measure attributions or 
attributional pathways, suggesting that the weight manipulation was likely not a significant 
factor in mock jurors’ attributional processes. To further confirm this assumption, chi-square 
difference tests were conducted to determine whether path analysis models specifying total 
responsibility scale scores as the DV and verdict as the DV differed for samples exposed to the 
obese and normal weight plaintiff. Results indicated that these models did not significantly 
differ between weight conditions. Thus, with regard to RQ 1, it was concluded that plaintiff 
weight did not moderate the attributional pathways followed by non-deliberating jurors in 
ascribing blame for the negative medical outcome. A more detailed explanation of the purpose 
and procedures for conducting chi-square difference tests to compare these models across 
weight conditions are presented in Appendix R, along with the specific results of the tests. It 
should be noted that chi-square difference testing was not used to compare models examining 
damage awards due to sample size limitations, as only jurors finding the defendant liable 
awarded damages.  
Eliminating individual difference variables as moderators of plaintiff weight on 
attributional pathways. RQ 3 aimed to explore whether any of the measured individual 





non-deliberating sample. There were no main effects of plaintiff weight on any of the 
dependent variables assessed in this study, and, as described above, there were no significant 
differences between models of attributional pathways between samples exposed to the normal 
weight plaintiff and obese plaintiff. As also reported earlier, analyses revealed significant 
interactions between plaintiff weight and only one individual difference variable on specific SLA 
and blame measures. Specifically, analyses revealed small but significant interactions between 
plaintiff weight and BJW-O scores on SLA scale scores, ratings of the plaintiff’s witnesses, and 
economic damage awards. Thus, it was assumed that BJW-O was the only individual difference 
that may potentially moderate the effects of plaintiff weight on attributional pathways.  
A series of linear regressions were conducted to identify any differences in the effects of 
scores on the BJW-O scale on all dependent CCM variables between normal weight and obese 
plaintiff conditions. There were no significant relationships between BJW-O scale scores and 
measures of SEs, SLAs, and case-related judgments (i.e., blame measures) in either the normal 
weight or obese condition (bs < 2.01, ps > .28). Based on these findings, it was concluded that 
individual differences did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight on attributional pathways, 
and no further analyses exploring RQ 3 were conducted. 
 Path analyses including the entire sample of non-deliberating jurors. Because the 
weight manipulation did not appear to moderate attributional pathways, a series of path 
analyses exploring the relationships between the CCM components were executed using the 
entire sample of non-deliberating jurors. Though the weight manipulation failed to impact 
attributional processes, testing the main tenets of the CCM and its proposed attributional 





 Prior to specifying full models exploring the relationships between the CCM 
components, a model assessing the relationships between the exogenous CCM variables (SE 
measures: negative SE scale, perceptions of the plaintiff, and perceptions of the defendant), and 
the variables expected to mediate the relationships between the exogenous and outcome 
variables (SLA measures: SLA scale, plaintiff witness ratings, and defendant witness ratings) was 
estimated using MLE. Findings indicated that scores on the negative SE scale did not significantly 
predict defendant witness ratings (B = -.13, p = .12), and thus this path was not included in any 
of the path analyses examining relationships between the CCM components in the non-
deliberating sample. 
 A total of four models were estimated, with one model estimated for each of the blame 
outcome variables. Each model tested the direct effects of all of the SE and SLA measures on the 
specified blame measure and the direct effects of each SE measure on each SLA measure. In 
addition, each model tested the indirect effects of each SE measure on the specified blame 
measure via each SLA measure. As recommended by MacKinnon (2008), confidence intervals for 
the indirect relationships were estimated using the bias-corrected bootstrap method, with 1,000 
bootstrap samples selected. Table 11 presents the Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficients for all of the SE and SLA variables, and Table 12 displays the correlations between 
the blame variables and each SE and SLA variable. Because all correlations between the SLA 
variables were significant (p < .01), their residuals were allowed to covary in all four models 
estimated. 
 Model fit was primarily assessed using the chi-square goodness of fit test, which 
indicates the amount of difference between expected and observed covariance matrices. 





suggesting that the proposed model reflects the observed data. A non-significant chi-square 
value is necessary to retain the null hypothesis of equality between the expected and observed 
covariance matrices (Geiser, 2013). Additional goodness-of-fit measures, such as root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the comparative fit index (CFI) also were considered 
in determining the extent to which the proposed models fit the observed data. The CFI is an 
“incremental fit index” which compares the fit between the target model and another model 
(typically the null model); values of .95 or above indicate a good fit (Geiser, 2013). The RMSEA is 
a measure of approximate fit, with a value less than .08 indicating an adequate-fitting model 
and a value less than .06 indicating a good-fitting model (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009). 
Importantly, obtaining any particular goodness of fit value that does not meet the criteria for a 
“good-fitting model” does not necessarily invalidate the target model. Rather, the adequacy of 
model fit should be more holistically considering multiple fit indicators and their assumptions 
(Suhr, 2008). The chi-square goodness of fit statistic has been identified as a particularly 
meaningful indicator of model fit if sample sizes are smaller (i.e. less than 500; Hair et al., 2006). 
 Model 1: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on total responsibility. 
Using the procedures described above, a path model was estimated using MLE with participants’ 
scores on the total responsibility scale as the outcome variable. Results of the chi-square 
goodness of fit test indicated a good model fit [χ2(1) = 2.46, p > .11], as did the CFI value of .997. 
Though the RMSEA value of .085 exceeded the cutoff, these goodness-of-fit measures taken 
together suggest that the target model adequately reflects the observed data. 
 A path diagram of the relationships between SE measures, SLA measures, and total 
responsibility is displayed in Figure 5. For this analysis and all following analyses, standardized 




Table 11. Correlations between SE and SLA Variables in the Non-Deliberating Sample.  
 
                                                          Negative SEs          Perceptions of          Perceptions of          SLA Scale         Plain. Witness        Def. Witness 
Variables                                                                                Plaintiff                    Defendant                                            Ratings                    Ratings 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Negative SEs                                              -                             .102                           -.125                        .211**                   .205**                    -.156*                          
Perceptions of Plaintiff                          . 102                           -                              -.399**                    .566**                   .519**                   -.316** 
Perceptions of Defendant                    -.125                       -.399**                          -                           -.598**                  -.484**                    .394** 
SLA Scale                                                  .211**                     .566**                      -.598**                       -                          .666**                    -.544** 
Plaintiff Witness Ratings                       .205**                     .519**                      -.484**                    .666*                        -                           -.200** 
Defendant Witness Ratings                 -.156*                     - .316**                       .394**                   -.544**                -.200**                        -  
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Table 12. Correlations between SE/SLA Variables and Blame Variables in the Non-Deliberating Sample.  
 
                                                          Negative SEs          Perceptions of          Perceptions of          SLA Scale         Plain. Witness        Def. Witness 
Variables                                                                                Plaintiff                    Defendant                                            Ratings                    Ratings 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total Responsibility                              .214**                   .554**                        -.598**                    .780**                    .674**                   -.453** 
Verdict                                                   .155*                      .368**                       -.489**                     .665**                    .649**                   -.300** 
Economic Damages                             .238**                    .294**                        -.083                        .305**                    .198*                     -.110 
Non-economic Damages                    .233**                    .332**                        -.327**                    .450**                   .365**                   -.128 




all of the estimated direct pathways between the endogenous SE variables and proposed 
mediator SLA variables were significant. More negative emotional reactions to the case (as 
evidenced by higher scores on the negative SE scale) were associated with a greater likelihood 
of interpreting attibutional criteria in a manner favorable to the plaintiff (as evidenced by higher 
scores on the SLA scale) and with higher plaintiff witness ratings. More favorable perceptions of 
the plaintiff were positively related to SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings and 
negatively related to defendant witness ratings; more favorable perceptions of the defendant 
were negatively related to SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings and positively related to 
defendant witness ratings. In addition, higher SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings led to 
higher ratings on the total responsibility scale, or a greater likelihood of assigning responsibility 
for the negative medical outcome to the defendant. The path between defendant witness 
ratings and total responsibility was non-significant (B = -.097, p > .08). 
 Path coefficients for both direct and indirect effects of each variable included in the 
model are displayed in Table 13. Although there were no significant direct effects of the SE 
variables on total responsibility (Bs < .07, ps > .30), results indicate that each SE variable 
impacted total responsibility indirectly through SLA variables. There were significant indirect 
effects on total responsibility of negative SE scale scores via SLA scale scores and plaintiff 
witness ratings; of perceptions of the plaintiff via SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings, 
and of perceptions of the defendant via SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings (see Table 
13 for confidence intervals used to determine statistical significance at p < .05). Because 
defendant witness ratings were not significantly related to total responsibility, there also were 





 As Table 12 shows, all SE measures are significantly correlated with total responsibility 
(negative SE scale r = .21; perceptions of plaintiff r = .55; perceptions of defendant r = -.60, all ps 
< .01). The absence of significant direct effects of the SE measures on total responsibility in the 
estimated model suggest that the effects of all SE measures on total responsibility are fully 
mediated by the SLA scale and plaintiff witness ratings (MacKinnon, 2008). Consistent with the 
“core” attributional pathway proposed by the CCM (i.e., the primary theoretical pathway from 
which deviations can occur), the results of this path analysis indicate that SEs related to the 
plaintiff, defendant, and case aspects impact SLAs. In this instance, those with stronger negative 
emotional reactions upon reading the case summary, more positive perceptions of the plaintiff, 
and more negative perceptions of the defendant were more likely to interpret attributional 
information in a manner consistent with assigning responsibility to the defendant, which they 
ultimately did. Mock jurors with weaker negative emotional reactions to the case, more 
negative perceptions of the plaintiff, and more positive perceptions of the defendant were more 
likely to interpret attributional information in a manner consistent with assigning responsibility 
to the plaintiff. Indeed, these modified SLAs did lead to a greater likelihood of perceiving the 
plaintiff as responsible for her own situation. 
  Model 2: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on verdict. A path model 
examining the relationships between SE variables, SLA variables, and verdict was estimated 
using WLSMV, which is appropriate for models with categorical outcome variables. Multiple 
goodness of fit indices suggested that the target model fit the observed data well, χ2(1) = 2.20, p 
> .13; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .08. The path diagram corresponding to this model is depicted in 
Figure 6. The effects of all SE variables on all SLA variables included in the model replicated 





estimated in Model 1. Yet, there was one notable difference between Model 1 and Model 2. As 
in Model 1, there were no direct effects of scores on the negative SE scale or perceptions of the 
plaintiff on the outcome variable (Bs < .50, ps >.49). There was, however, a significant direct 
effect of perceptions of the defendant on verdict (B = -.217, p < .05).  
 Coefficients, p values, and confidence intervals pertaining to the indirect pathways from 
SE variables to verdict are displayed in Table 14. Indirect pathways from the exogenous 
variables to verdict mirrored the pathways estimated in Model 1 with one exception: In Model 
2, the indirect pathway from negative SE scale scores to verdict via plaintiff witness ratings was 
non-significant. There were significant indirect effects of negative SE scale scores via SLA scale 
scores; perceptions of the plaintiff via SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings; and 
perceptions of the defendant via SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings. Again, the 
direction of these relationships adhere to the main tenets of the CCM. More negative emotional 
reactions to the trial summary led to more “pro-plaintiff” attributions, which in turn increased 
participants’ likelihood of finding the defendant liable for malpractice. As positive perceptions of 
the plaintiff increased, so did SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings, which again led to a 
higher likelihood of finding the defendant liable. Both the negative SE scale and perceptions of 
the plaintiff were significantly correlated with verdict (negative SE scale r = .16, p < .05; 
perceptions of the plaintiff r = .39, p < .01; see Table 12), but their direct effects on verdict in 
Model 2 were non-significant. Thus, it appears that the effects of the negative SE scale and 
perceptions of the plaintiff were fully mediated by the SLA measures, and that the relationship 
between perceptions of the defendant and verdict was partially mediated by these SLA 





such that those with more negative perceptions of the defendant were more likely render a 
liable verdict than those with more positive perceptions. 
 Model 3: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on economic damage 
awards. This analysis included only those participants finding the defendant liable (N = 128). 
Prior to model estimation, the economic damage awards variable for all cases was divided by 
10,000. This was necessary to avoid iteration problems that can occur when variables in a model 
use very different scales (e.g., 1-10 vs. 10,000 – 100,000; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). All goodness 
of fit measures indicated that Model 3 was a good fit for the observed data, χ2(1) = 1.18, p > .27; 
CFI = .99; RMSEA = .04.  
 As the diagram in Figure 7 illustrates, estimation of Model 3 resulted in fewer significant 
direct pathways between CCM variables as compared to Models 1 and 2. Consistent with prior 
models and CCM predictions, analyses revealed that negative SE scale scores and perceptions of 
the plaintiff were significantly and positively related to SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness 
ratings. There was a significant negative relationship between perceptions of the defendant and 
SLA scale scores and a significant positive relationship between perceptions of the defendant 
and defendant witness ratings. SLA scale scores were significantly and positively related to 
economic damages, whereas plaintiff and defendant witness ratings had no significant impacts 
(Bs < .06, ps > .50). Negative SE scale scores and perceptions of the defendant failed to exert 
significant direct impacts on economic damage awards (Bs < .161, ps > .11). However, the direct 
pathway between perceptions of the plaintiff and economic damages was significant, such that 






 Because perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant did not significantly impact 
economic damage awards, the only viable indirect pathways were from the three SE measures 
to economic damages via SLA scale scores. Yet, none of these indirect pathways were 
statistically significant (see Table 15 for path coefficients and confidence intervals). Upon 
observing that no proposed indirect pathways reached significance, a modified model excluding 
non-significant pathways was estimated. However, the modified model proved to be a poor fit 





Figure 5. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Total Responsibility in Non-Deliberating Sample 
 












Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Figure 6. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Verdict in Non-Deliberating Sample 
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Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 





Table 13. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Total Responsibility in Non-Deliberating Sample. 
 
SE Measure                                   Direct β                      SLA Measure                                    Direct β                     Indirect β                       95% CI     
Negative SE Scale                           .089*                        SLA Scale                                            .458**                        .041*                      .006        .134 
Negative SE Scale                           .136*                        Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .274**                        .037*                      .002        .073  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .384**                      SLA Scale                                            .458**                        .176**                    .099        .254  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .381**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .274**                        .104**                    .063        .205 
Perceptions of Plaintiff                -.190*                        Defendant Witness Ratings           -.097                            .019                       -.006        .043 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.435**                      SLA Scale                                           .458**                       -.199**                   -.286      -.113 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.314**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                .274**                       -.086**                   -.201      -.060 
Perceptions of Defendant            .317**                      Defendant Witness Ratings           -.097                           -.031                       -.112      -.001 




Table 14. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Verdict in Non-Deliberating Sample. 
 
SE Measure                                   Direct β                      SLA Measure                                    Direct β                     Indirect β                       95% CI     
Negative SE Scale                           .119*                        SLA Scale                                            .489**                        .058*                      .006       .110 
Negative SE Scale                           .128*                        Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .366**                        .047                       -.001       .094  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .382**                      SLA Scale                                            .489**                        .187**                    .083        .290  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .381**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .366**                        .139**                    .079        .268 
Perceptions of Plaintiff                -.186*                        Defendant Witness Ratings            .040                           -.007                       -.038        .023 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.432**                      SLA Scale                                           .489**                       -.211**                   -.314      -.109 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.316**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                .366**                       -.116**                   -.183      -.048 
Perceptions of Defendant            .311**                      Defendant Witness Ratings           .040                             .012                       -.036       .061 




 Model 4: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on non-economic damage 
awards. As with Model 3, only participants finding the defendant liable were included in 
analyses, and the non-economic damage awards variable was divided by 10,000 to avoid model 
iteration issues. Model 4 appeared to fit the observed data well, χ2(1) = 1.18, p > .27; CFI = .99; 
RMSEA = .04. All estimated direct pathways between the SE and SLA measures were significant 
and in the expected directions (see Figure 8). As in Model 3, only the pathway between SLA 
scale scores and the outcome variable was significant- those with higher SLA scale scores 
awarded higher non-economic damages than those with lower scores. Plaintiff and defendant 
witness ratings did not significantly impact non-economic damage awards. In addition, no 
significant direct pathways emerged between any of the SE measures and non-economic 
damages (Bs < .14, ps > .14).  
 Again, because only SLA scale scores had a significant direct impact on non-economic 
damages, the only possible indirect effects of SE measures in model 4 would occur via the SLA 
scale. Though no indirect pathways reached significance in Model 3, all three possible indirect 
pathways were significant in Model 4 (see Table 16). Fist, stronger negative emotional reactions 
led to higher, more “pro-plaintiff” scores on the SLA scale, which resulted in increased non-
economic damage awards. Second, more positive perceptions of the plaintiff lead to higher SLA 
scale scores, which increased non-economic damage awards. Third, more positive perceptions 
of the defendant led to lower, more “pro-defendant” SLA scale scores, which in turn resulted in 
decreased economic damage awards. Though there were no direct effects of any of the SE 
measures on non-economic damages in Model 4, bivariate correlations between each SE 
measure and non-economic damages were significant (negative SE scale r = .233, p < .01; 





Table 12). Thus, it is again assumed that the effects of the SE variables on non-economic 
damage awards were fully mediated by SLA scale scores. 
 Summary of path analyses in the non-deliberating sample. Taken together, results of 
the path analyses conducted to illuminate attributional pathways in the non-deliberating sample 
are largely consistent with Path 2 (as illustrated in Figure 1). Path 2 is considered as the “main” 
pathway that CCM proponents expect perceivers to follow in assigning blame and this pathway 
has received the most attention in the extant literature; however, CCM researchers also assert 
that blame may be ascribed via alternate pathways (Alicke, 2000; 2008; Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, 
& Davis, 2008). Models 1 and 2 in particular supported Path 2, which depicts SLAs as full 
mediators between SEs and blame variables. Model 2 does suggests that some participants also 
followed Path 3 in determining their verdicts, such that perceptions of the defendant (an SE 
measure) were only partially mediated by SLA measures.  
 Model 3, which explored the effects of CCM measures on economic damages, yielded 
no significant indirect effects of any of the SE measures via SLA measures.  Though all of the SE 
measures were significantly related to SLA scale scores, there were only significant direct effects 
of perceptions of the plaintiff and SLA scale scores on economic damages. The direct effect of 
perceptions of the plaintiff on economic damages reflects Path 1A as depicted in Figure 1, 
whereby SEs impact blame without modifying SLAs. Model 4, which explored the effects of CCM 
measures on non-economic damages, was again consistent with Path 2. SLA scale scores fully 
mediated the relationship between all of the SE measures and non-economic damage awards. 
 Overall, perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant were the strongest predictors of 
scores on the SLA scale; scores on the SLA scale in turn were the strongest predictors of blame 





of negative SEs and perceptions of the plaintiff on the blame measures were fully mediated by 
SLA scale scores. Explanations for model differences and further theoretical implications will be 




Figure 7. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Economic Damages in Non-Deliberating Sample (liable 
verdicts only) 
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Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 







Figure 8. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Non-Economic Damages in Non-Deliberating Sample (liable 
verdicts only) 
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Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 





Table 15. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Economic Damages in Non-Deliberating Sample. N = 128 
 
SE Measure                                   Direct β                      SLA Measure                                    Direct β                     Indirect β                       95% CI     
Negative SE Scale                           .195**                      SLA Scale                                            .225*                          .044                        -.007       .095 
Negative SE Scale                           .274**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .031                            .008                        -.051       .068  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .279**                      SLA Scale                                            .225*                          .063                        -.008       .134  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .260**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .031                            .008                        -.045        .061 
Perceptions of Plaintiff                -.159                          Defendant Witness Ratings            .056                           -.009                        -.044       .027 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.322**                      SLA Scale                                           .225*                         -.072                        -.152       .007 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.170                          Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .031                           -.005                        -.045       .035 
Perceptions of Defendant            .218*                        Defendant Witness Ratings            .056                            .012                        -.033        .057 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
 
Table 16. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Non-Economic Damages in Non-Deliberating Sample. N = 128 
 
SE Measure                                   Direct β                      SLA Measure                                    Direct β                     Indirect β                       95% CI     
Negative SE Scale                           .195**                      SLA Scale                                            .329**                        .093*                      .016       .167 
Negative SE Scale                           .274**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .148                            .059                       -.012       .102  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .297**                      SLA Scale                                            .329**                        .092*                      .016       .167  
Perceptions of Plaintiff                 .269**                      Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .148                             .038                      -.014        .901 
Perceptions of Plaintiff                -.159                          Defendant Witness Ratings            .105                           -.017                       -.084       .008 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.322**                      SLA Scale                                           .329**                       -.106**                   -.185      -.027 
Perceptions of Defendant           -.170                          Plaintiff Witness Ratings                 .148                           -.025                       -.070       .020 
Perceptions of Defendant            .218*                        Defendant Witness Ratings            .105                            .023                       -.023       .069 






Chapter 11: Results Addressing Hypotheses and Research Questions Comparing Deliberating 
and Non-Deliberating Jurors and Juries 
 As proposed, this series of analyses aimed to illuminate any differences in attributional 
processes and case decisions between mock jurors assigned to deliberating and non-
deliberating conditions. In particular, these analyses sought to determine whether deliberating 
and non-deliberating jurors’ decisions differed as a function of plaintiff weight. Based on theory 
(i.e., the JSM; see Chapter 3) and prior research demonstrating that deliberations often 
attenuate the effects of jurors’ individual biases on group decisions (see Chapter 5), it was 
expected that deliberating jurors would render more pro-plaintiff judgments in the obese 
condition than non-deliberating jurors.  
 Research questions focused on identifying any differences in group and individual level 
case judgments among deliberating jurors as well differences in attributional processes and 
pathways (measured at the individual level) among deliberating and non-deliberating jurors. A 
research question exploring the impacts of individual differences on CCM measures in the 
deliberating sample was not initially proposed. However, such an exploration seems prudent 
given that individual differences were measured in the entire sample, and analyses can help 
determine if individual differences operated differently in deliberating and non-deliberating 
conditions. Thus, interactive effects between decision context (deliberating vs. non-
deliberating), plaintiff weight, and each measured individual difference variable on CCM 
measures are tested. 
 This chapter first presents the results of analyses exploring differences between 
judgments rendered at the jury level and at the individual level. Second, it presents results of a 





weight and individual differences on case judgments, or CCM blame variables. Because these 
results address specific hypotheses (H1 C – H1 E) and involve outcome variables of particular 
interest to the jury decision-making field, they are described in detail. Third, this chapter 
summarizes key findings from analyses exploring differences between deliberating and non-
deliberating jurors on other CCM measures.   
These analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 21. Finally, this chapter describes the results 
of path analyses exploring attributional pathways in the deliberating sample, which were 
estimated using Mplus Version 7. All other analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 21 
Effects of Plaintiff Weight on Jury Level Case Decisions: Analyses Addressing H1 A and H1 B 
 Multilevel modeling procedures were not used in addressing these hypotheses, as the 
dependent variables examined were measured at the group level. Among the 53 jury groups, 31 
(58.5%) delivered a collective verdict of not liable, 16 (30.2%) delivered a verdict of liable, and 6 
(11.3%) were hung. The hung juries were excluded from the following analyses because the 
number of hung juries was not large enough to conduct meaningful statistical tests related to 
this third category, and because they were not asked to award damages. 
 First, a binary logistic regression was executed with plaintiff weight as the independent 
variable and jury level verdict as the dependent variable. Results indicated that plaintiff weight 
did not impact jury level verdicts, b = -.065, p < .93). Because plaintiff weight also failed to 
impact individual verdicts rendered by non-deliberating jurors, it is reasonable to assume that 
the opportunity to deliberate did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight on verdicts. Thus, 
H1 A is unsupported. 
 Second, a linear regression was executed with plaintiff weight as the independent 





limited to the 16 juries finding the defendant liable for medical malpractice. There were no 
significant effects of plaintiff weight on jur -level economic damage awards, b = 121875.00, p < 
.67. Third, jury level non-economic damages were regressed upon plaintiff weight. This simple 
model accounted for approximately 37% of the variance in jury level non-economic damage 
awards (R2 = .369), such that juries awarded fewer non-economic damages when the plaintiff 
was obese, b = -121875.00, p = .013 (see Table 17 for a summary of regression coefficients). H1 
B, which proposed that compared to non-deliberating jurors, deliberating juries would award 
higher economic and non-economic damages in the obese condition, was unsupported. In fact, 
findings in part suggest that juror bias related to plaintiff weight may have been exacerbated in 
the deliberating condition to the extent that they affected jury level non-economic damage 
awards. 
Table 17. Regression of Plaintiff Weight on Jury Level Non-Economic Damage Awards. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                                    B                          SE                          β                          p                          t 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Plaintiff weight              -121875.00           42570.19               -.608                    .013                    -2.86 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Differences between Group and Individual Level Case Judgments among Deliberating Jurors: 
Analyses Addressing RQ 1 
 Research Question 1 sought to determine whether deliberating jurors’ individual 
verdicts and damage awards substantially differed from these same judgments made 
collectively by their jury group. As there are no statistical tests that can be used to address this 
question, comparisons of case judgments rendered at the group and individual level were 
conducted using descriptive statistics. At the individual level, 62.4% of deliberating jurors found 
the defendant not liable and 37.6% found the defendant liable. Among these same mock jurors, 





groups finding the defendant liable, and 12.1% were part of the six hung juries. When asked to 
render an individual level verdict, 48.1% of the 31 individuals participating in hung juries found 
the defendant liable and 51.6% found the defendant not liable. Thus, it can be concluded that 
most verdicts rendered by deliberating jurors at the individual level were the same as those 
rendered by their jury groups.   
 Some differences were noted in damages awarded at the jury level and at the individual 
level. There was little difference in economic damages awarded by juries (M = $164,062.50, SD = 
$99,569.39) and deliberating jurors at the individual level (M = $169,531.25, SD = $107,923.73). 
However, individually, deliberating jurors awarded slightly higher non-economic damages (M = 
$139,791.67, SD = 131565.31) than did jury groups (M = $107,812.50, SD = $103,569.12). Similar 
trends emerged when limiting the sample of deliberating jurors to those who agreed with their 
jury’s verdict of liable at the individual level (n = 69). On average, this sample awarded 
$177,898.55 (SD = $110,441.65) economic damages and $143,768.12 (SD = $132,035.55) non-
economic damages at the individual level. 
Interactive Effects of Plaintiff Weight and Decision Context on Individual Level Case Decisions: 
Analyses Addressing H1 C – H1 E 
 After juries delivered group level verdicts and damage awards, the individual jurors 
within those juries were asked to make the same case-related judgments as the non-
deliberating jurors and were told that those individual level judgments could be the same or 
different from those made collectively by their jury group. H1 C –H1 E seek to identify any 
differences in individually-rendered case judgments between deliberating and non-deliberating 





of the data, as deliberating jurors’ individual level responses were likely affected by the previous 
discussions and judgments that occurred within a group context. 
 Prior to conducting this series of analyses, “null” models were executed for each 
continuous dependent variable to obtain the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for both the 
deliberating and non-deliberating samples. The ICC provides an estimate of the extent to which 
the variance in the dependent variable (i.e., economic damages) is due to differences between 
groups (i.e., jury group). The results of all null models are summarized in Appendix S. In the 
deliberating sample, the ICC for most CCM dependent variables was significant and quite high, 
indicating that a substantial portion of variance in deliberating jurors’ judgements could be 
attributed to their jury group membership. 
 Separate models were estimated to explore the main and interactive effects of each 
measured individual difference variable on individually rendered case judgments. This approach 
was taken because the models estimated using the entire sample incorporated several 
additional predictors (i.e., decision context and its related interaction terms), and adding all 
individual difference variables would overwhelm a single model. Thus, for each outcome 
variable, a series of models were executed that included decision context (deliberating vs. non-
deliberating), plaintiff weight, and a decision context by plaintiff weight interaction term as fixed 
effects and specified jury group (both nominal and actual groups) as a random intercept or 
random effect. In addition, each model included one of the five measured individual difference 
variables, an individual difference variable by decision context interaction term, an individual 
difference variable by plaintiff weight interaction term, and a three-way interaction term for 
decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference variable. All predictors were 





 Notes about presentation of results. None of the following models yielded a significant 
main effect for plaintiff weight on the specified outcome variable (Fs < 1.72, ps > .19) or a 
significant three-way interaction between plaintiff weight, decision context, and any individual 
difference variable on the specified outcome variable (Fs < 2.50, ps > .15). These non-significant 
findings will not be reiterated in the presentation of results for each model. 
 As in all prior results reported thus far, results with any p value below .05 will be 
considered as statistically significant. Some models presented throughout the remainder of this 
chapter, however, yielded results with p values greater than .05 but less than .09. These results 
will be reported as “marginally significant,” whereas results with p values greater than or equal 
to .09 will be considered non-significant. This decision was made based on the observation that 
all results with p values between .05 and .089 aligned with theoretical expectations, and thus 
should be reported to further inform theory as well as to demonstrate consistency among 
current findings (i.e., to lend empirical support to other findings that did reach traditional 
statistical significance at the .05 level). 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on verdict. 
Because verdict is a binary outcome variable, Generalized Linear Mixed Modeling (GLMM) was 
used for this series of analyses. In the GLMMs, Verdict= 1 (liable) was set as the reference 
category. Summary results for each model are displayed in Table 18. 
 Model 1: Effects of gender. H1 C proposed an interactive effect between decision 
context and plaintiff weight, such that in the obese condition, deliberating jurors would be more 
likely to find the defendant liable than would non-deliberating jurors. Model 1 results and 
results of all subsequent models specifying verdict as the outcome variable did not support this 





Table 18. Fixed Effects of Decision Context, Plaintiff Weight, and Individual Difference Variables 
on Verdict in Total Sample. 
______________________________________________________________________________
Model 
Variable                                                                                          F                              df                           p                                 
 
Model 1: Effects of Gender* 
 Decision context                                                        13.93                       1, 66                    <.001 
 Weight condition                                                           .00                       1, 66                      .986 
 Decision context x Weight condition                         .15                       1, 66                      .705 
 Gender                                                                         15.56                       1, 448                 <.001 
 Gender x Decision context                                           .69                       1, 448                    .405 
 Gender x Weight condition                                          .14                       1, 448                    .704 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
 BJW-O                                                                              .24                       1, 449                    .621    
 BJW-O x Decision context                                          3.03                       1, 449                    .083   
 BJW-O x Weight condition                                         8.09                       1, 449                    .005 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
 BPWE                                                                             2.86                       1, 448                    .092 
 BPWE x Decision context                                           4.89                       1, 448                    .028 
 BPWE x Weight condition                                          3.38                       1, 448                    .067 
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
 FPS                                                                                  3.93                       1, 435                   .048 
 FPS x Decision context                                                  .94                        1, 435                   .333 
 FPS x Weight condition                                                .97                        1, 435                    .326 
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
 BMI                                                                                3.90                        1, 438                    .049 
 BMI x Decision context                                                .23                        1, 438                    .878 
  BMI x Weight condition                                               .21                        1, 438                    .561  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. *For all models, the main effect of decision context was significant, all Fs > 13.83 and all 
ps < .001. For all models, the main effect of weight condition and interaction between weight 
condition and decision context was non-significant, all Fs < 1.24, all ps > .25. 
 
(Fs < .70, ps > .40). There was, however, a significant main effect of decision context on verdicts, 
F(1,66) = 13.93, p < .001. Estimated marginal means revealed that non-deliberating jurors were 





.05). A significant main effect of gender on verdicts also emerged F(1,448) = 15.56, p < .001. 
Women (M = .65, SE = .05) were more likely than men (M = .42, SE = .05) to find the defendant 
liable, regardless of plaintiff weight or decision context. All interactions involving participant 
gender, decision context, and plaintiff weight were non-significant (Fs < 2.39, ps > .13). 
 Model 2: Effects of BJW-O. The main effect of decision context was again significant in 
this model, F(1,448) = 16.62, p < .001 , such that non-deliberating jurors were more likely to 
render liable verdicts (M = .68, SE = .06) than deliberating jurors (M = .34, SE = .04). This effect 
was replicated in all of the following models examining the effects of decision context, plaintiff 
weight, and individual differences on verdicts, and thus will not continue to be reported for each 
additional model. There was no significant main effect of BJW-O scores on verdict (F = .24, p = 
.62), but analyses did reveal a significant interaction between BJW-O scores and plaintiff weight, 
F(1,449) = 8.09, p = .005. This interaction is depicted in Figure 9. Estimated marginal means 
indicate that when participants believed the plaintiff to be normal weight, those with higher 
BJW-O scores (estimated at 1 SD above the centered mean) were slightly more likely to render 
liable verdicts (M = .57, SE = .07) than those with lower BJW-O scores (estimated at 1 SD below 
the centered mean; M = .46, SE = .07). When participants believed the plaintiff to be obese, 
those with higher BJW-O scores were less likely to render liable verdicts (M = .41, SE = .06) than 
those with lower BJW-O scores (M = .58, SE = .07). 
 In addition, the interaction between BJW-O scores and decision context was marginally 
significant, F(1,449) = 3.03, p = .082. Both those with low and high BJW-O scores were more 
likely to find the defendant liable in the non-deliberating than in the deliberating condition, but 
this effect was a bit more pronounced for those with lower BJW-O scores (Non-deliberating M = 





deliberating M = .64, SE = .08; Deliberating M = .39, SE = .06). This marginally significant 
interaction is displayed in Figure 10.  
Figure 9. Interaction between Weight Manipulation and BJW-O Scores on Verdicts in Total 
Sample.  
 





























 Model 3: Effects of BPWE. The main effect of BPWE scores on verdict failed to reach 
statistical significance (F = .29, p = .09). Yet, there was a significant interaction between BPWE 
scores and decision context on verdict, F(1,448) = 4.89, p = .028 (See Figure 11). Both those with 
low and high BPWE scores were more likely to find the defendant liable in the non-deliberating 
condition. The increase in the likelihood of finding the defendant liable in the non-deliberating 
condition was greater for those with lower BPWE scores (Non-deliberating M = .67, SE = .07; 
Deliberating M = .23, SE = .06) than for those with higher BPWE scores (Non-deliberating M = 
.64, SE = .07; Deliberating M = .42, SE = .06). This same pattern of results was obtained in 
examining the estimated marginal means associated with the marginally significant interaction 
between BJW-O and decision context described above. 
 The interaction between plaintiff weight and BPWE was marginally significant, F(1,448) 
= 3.38, p = .067 (See Figure 12). When participants believed that the plaintiff had a normal 
weight, there was little difference in verdicts between those with higher BPWE scores (M = .50, 
SE = .07) and those with lower BPWE scores (M = .52, SE = .07). When led to believe that the 
plaintiff was obese, those with lower BPWE scores were more likely to find the defendant liable 
(M = .57, SE = .08) than those with higher BPWE scores (M = .37, SE = .08).  
 Model 4: Effects of FPS Scores. All interactive effects incorporating FPS scores were non-
significant (Fs < .50, ps > .33). There was a significant main effect of FPS scores on verdict, 
F(1,435) = 3.93, p = .048. This replicated the effect from the analysis conducted using only the 
non-deliberating sample, such that those with lower FPS scores were more likely to find the 
defendant liable than those with higher FPS scores. However, this effect was very small, and the 






Figure 11. Interaction between Decision Context and BPWE Scores on Verdicts in Total Sample. 
 
 





























 Model 5: Effects of BMI. There were no significant interactions between participants’ 
BMI, plaintiff weight, or decision context (Fs < 2.12, ps > .14). There was a main effect of BMI on 
verdicts, such that the likelihood of finding the defendant liable increased as BMI increased. The 
fixed coefficient again indicates that this effect was small (b = .11, p = .97).   
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on damage 
awards. Mixed modeling procedures were used to examine the effects of plaintiff weight, 
decision context and individual differences on damage awards while accounting for the nested 
nature of the data pertaining to deliberating jurors. Because including predictors and outcome 
variables with substantially different scale values (e.g., 1-7 vs. 25,000 – 400,000) can lead to 
convergence problems in estimating mixed models (Kiernan, Tao, & Gibbs, 2012), both 
economic and non-economic damage award values were multiplied by .0001 before inclusion in 
analyses. Only participants finding the defendant liable were included in the following analyses. 
A summary of fixed effects for models executed with both economic and non-economic 
damages as DVs is displayed in Table 19. 
 Model 1A: Effects of gender on economic damages. Model 1A examined the main and 
interactive effects of gender on non-economic damage awards. Results did not support H1 D, 
which predicted that, in the obese condition, deliberating jurors would award higher damages 
than non-deliberating jurors. The interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight was 
non-significant in this model and in the other four individual difference variable models (Fs < 
.64, ps > .49), and thus no further results pertaining to these variables will be reported. This 
model did yield a marginally significant effect of decision context on damage awards, F(1,81.1) = 
3.65, p = .06, such that jurors in the non-deliberating condition gave higher economic damage 





However, there were no significant main effects of decision context in any of the other 
individual difference variable models (Fs < 2.47 , ps > .11), and this effect was non-significant in 
a model with only condition weight, decision context, and the condition weight by context 
interaction term entered as fixed effects variables (F = .57, p = .45). 
 The interaction between gender and decision context was marginally significant, 
F(1,202) = 3.01, p = .084; see Figure 13). Pairwise comparisons indicate that this interaction is 
driven by an increased likelihood for males to award higher economic damages in the non-
deliberating condition (M = 2.18, SE = .19) than in the deliberating condition (M = 1.51, SE = .23; 
p = .026). Females awarded similar amounts of economic damages regardless of decision 
context (non-deliberating M = 1.82, SE = .14; deliberating M = 1.70, SE = .19). The main effect of 
gender and the interactions between gender and plaintiff weight and gender and decision 
context were non-significant (Fs < .38, ps > .53).   
 Model 2A: Effects of BJW-O on economic damages. Results of Model 2A revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions for any of the included fixed effects variables (Fs < 2.82, 
ps > .10). 
 Model 3A: Effects of BPWE on economic damages. This model yielded a significant main 
effect for BPWE on economic damage awards, F(1,199.9) = 10.54, p = .001. Those with lower 
BPWE scores awarded significantly higher economic damages than those with higher BPWE 
scores, b = -.438, SE = .21, p = .037. Results revealed no other significant main or interactive 




Table 19. Fixed Effects of Decision Context, Plaintiff Weight, and Individual Difference Variables on Damage Awards and Total 
Responsibility Judgments in Total Sample. 
 
Model                                                                         A: Economic damages                 B: Non-economic damages               C: Total responsibility  
     Variable*                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 1: Effects of Gender 
     Decision context                                                       3.65-           .06                               12.42           .001                                     15.61           >.001                   
     Weight condition                                                        .63            .43                                 1.60           .25                                            .22             .64 
     Decision context x Weight condition                      .26            .61                                 4.84           .03                                          2.02             .16 
     Gender                                                                         .28             .60                                 2.44           .12                                        13.41          >.001    
     Gender x Decision context                                     3.01            .08                                    .08           .78                                            .01             .98     
     Gender x Weight condition                                    3.84            .54                                    .22           .64                                          1.07             .30 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
     Decision context                                                       1.92-           .17                               12.71           .001                                     17.59            >.001 
     Weight condition                                                      1.06            .31                                 1.71           .20                                            .11              .74 
     Decision context x Weight condition                      .34            .56                                 4.25           .04                                          3.74              .06                 
     BJW-O                                                                         1.36            .25                                   .49           .48                                          2.21              .14 
     BJW-O x Decision context                                         .50            .48                                   .35           .55                                            .72              .40 
     BJW-O x Weight condition                                        .91            .34                                   .54           .47                                          5.99              .02 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
     Decision context                                                       2.33-           .13                               13.67         >.001                                      18.33           >.001  
     Weight condition                                                        .74            .39                                  1.19           .28                                            .01             .96 
     Decision context x Weight condition                      .46            .50                                   4.21          .04                                          5.00             .03 
     BPWE                                                                        10.54            .001                                3.98          .05                                          9.26             .002 
     BPWE x Decision context                                          .06            .94                                     .70          .40                                        11.66             .001    
     BPWE x Weight condition                                       1.37            .24                                     .24          .63                                          4.46             .04 
 
Note.  *Each model also included a three-way interaction term between decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference 






Table 19 (continued).  
 
Model                                                                         A: Economic damages                 B: Non-economic damages               C: Total responsibility  
     Variable                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
     Decision context                                                       1.67-           .20                               15.15          >.001                                 16.09            >.001 
     Weight condition                                                        .50            .48                                   .84            .36                                        .21               .65 
     Decision context x Weight condition                      .43            .49                                 4.07            .05                                      2.99              .09 
     FPS                                                                               3.57           .06                                   .96             .33                                      3.67              .06 
     FPS x Decision context                                             1.67           .20                                   .29             .59                                      5.38              .02 
     FPS x Weight condition                                              .50           .54                                   .02             .90                                        .01               .92          
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
     Decision context                                                       2.45            .12                               11.53            .001                                  16.28           >.001                    
     Weight condition                                                        .93            .34                                 1.07            .30                                         .18             .68 
     Decision context x Weight condition                      .21            .65                                 3.54            .06                                       4.24             .04  
     BMI                                                                                .19           .66                                  1.24            .27                                       2.96             .09 
     BMI x Decision context                                            1.10           .30                                  4.10           .04                                        2.73             .10 
















 Model 4A: Effects of FPS on economic damages. There was a marginally significant main 
effect of FPS scores on economic damage awards, F(1,187.4) = 3.57, p = .06. Those with lower 
FPS scores awarded higher economic damages than those with higher FPS scores, though the 
fixed effect coefficient for FPS was non-significant, b = -.262, SE = .26, p = .31. There were no 
significant interactions between FPS scores, decision context, and plaintiff weight (Fs < 1.68, ps > 
.18). 
 Model 5A: Effects of BMI on economic damages. Results of this model yielded no 
significant main or interactive effects (Fs < 2.46, ps > .13). 
 Model 1B: Effects of gender on non-economic damages. Analyses examining the effects 
of decision context, plaintiff weight, and participant gender on non-economic damage awards 

























context on non-economic damage awards, F(1,80.1) = 12.42, p < .001 (see Table 19 for a 
summary of fixed effects). Those in the non-deliberating condition awarded significantly higher 
non-economic damages (M = 2.22, SE = .15) than those in the deliberating condition (M = 1.41, 
SE = .18). This effect was replicated in all models (Fs > 11.53, ps <.001) and thus will not be 
repeatedly reported in results for models 2B-5B.  
 Model 1B also yielded a significant interaction between plaintiff weight and decision 
context on non-economic damage awards F(1,81.2) = 4.84, p = .31 (see Figure 14). An 
examination of estimated marginal means showed that this effect contradicts H1 D, which 
predicted that, in the obese condition, deliberating jurors would award higher non-economic 
damages than non-deliberating jurors. Instead, participants in the non-deliberating condition 
awarded higher non-economic damages to the obese plaintiff (M = 2.35, SE = .22) than those in 
the deliberating condition (M = 1.04, SE = .25). There was little difference between non-
economic damage awards to the normal weight plaintiff between non-deliberating (M = 2.10, SE 
= .20) and deliberating (M = 1.80, SE = .25) conditions. The pairwise comparison between 
deliberating and non-deliberating jurors in the obese condition was significant (p < .001), as was 
the comparison between normal weight and obese conditions in the deliberating condition (p = 
.036). The same interactive effect emerged in all models and was significant in Models 2B-4B (Fs 
> 4.07, ps < .05), but was marginally significant in Model 5B (F = 4.10, p =.06). Gender did not 
significantly impact non-economic damage awards (F = 2.44, p = .12). In addition, there were no 






 Model 2B: Effects of BJW-O on non-economic damages. All main and interactive effects 
of  BJW-O scores, plaintiff weight, and decision context on non-economic damages were non-
significant (Fs < 1.61, ps > .20). 
 Model 3B: Effects of BPWE on non-economic damages. There was a significant main 
effect of BPWE scores on non-economic damages awards, F(1,213.9) = 3.98, p = .04. The fixed 
coefficient for BPWE did not reach significance, but indicated those with lower BPWE scores 
awarded greater non-economic damages than those with higher scores (b = -.20, SE = .27, p = 
.47). Tests of two-way interactions involving BPWE as a predictor were non-significant (Fs < .71, 
ps > .40). 
Figure 14. Interaction between Decision Context and Plaintiff Weight on Non-Economic Damage 
Awards in the Total Sample. 
 
 
 Model 4B: Effects of FPS on non-economic damages. FPS scores did not significantly 
affect non-economic damage awards (F = .96, p = .33). There also were no significant 




























 Model 5B: Effects of BMI on non-economic damages. The main effect of participant 
BMI on non-economic damages was non-significant, as was the interaction between BMI and 
plaintiff weight (Fs < 1.25, ps > .26). However, a significant interaction between BMI and 
decision context emerged, F(1,209.7) = 4.10, p = .04 (see Figure 15). Estimated marginal means 
were obtained for the sample at +1 and -1 SD of the transformed and centered BMI variable to 
interpret this effect. Non-economic damage awards were similar in the non-deliberating 
condition, regardless of participant BMI (Low BMI M = 1.47, SE = .21; High BMI M = 1.30, SE = 
.22). In the deliberating condition, those with higher BMIs awarded greater non-economic 
damages (M = 2.40, SE = .17) than did those with lower BMIs (M = 1.80, SE = 1.81). Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that the difference between non-economic damages awarded by those 
with higher BMIs in the deliberating condition was significant (p < .001). 
  Model 5B was the only model in this series (exploring effects of plaintiff weight, 
decision context, and individual differences on non-economic damage awards) that did not yield 
a significant interaction between plaintiff weight and decision context. Yet, estimated marginal 
means and pairwise comparisons suggested that the interactive effect between plaintiff weight 
and decision context was replicated in Model 5B. 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on 
responsibility judgments. The same model-building procedures incorporating individual 
difference variables that were used to test H1 C and H1 D were also used to test H1 E, with 
participant scores on the total responsibility scale as the dependent variable. Table 19 








Figure 15. Interaction between Decision Context and Participant BMI on Non-Economic Damage 
Awards in the Total Sample 
 
 
 Model 1C: Effects of gender. None of the interaction terms entered into the model 
yielded significant results, including the hypothesized interaction between plaintiff weight and 
decision context (Fs < 2.01, ps > .15). Decision context significantly predicted total responsibility 
scale scores, F(1,95) = 15.61, p < .001, such that non-deliberating jurors had higher total 
responsibility scale scores (indicating increased attributions of responsibility to the defendant; 
M = 4.25, SD =  .15) than deliberating jurors (M = 3.54, SE = .14). This result is consistent with the 
decision context effects obtained in models testing H1 C and H1 D, and was obtained in the 
remaining models (2C – 5C) including total responsibility as the outcome variable (Fs > 15.61, ps 
< .001). Thus, results pertaining to the main effects of plaintiff weight and decision context for 
the other four models will not be reiterated in text. 
 Gender was a significant predictor of total responsibility scale scores, F(1,95) = 15.61, p 





























medical outcome (M = 4.19, SE = .12) than were men (M = 3.69, SE = .13). This result is similar 
that that obtained in examining the impact of gender on verdict, which indicated that, overall, 
women were significantly more likely than men to find the defendant liable for malpractice. 
 Model 2C: Effects of BJW-O. Though the interaction between plaintiff weight and 
decision context did not approach significance in Model 1C, it was marginally significant in 
Model 2C, F(1,92.1) = 3.75, p = .056. As Figure 16 demonstrates, those in the non-deliberating 
condition attributed slightly more responsibility to the defendant when the plaintiff was 
depicted as normal weight (M = 4.27, SE = .21) than when she was depicted as obese (M = 4.59, 
SE = .22).  However, in the deliberating condition, participants attributed more responsibility to 
the obese plaintiff (M = 3.34, SE = .20) compared to the normal weight plaintiff (M = 3.80, SE = 
.19). Pairwise comparisons indicated that in the obese condition, there was a significantly 
greater decrease in total responsibility scores among deliberating jurors compared to non-
deliberating jurors (p < .001). 
 The main effect of BJW-O scores on total responsibility scores was non-significant (F = 
2.21, p = .14), but there was a significant interaction between BJW-O scores and plaintiff weight, 
F(1,92.1) = 3.75, p = .056 (see Figure 17). Estimated marginal means calculated at -1 and + 1 
standard deviations of the mean of the centered BJW-O scale revealed that there was little 
difference between deliberating and non-deliberating jurors’ total responsibility scores in the 
normal weight condition (non-deliberating M = 3.97, SE = .18; deliberating M = 4.10, SE = .17). 
There was a substantial difference between the two groups in the obese condition, such that 
those with higher BJW-O scores were less likely to attribute responsibility to the defendant (M = 
3.71, SE = .18) than those with lower BJW-O scores (M = 4.23, SE = .17). The interaction between 





Figure 16. Interaction between Decision Context and Plaintiff Weight on Total Responsibility 
Judgments in the Total Sample. 
 
 
Figure 17. Interaction between Plaintiff Weight and BJW-O Scores on Total Responsibility 
























































 Model 3C: Effects of BPWE. The interaction between decision context and plaintiff 
weight on total responsibility scores reached statistical significance in Model 3C, F(1,90.6) = 
4.99, p = .028. The interpretation of this interaction is the same as that described in model 2C 
results: there was a greater difference between non-deliberating and deliberating jurors’ total 
responsibility judgments in the obese condition (non-deliberating M = 4.71, SE = .22; 
deliberating M = 3.38, SE = .20) than in the normal weight condition (non-deliberating M = 4.24, 
SE = .21; deliberating M = 3.82, SE = .29). Again, pairwise comparisons indicated that the 
difference between deliberating and non-deliberating jurors in the obese condition was 
significant (p < .001). Contrary to expectations, deliberations did not attenuate weight-related 
bias, according to scores on the total responsibility scale. Instead, this bias seemed to increase 
when participants deliberated in groups.  
 A main effect of BPWE on total responsibility scores emerged, F(1,408.6) = 9.26, p = 
.002, which was similar to the effect of BPWE on verdicts in the total sample. This effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction between BPWE scores and decision context on total 
responsibility scores, F(1,408.4) = 11.66, p < .001. This interaction is depicted in Figure 18. 
Attributions of plaintiff and defendant responsibility for the negative medical outcome in the 
deliberating condition were not affected by BPWE (low BPWE M = 3.57, SE = .16; high BPWE M = 
3.62, SE = .16). Scores on the total responsibility scale were higher overall in the non-
deliberating condition, but were particularly high among those with lower BPWE scale scores 
(low BPWE M = 4.89, SE = .18, high BPWE M = 4.06, SE = .18).  Similar findings emerged when 
testing the interactive effect between BPWE and decision context on verdicts. Tests of pairwise 
comparisons indicated that total responsibility scores among those with low BPWE scores 





 Finally, there was a significant interaction between BPWE and plaintiff weight on total 
responsibility scale scores, F(1,408.4) = 4.46, p = .035 see Figure 19). Again, this interactive 
effect was consistent with the effect between BPWE and plaintiff weight on verdicts. Scores on 
the total responsibility scale did not significantly differ as a function of BPWE scores in the 
normal weight condition (low BPWE M = 4.09, SE = .17; high BPWE M = 3.97, SE = .17). In the 
obese condition, however, those with lower BPWE scores attributed more responsibility to the 
defendant (M = 4.37, SD = .18) than those with higher BPWE scores (M = 3.71, SE = .17). 
 
Figure 18. Interaction between Decision Context and BPWE Scores on Total Responsibility 




























Figure 19. Interaction between Plaintiff Weight and BPWE Scores on Total Responsibility 
Judgments in the Total Sample. 
 
 Model 4C: Effects of FPS. The interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight 
was marginally significant, F(1,407.4) = 2.99, p = .087, revealing a pattern similar to those 
occurring in Models 2C and 3C. The main effect of FPS scores on total responsibility judgments 
approached statistical significance, F(1,407.4) = 3.67, p = .056. This effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between decision context and FPS scores on total responsibility 
judgments, F(1,407.4) = 5.38, p = .021 (see Figure 20). As in the previously described interaction 
between decision context and BPWE scores, FPS scores appeared to have little impact on total 
responsibility judgments among deliberating jurors (low FPS M = 3.56, SE = .16; high FPS M = 
3.62, SE = .17). In the non-deliberating condition, those with lower FPS scores were more likely 
to attribute responsibility to the defendant (M = 4.71, SE = .19) than those with higher FPS 



























statistically significant (p < .001). The interaction between plaintiff weight and FPS scores was 
non-significant (F = .01, ps = .92).   
 Model 5C: Effects of BMI. The interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight 
reached statistical significance in Model 5C, F(1,90.9) = 4.24, p = .042. This interactive effect 
replicated those that emerged in models 2C – 4C. There also was a marginally significant main 
effect of participant BMI on total responsibility scale scores, F(1,414.9) = 2.96, p = .086. Those 
with higher BMIs were more likely to attribute responsibility to the defendant than those with 
lower BMIs (b = -.60, SE = 1.60, p = .71). Participant BMI did not interact with plaintiff weight or 
decision context to influence total responsibility scale scores (Fs < 2.73, ps > .10). 
Figure 20. Interaction between Decision Context and FPS Scores on Total Responsibility 
Judgments in the Total Sample. 
 
 
 Summary of results of analyses addressing H1 C – H1 E. This series of analyses yielded 
multiple significant or marginally significant findings. Some of these findings were consistent 






























which were not specifically hypothesized, but align with extant theory and research. “Trends” or 
effects emerging across several models are highlighted below.  
 The main effect of plaintiff weight was non-significant in all of the models tested with 
verdict, damage awards, and total responsibility scale scores as dependent variables. However, 
there was a relatively consistent main effect of decision context on verdict, non-economic 
damage awards, and total responsibility scale scores. Jurors who deliberated are less likely to 
find the defendant liable for medical malpractice and less likely to attribute responsibility to the 
defendant for the negative medical outcome than jurors who do not deliberate. Among jurors 
who did find the defendant liable, deliberating jurors awarded fewer non-economic damages 
than non-deliberating jurors. These results cohere with the “leniency effect” documented across 
multiple studies involving both actual and mock jurors in criminal cases (see MacCoun & Kerr, 
1988).  
 H1 C – E predicted that plaintiff weight would interact with decision context such that 
non-deliberating jurors would be more punitive towards the obese plaintiff than the 
deliberating jurors. These hypotheses were unsupported, and in some cases, contradicted. 
There were no significant interactions between plaintiff weight and decision context on verdicts 
or economic damage awards. However, the interaction between plaintiff weight and decision 
context was a significant or marginally significant predictor of non-economic damage awards 
and total responsibility scale scores. Results suggest that deliberations may actually exacerbate, 
rather than attenuate, the effects of anti-fat bias. When the plaintiff was depicted as obese, 
deliberating jurors awarded fewer non-economic damages and were more likely to attribute 





 Two notable interactive effects between individual difference variables and the 
manipulated independent variables emerged. First, the influence of some individual difference 
variables on jurors’ decisions appeared to be stronger in the non-deliberating condition. 
Specifically, both BJW-O and BPWE scale scores had a greater effect on jurors’ individual level 
verdicts in the non-deliberating condition than in the deliberating condition, with participants 
scoring lower on both measures particularly inclined to find the defendant liable when they 
considered the case individually. Similarly, BPWE and FPS scores only affected responsibility 
judgments in the non-deliberating condition, with participants scoring lower on these measures 
especially likely to attribute responsibility to the defendant. 
 Second, both BJW-O and BPWE scores appeared to moderate the effect of the weight 
manipulation on total responsibility judgments and verdicts. In the normal weight condition, 
BJW-O and BPWE scores generally had little impact on verdicts and responsibility judgments; 
however, those with higher BJW-O scores were more likely to find the defendant liable in the 
normal weight condition than those with lower BJW-O scores. In the obese condition, those with 
higher BJW-O and BPWE scores were notably less likely to find the defendant liable and 
responsible for the negative medical outcome than those with lower scores on these measures.   
Interactive Effects of Plaintiff Weight and Decision Context on Individual Level SE and SLA 
Measures: A Summary of Analyses Addressing RQ 2 
 As initially proposed, RQ 2 aimed to examine “differences between deliberating and 
non-deliberating jurors on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case judgments” in the normal weight 
condition. After completing data collection and analyses, the decision was made to expand the 
scope of this research question so that it included samples in both weight conditions, as there 





non-deliberating conditions. In addition, analyses addressing RQ 2 also explored potential 
interactive effects between individual difference variables, decision context, and plaintiff weight 
on SE and SLA measures. The effects of decision context, weight condition, and individual 
difference variables on case judgments are described in the previous section. The current 
section explores whether condition assignment interacts with individual differences to influence 
initial, emotionally-based reactions to the case (indicated by SE measures) and attributional 
decision-making processes (indicated by SLA measures) that are hypothesized to lead to case 
judgments. 
  All analyses addressing RQ 2 were conducted in the same manner as those in the prior 
section that addressed H1 C – E, with separate models estimated to examine the main and 
interactive effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and each individual difference variable 
on each SE and SLA measure. Because RQ 2 aims to illuminate key differences in attributional 
responses (rather than differences in case judgements) between deliberating and non-
deliberating jurors, findings are presented in summary form for brevity. Rather than describing 
the results of each individual model, this section summarizes the effects of 1) decision context; 
2) interactions between plaintiff weight and decision context; 3) individual difference variables; 
4) interactions between decision context and individual difference variables; and 5) interactions 
between plaintiff weight and individual difference variables on SE and SLA measures. Non-
significant findings are not reported in detail in the main text. Complete results of each model 
executed and figures depicting all interactive effects, however, are included in Appendix T. 
Moreover, Table 20 includes a summary of fixed effects for all models with SE measures as the 
dependent variable, and Table 21 summarizes the fixed effects for all models with SLA measures 





 Results of all null models executed specifying all SE and SLA measures as the outcome 
variable indicated that all ICCs in the deliberating sample warranted the use of multilevel 
modeling (see Appendix S). There were no significant main effects of plaintiff weight or three-
way interactions between plaintiff weight, decision context, and any measured individual 
difference variable on any of the SE and SLA measures (Fs < 3.05, ps > .09). Thus, results 
pertaining to these effects will not be presented in the following summary. 
 Main effects of decision context on SE measures. SE measures included scores on the 
Negative SE scale, perceptions of the plaintiff, and perceptions of the defendant. Analyses 
revealed a main and consistent effect of decision context on Negative SE scale scores in all five 
models executed including each individual difference variable. Because the model including 
gender as the individual difference variable was the first to yield this significant effect, results 
pertaining to this model are reported here; similar results (including findings of all pairwise 
comparisons) for all other models are included in Appendix T. This approach is followed 
throughout this summary of results, such that the first significant effect of a particular IV on a 
DV emerging in this series of analyses is reported in greater detail; all similar effects of the IV on 
related DVs (i.e., SE and SLA measures) are simply noted and the reader may refer to Appendix T 
for full results. 
 The significant effect of decision context emerging in the model including gender as the 
individual difference variable and Negative SE scale scores as the dependent variable (F[1,100.4] 
= 9.90, p = .002) indicated that participants in the non-deliberating condition had stronger 
negative emotional reactions to the case (M = 2.07, SE = .07) than did those in the deliberating 
condition (M = 1.77, SE = .063). Similarly, analyses revealed that non-deliberating participants 




Table 20. Fixed Effects of Decision Context, Plaintiff Weight, and Individual Difference Variables on SE Measures in Total Sample. 
 
Model                                                                             D: Negative SEs                   E: Perceptions of plaintiff            F: Perceptions of defendant  
     Variable*                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 1: Effects of Gender 
     Decision context                                                       9.68-         >.01                                 9.77         >.01                                         2.27            .14                   
     Weight condition                                                        .07            .79                                   .62           .43                                          1.75            .19 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    1.32            .25                                 3.15           .08                                         1.10             .30 
     Gender                                                                         .50             .48                                 1.76           .19                                         8.26           >.01    
     Gender x Decision context                                       .01             .95                                   .79           .38                                            .60             .44     
     Gender x Weight condition                                      .02             .31                                   .35           .56                                          5.01             .02 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
     Decision context                                                     10.50-        >.01                               10.74          .001                                        4.91            .03 
     Weight condition                                                        .07            .79                                   .71           .20                                            .93            .34 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    2.12            .15                                 4.10           .05                                          2.82            .10                 
     BJW-O                                                                           .19            .67                                 1.73           .19                                        10.28            .001 
     BJW-O x Decision context                                         .04            .85                                   .76           .38                                            .09            .77 
     BJW-O x Weight condition                                        .41            .52                                 2.32           .13                                          4.42            .04 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
     Decision context                                                       8.90-         >.01                               10.81          .001                                        4.47            .04  
     Weight condition                                                        .35            .56                                   .14            .71                                            .07            .79 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    1.88            .17                                  5.04           .03                                          2.18            .08 
     BPWE                                                                          1.64            .20                                  8.49         >.01                                       23.18         >.001 
     BPWE x Decision context                                          .01            .97                                  1.56           .21                                            .84           .36    
     BPWE x Weight condition                                       1.37            .24                                    .23           .63                                            .64           .42 
 
Note.  *Each model also included a three-way interaction term between decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference 







Table 20 (continued).  
 
Model                                                                             D: Negative SEs                   E: Perceptions of plaintiff            F: Perceptions of defendant  
     Variable                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
     Decision context                                                     11.67-           .001                            11.42           .001                                      3.62            .06 
     Weight condition                                                        .13            .72                                   .62           .43                                          .52             .47 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     1.57           .21                                 3.61           .06                                        2.07            .15 
     FPS                                                                                  .78           .38                               12.02           .001                                      3.44           .06 
     FPS x Decision context                                                .01           .95                                   .43           .51                                          .79            .38 
     FPS x Weight condition                                               .95           .33                                   .20           .65                                          .77            .38          
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
     Decision context                                                     10.09          >.01                                 9.59          >.01                                      3.73            .06                    
     Weight condition                                                        .20            .66                                   .99            .32                                       1.04            .31 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    2.94            .10                                 4.63            .03                                      2.02             .16  
     BMI                                                                              1.12            .27                               14.17         >.001                                     5.71            .02 
     BMI x Decision context                                              .71            .40                                  1.76           .19                                        .25             .62 
















Table 21. Fixed Effects of Decision Context, Plaintiff Weight, and Individual Difference Variables on SLA Measures in Total Sample. 
 
Model                                                                                 G: SLA Scale                      H: Plaintiff witness ratings         I: Defendant witness ratings  
     Variable*                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 1: Effects of Gender 
     Decision context                                                      11.15-         >.01                              14.90           >.001                                    1.89            .17                   
     Weight condition                                                       2.07            .14                                 2.61            .43                                         .36            .55 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     2.70            .10                                   .82            .37                                       2.94            .90 
     Gender                                                                       14.92         >.001                             19.05          >.001                                      .07            .79    
     Gender x Decision context                                         .08            .78                                   .39            .53                                       3.18            .09     
     Gender x Weight condition                                        .43            .51                                   .30            .59                                       1.43            .23 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
     Decision context                                                    13.46-         >.001                             17.53          >.001                                        .95            .33 
     Weight condition                                                      2.37            .13                                 2.03            .16                                          .03            .87 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    5.68            .02                                 2.22            .14                                        5.02            .03                 
     BJW-O                                                                         6.35            .01                                   .36            .55                                      12.02            .001 
     BJW-O x Decision context                                       1.20            .27                                   .98            .32                                           .06            .81 
     BJW-O x Weight condition                                      8.58          >.01                                 4.48            .04                                        2.93            .08 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
     Decision context                                                     13.61-         >.001                            18.40          >.001                                       1.07            .31  
     Weight condition                                                        .84            .36                                 1.47            .23                                            .35            .56 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    7.45          >.01                                  3.06            .08                                         5.56            .02 
     BPWE                                                                        24.15          >.001                               4.79            .03                                       13.68         >.001 
     BPWE x Decision context                                        7.79           >.01                                1.35            .25                                            .30            .58    
     BPWE x Weight condition                                       2.45             .12                                1.08            .30                                          6.89           >.01 
 
Note.  *Each model also included a three-way interaction term between decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference 







Table 21 (continued).  
 
Model                                                                               G: SLA Scale                        H: Plaintiff witness ratings         I: Defendant witness ratings  
     Variable                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
     Decision context                                                      11.44-          .001                           16.96          >.001                                      .97             .06 
     Weight condition                                                       2.54           .12                                2.74            .10                                        .15             .47 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     5.10           .03                                2.60            .11                                      2.79            .10 
     FPS                                                                              13.13        >.001                              7.65          >.01                                    10.52            .001 
     FPS x Decision context                                                .38           .54                                  .04            .84                                       5.89            .02 
     FPS x Weight condition                                             2.01           .15                                  .20            .65                                       3.42            .07          
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
     Decision context                                                     10.82            .001                             17.27         >.001                                       .48            .49                    
     Weight condition                                                      3.05            .09                                 2.96            .32                                         .01            .31 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    6.41            .01                                 3.07            .08                                       3.74            .06  
     BMI                                                                              5.34            .02                                   .52            .47                                     10.84            .001 
     BMI x Decision context                                            1.06            .30                                   .07            .80                                         .18             .67 




difference was significant in all five models executed with perceptions of the plaintiff as the DV 
(ps < .004). Finally, non-deliberating participants had more negative perceptions of the 
defendant than deliberating participants in four of the five models executed with perceptions of 
the defendant as the DV, and these differences all reached or approached significance (ps < .06). 
 Interactive effects of plaintiff weight and decision context on SE measures. Decision 
context did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight on participants’ Negative SE scale scores 
or perceptions of the defendant. However, the interactive effect of decision context and plaintiff 
weight was significant or marginally significant in four of the five models testing the main and 
interactive effects of individual difference variables on perceptions of the plaintiff (ps < .06). The 
model including BJW-O as the individual difference variable was the first to yield a significant 
interactive effect, F(1,92.3) = 4.10, p = .046, which is depicted in Figure 21.  In the normal weight 
condition, the perceptions of the plaintiff among non-deliberating (M = 3.82, SD = .15) and 
deliberating jurors (M = 3.64, SE = .13) were similar. When the plaintiff was depicted as obese, 
those in the deliberating condition had more negative perceptions (M = 3.25, SE = .14) than 
those in the non-deliberating condition (M = 4.01, SE = .15). Pairwise comparisons indicate that 
the difference in perceptions of the plaintiff in the obese condition between deliberating and 
non-deliberating conditions is significant (p < .001), as is the difference in perceptions of the 





Figure 21. Interaction between Decision Context and Plaintiff Weight on Perceptions of the 
Plaintiff in the Total Sample. 
 
 Main and interactive effects involving individual difference variables on SE measures. 
 Gender. Gender only impacted perceptions of the defendant, F(1,440) = 8.26, p = .004, 
such that males had more positive perceptions of the defendant than females (b = -.42, SE = .25, 
p = .04). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between participant gender 
and plaintiff weight, F(1,440) = 5.51, p = .019, which is displayed in Figure 22. In the normal 
weight condition, perceptions of the defendant were similar among female (M = 3.92, SE = .11) 
and male (M = 3.98, SE = .13) participants. In the obese condition, however, males had more 
positive perceptions of the defendant (M = 4.40, SE = .14) than did females (M = 3.85, SE = .11). 
Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that, for males, the difference in perceptions of the 

































Figure 22. Interaction between Plaintiff Weight and Participant Gender on Perceptions of the  
Defendant in the Total Sample. 
 
 
 BJW-O. As with gender, BJW-O scores only significantly predicted perceptions of the 
defendant. There was a significant main effect, F(1,434.6) = 10.28, p = .001, such that that those 
with higher BJW-O scores had more positive perceptions than those with lower BJW-O scores (b 
= .55, SE = .18, p = .002). In addition, BJW-O moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on 
perceptions of the defendant, F(1,434.6) = 4.42, p = .036 (see Figure 23). Estimated marginal 
means calculated at +1 and -1 standard deviations of scores on the BJW-O scale revealed that 
perceptions of the defendant did not substantially differ among those low in BJW-O, regardless 
of whether the plaintiff was depicted as normal weight (M = 3.89, SE = .12) or obese (M = 3.80, 
SE = .12). Those high in BJW-O had more positive perceptions of the defendant when the 
plaintiff was depicted as obese (M = 4.34, SE = .12) compared to when she was depicted as 




































perceptions of the defendant between normal weight and obese plaintiff condition among 
those higher in BJW-O was significant (p = .044). 
Figure 23. Interaction between Plaintiff Weight and BJW-O on Perceptions of the Defendant in 
the Total Sample. 
 
 BPWE. BPWE did not moderate the effects of decision context or plaintiff weight on any 
of the SE measures. There was a main effect of BPWE scale scores on perceptions of the 
plaintiff, F(1,433.9) = 8.49, p = .004. Though the fixed effect estimate for BPWE was non-
significant, it indicated that those lower in BPWE had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff 
than those higher in BPWE (b = -.19, SE = .13, p = .17). Correspondingly, there was a significant 
main effect of scores on the BPWE measure on perceptions of the defendant (p < .001), such 
that those higher in BPWE had more positive perceptions of the defendant than those lower in 
BPWE. 
 FPS. There was a significant main effect of FPS scores on perceptions of the plaintiff, 
F(1,430) = 12.02, p = .001. Estimates of fixed effects indicate that those with lower FPS scores 




































= .036). The main effect of FPS scores on perceptions of the defendant approached significance 
(p = .064); those with higher FPS scores had more positive perceptions of the defendant than 
those with lower FPS scores. 
 BMI. Participant BMI was a significant predictor of perceptions of the plaintiff, 
F(1,434.6) = 14.18, p > .001. The fixed effects estimate was non-significant but indicated that 
those with higher BMIs had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff than those with lower 
BMIs (b = 1.48, SE = 1.37, p = .28). Similarly, participants with higher BMIs had more negative 
perceptions of the defendant than those with lower BMIs (p = .017). 
 Main effects of decision context on SLA measures. SLA measures included scores on 
the SLA scale, plaintiff witness ratings, and defendant witness ratings. The model examining the 
effects of gender on SLA scale scores revealed a significant effect of decision context, such that 
deliberating jurors had lower scores on the SLA scale (M = 3.47, SE = .08) than non-deliberating 
jurors (M = 3.85, SE = .08). That is, deliberating jurors were less likely than non-deliberating 
jurors to express pro-plaintiff attributions and more likely to express pro-defendant attributions. 
This effect was replicated in all other models specifying SLA scale scores as the DV. In addition, 
deliberating jurors had significantly lower ratings of the plaintiff’s witnesses than did non-
deliberating jurors across all five models for plaintiff witness ratings (ps <.001). Interestingly, 
decision context did not significantly impact defendant witness ratings in any model. 
 Interactive effects of plaintiff weight and decision context on SLA measures. Decision 
context moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on SLA measures in four of the models 
executed for this DV (excluding gender). This interactive effect first emerged in the model 
incorporating BJW-O as the individual difference variable, F(1,94.7) = 5.68, p = .019. As Figure 24 





were assigned to normal weight (M = 3.85, SE = .11) or obese (M = 3.95, SE = .12) plaintiff 
conditions. In the deliberating condition, jurors in the obese condition had lower SLA scale 
scores (M = 3.28, SE = .11) than jurors in the normal weight condition (M = 3.71, SE = .10). Tests 
of pairwise comparisons indicated that the difference between SLA scale scores in the normal 
weight and obese conditions was significant for the deliberating sample (p < .001). 
 The interaction between plaintiff weight and decision context approached significance 
in only two models specifying plaintiff witness ratings as the DV (ps <.09). The pattern of the 
interaction was consistent with prior findings: plaintiff weight had a negligible effect on plaintiff 
witness ratings in the non-deliberating condition, but deliberating jurors had lower ratings of 
plaintiff witness convincingness when presented with an obese plaintiff compared to a normal 
weight plaintiff. In three of the five models specifying defendant witness ratings as the DV, the 
interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight was significant or marginally 



























significant (ps < .06). Again, deliberations did not substantially affect defendant witness ratings 
in the normal weight condition. Participants in the obese condition, however, viewed the 
defendant’s witnesses as more credible when they deliberated than when they considered the 
case individually.  
 Main and interactive effects involving individual difference variables on SE measures. 
 Gender. SLA scale scores were lower among males (M = 3.48, SE = .08) than among 
females (M = 3.83, SE = .07), and this difference was statistically significant, F(1,439.2) = 14.92, p 
< .001. In addition, males had significantly lower plaintiff witness ratings (M = 4.04, SE = .10) 
than did females (M = 4.56, SE = .08), F(1, 441.7) = 19.85, p < .001. There was a marginally 
significant interaction between gender and condition context on defendant witness ratings (p = 
.075), such that males in the non-deliberating condition perceived the defendant’s witnesses as 
less convincing than males in the deliberating condition; there were no differences in females’ 
ratings as a function of decision context (please see Appendix T for more detailed results and a 
graph of this interaction). 
 BJW-O. The significant main effect of BJW-O on SLA scale scores (F[1,439.2] = 14.92, p < 
.001) was qualified by a significant interaction between BJW-O and plaintiff weight, (F[1, 439.2] 
= 8.58, p < .001). As depicted in Figure 25, plaintiff weight did not impact SLA scale scores 
among those lower in BJW-O (normal weight M = 3.77, SE = .10; obese M = 3.84, SE = .10). Those 
higher in BJW-O had lower scores on the SLA scale in the obese condition (M = 3.38, SE = .10) 
than in the normal weight condition (M = 3.81, SE = .09), and tests of pairwise comparisons 
indicated that this difference was significant (p = .003).  
 This interaction persevered in the models examining the main and interactive effects of 





with higher BJW-O scores rated the plaintiff’s witnesses as less convincing and the defendant’s 
witnesses as more convincing in the obese condition than in the normal weight condition. 
 BPWE. There were numerous main and interactive effects of participants’ BPWE on SLA 
measures. The significant main effect of BPWE on SLA scale scores (F[1,429.9] = 24.15, p < .001) 
such that those lower in BPWE scored higher on the SLA scale than those higher in BPWE (b = -
.18, SE = .10, p = .065)  was qualified by a significant interaction between BPWE and decision 
context, F(1,429.9) = 7.79, p = .005 (see Figure 26). Those higher in BPWE had similar SLA scale 
scores regardless of whether they were in the non-deliberating (M = 3.60, SE = .10) or 
deliberating (M = 3.43, SD = .09) condition. Among those lower in BPWE, SLA scale scores were 
higher for those in the non-deliberating condition (M = 4.24, SE = .10) compared to the 
deliberating condition (M = 3.60, SE = .09). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that the 
difference between decision contexts for those lower in BPWE was significant (p < .001). 






























 There was a main effect of BPWE on plaintiff witness ratings, such that plaintiff witness 
ratings decreased as BPWE scores increased (p = .029); however, no interactive effects between 
BPWE and decision context or plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings emerged. The 
significant main effect of BPWE on defendant witness ratings (p = .001) was qualified by two 
significant interactions.  First, BPWE moderated the effects of decision context on defendant 
witness ratings (p < .038). Decision context had a negligible effect on defendant witness ratings 
among those higher in BPWE, but participants lower in BPWE perceived the defendant’s 
witnesses as less convincing in the non-deliberating condition than in the deliberating condition. 
This pattern is consistent with the interaction between BPWE and decision context on SLA scale 
scores: in both models, jurors lower in BPWE were more likely to interpret attributional 























condition compared to the deliberating condition. Second, BPWE moderated the effects of 
plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings (p < .009). This interactive effect complements the 
effects that emerged in the models executed for plaintiff witness ratings. In the normal weight 
condition, participants’ BPWE had little effect on defendant witness ratings. In the obese 
condition, those scoring lower on the BPWE scale had less favorable perceptions of the 
defendant’s witnesses than those with higher BPWE scale scores. 
 FPS. FPS scores significantly predicted SLA scale scores, F(1,427.1) = 13.13, p < .001; SLA 
scale scores decreased as FPS scores increased (b = -.28, SE = .13, p = .037). There were also 
significant main effects of FPS scores on plaintiff witness ratings (such that higher FPS scores 
were associated with lower plaintiff witness ratings, p = .006), and on defendant witness ratings 
(such that higher FPS scores were associated with higher defendant witness ratings, p = .001). 
The main effect of FPS scores on defendant witness ratings was qualified by two interactions. 
The first interaction (p =.016) is similar to the interaction between BPWE and decision context 
described above. Those with higher FPS scores provided similar ratings of the defendant’s 
witnesses across decision contexts, whereas those with lower FPS scores perceived the 
defendant’s witnesses as less convincing in the non-deliberating condition than in the 
deliberating condition. The second interaction, between FPS scores and plaintiff weight, was 
marginally significant (p = .065) but was consistent with the interactive effects between BJW-O 
and plaintiff weight and BPWE and plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings. FPS scale 
scores had little impact on defendant witness ratings in the normal weight condition. In the 
obese condition, those with higher FPS scale scores perceived the defendant’s witnesses as 





 BMI. Participant BMI significantly impacted SLA scale scores F(1,433.5) = 5.34, p = .021, 
such that SLA scale scores decreased as BMI decreased. The fixed effects estimate of BMI, 
however, was non-significant (b = -.21, SE = 1.03, p = 84). There also was a significant main effect 
of BMI on defendant witness ratings (p = .001), such that ratings of the defendant’s witnesses’ 
convincingness increased as BMI decreased. Participant BMI did not significantly impact plaintiff 
witness ratings, and did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on any 
of the SLA variables. 
 Review of results of analyses addressing RQ 2. Analyses revealed that there were 
indeed many differences in deliberating and non-deliberating jurors’ scores on SE and SLA 
measures. On  nearly all  SE and SLA measures, deliberating jurors’ scores indicated more 
support for the defendant and less support for the plaintiff than non-deliberating jurors’ scores. 
In addition, plaintiff weight only impacted SE and SLA measures in the deliberating condition. 
When the plaintiff was depicted as obese, deliberating jurors had less favorable perceptions of 
the plaintiff, lower scores on the SLA scale, lower ratings of the plaintiff’s witnesses, and higher 
ratings of the defendant’s witnesses than when the plaintiff was depicted as normal weight. 
These findings are consistent with those examining the effects of decision context and plaintiff 
weight on case outcome variables. 
 Decision context moderated the effects of certain individual difference variables on 
certain SLA measures. Attributional responses among jurors with higher BPWE and FPS scores 
were similar across decision contexts. Those with lower BPWE and FPS scores, however, scored 
more “pro-plaintiff” and “anti-defendant” on some of the SLA measures in the non-deliberating 
condition than in the deliberating condition. This tendency for those lower in BPWE and FPS to 





deliberating condition also emerged in the analyses examining predictors of case outcomes (i.e., 
verdict, total responsibility assessment). Analyses revealed several significant or marginally 
significant interactions between plaintiff weight and scores on the BJW-O scale on SE and SLA 
measures. The pattern of all of these interactive effects was similar and supports prior research 
indicating that strong just world beliefs are associated with anti-fat bias (Crandall, 1994; Crandall 
& Martinez, 1996). Overall, plaintiff weight had little influence on several SE and SLA measures 
for participants lower in BJW-O. For those higher in BJW-O, responses indicated more favorable 
perceptions of the defendant and interpretation of attributional information more conducive to 
blaming the plaintiff in the obese condition compared to the normal weight condition. Again, 
these interactive effects cohere with the interactions between plaintiff weight and scores on the 
BJW-O scale on case-related judgments.   
 Plaintiff weight moderated the effects of other individual difference variables on SE and 
SLA measures pertaining to the defendant. These effects again are consistent with extant 
literature regarding the relationships between individual differences and anti-fat bias (e.g., 
Latner et al., 2008; Quinn & Crocker, 1999). Males had more positive perceptions of the 
defendant when the plaintiff was depicted as obese than when she was depicted as normal 
weight, and those high in BPWE provided more favorable ratings of the defendant’s witnesses in 
the obese condition than in the normal weight condition. 
 Finally, several main effects of individual difference variables on SE and SLA measures 
emerged, which were not qualified by interactions with decision context or plaintiff weight. 
Participant BPWE in particular impacted SE and SLA measures independent of the study 
manipulations, such that those lower in BPWE scored more “pro-plaintiff” and “anti-defendant” 





influenced damage awards in a similar manner, though BPWE itself did not significantly impact 
verdicts or assessments of total responsibility. Similarly, those with higher FPS scores had less 
favorable perceptions of the plaintiff and interpreted attributional information to be more 
consistent with blaming the plaintiff than those with lower FPS scores. Prior analyses also 
revealed that those with higher FPS scores were less likely to find the defendant liable and 
awarded fewer economic damages than those with lower FPS scores. 
 Participant BMI also impacted SE and SLA measures independent of plaintiff weight and 
decision context, such that the perceptions and interpretations of attributional information 
were more consistent with blaming the defendant among those with lower BMIs than those 
with higher BMIs. As reported earlier, those with higher BMIs were significantly more likely to 
find the defendant liable than those with lower BMIs. Interestingly, participant BMI did not 
moderate the effects of the weight manipulation on any of the SE or SLA measures.  
 In sum, analyses revealed many significant main effects of decision context and 
individual differences on SE and SLA measures; several significant two-way interactions between 
decision context and plaintiff weight, decision context and individual differences, and plaintiff 
weight and individual differences also emerged. These effects typically aligned with those 
emerging in analyses examining the effects of decision context, plaintiff weight, and individual 
difference variables on case outcomes. Whether the interactions between individual 
differences, decision context, and plaintiff weight affect the relationships between CCM 
attributional components is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the next series of analyses examine the attributional pathways followed by 






Elucidating Attributional Pathways in the Deliberating Sample: Analyses Addressing Research 
Question 3 
 Research Question 3 seeks to determine if the attributional pathways followed in 
assigning blame differ among deliberating and non-deliberating jurors. As previous findings 
demonstrate, discussing the case in groups and rendering a group verdict does have a significant 
impact on participants’ individually rendered SEs, SLAs, and case judgments. Thus, it is likely that 
relationships between CCM attributional components differ between deliberating and non-
deliberating samples in some respects. Because the attributional models involving deliberating 
jurors are nested and because they are specified a bit differently than the attributional models 
involving non-deliberating jurors, each parameter in the deliberating and non-deliberating 
models will not be tested assess differences. Rather, the models will be compared based on the 
significance of specific pathways and indirect effects to elucidate any differences between the 
attributional processes of deliberating and non-deliberating jurors.  
  The procedures followed in specifying the models in Mplus Version 7 were similar to 
those used to elucidate attributional pathways in the non-deliberating sample, with one 
important exception. All path analyses pertaining to the deliberating sample utilized the 
“cluster” command, which results in calculation of robust standard errors and a mean-adjusted 
chi-square statistic to account for the fact that the data are nested and may not meet common 
normality assumptions (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).  
 Eliminating plaintiff weight as a moderator of attributional pathways in the 
deliberating sample. Chi-square difference testing was again conducted to determine whether 
attributional pathways leading to assessments of total responsibility and verdicts differed as a 





of these tests indicated no significant differences between models estimated for the obese and 
normal weight conditions. Therefore, all models of attributional pathways estimated below will 
include the entire sample of deliberating jurors, regardless of weight condition assignment. 
Appendix U contains specific details and results of the chi-square difference tests conducted to 
compare attributional pathway models between deliberating jurors exposed to the obese and 
normal weight plaintiff. 
  Model 1: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on total responsibility. 
Prior to specifying Model 1, a path analysis was executed to assess the effects of all of the 
endogenous variables (SE measures) on all of the proposed mediator variables (SLA measures). 
Results revealed significant relationships between each SE and SLA variable, with one exception: 
perceptions of the plaintiff did not significantly impact defendant witness ratings (B = -.101, p = 
.138). Thus, the pathway from perceptions of the plaintiff to defendant witness ratings was not 
included in Model 1 to avoid saturation. Aside from this pathway, Model 1 assessed the direct 
effects of all SE and SLA variables on total responsibility assessments, the direct effects of all SE 
variables on all SLA variables, and the indirect effects of all SE variables on total responsibility via 
SLA variables. Tables 22 and 23 present the bivariate correlations between SE measures, SLA 
measures, and case outcome variables in the deliberating sample. 
 Model 1 was estimated using MLR. The direct effects of all SE and SLA variables are 
depicted in Figure 27, and a summary of indirect effects appears in Table 24. Goodness-of-fit 
indicators suggest that the specified model fit the data well. The Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 
was non-significant, [χ2(1) = 2.06, p > .15], and the REMSA and CFI values also indicated good 
model fit (.064 and .998, respectively). Standardized coefficients indicated that all SE measures 





were positively related to SLA scale scores (which indicated interpretation of attributional 
information in a manner consistent with blaming the defendant) and ratings of the plaintiff’s 
witnesses. In addition, negative SE scale scores were negatively related to ratings of the 
defendant’s witnesses. Perceptions of the defendant were negatively related to SLA scale scores 
and plaintiff witness ratings, and positively related to defendant witness ratings. All SLA 
measures affected assessments of total responsibility as expected. Higher SLA scores and 
plaintiff witness ratings were positively related to assessments total responsibility (with higher 
scores on the total responsibility scale indicating more responsibility attributed to the 
defendant), whereas higher defendant witness ratings were negatively related to assessments 
of total responsibility. 
 Because the “complex” command was used in MPLUS to account for the nested nature 
of the data in estimating these models, confidence intervals for indirect effects could not be 
calculated using bootstrapping methods (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). It should be noted that all p 
values obtained from the path analyses conducted using the non-deliberating sample were 
consistent with the confidence intervals obtained from bootstrapping methods, and the p values 
obtained for the indirect effects for the models using the deliberating sample are likely similarly 
valid. Model 1 indirect effects results   indicated that all indirect effects of the SE measures on 
total responsibility via the SLA measures were statistically significant (see Table 24). The direct 
effects of scores on the negative SE scale and perceptions of the defendant on total 
responsibility were non-significant (Bs < .93, ps > .10), yet negative SEs and perceptions of the 
defendant were significantly correlated with total responsibility (rs > .28, ps < .001; see Table 
23). This suggests that the relationship between Negative SEs and total responsibility 




Table 22. Correlations between SE and SLA Variables in the Deliberating Sample.  
 
                                                          Negative SEs          Perceptions of          Perceptions of          SLA Scale         Plain. Witness        Def. Witness 
Variables                                                                                Plaintiff                    Defendant                                            Ratings                    Ratings 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Negative SEs                                              -                             .243**                       -.150*                      .295**                   .297**                   -.235**                          
Perceptions of Plaintiff                          .243**                        -                              -.423**                    .491**                   .543**                   -.281** 
Perceptions of Defendant                    -.150*                      -.423**                          -                           -.547**                 -.475**                    .357** 
SLA Scale                                                  .295**                     .491**                      -.547**                        -                          .650**                   -.509** 
Plaintiff Witness Ratings                       .297**                     .543**                      -.475**                    .650**                      -                           -.282** 
Defendant Witness Ratings                 -.235**                   -.281**                       .357**                   -.509**                  -.282**                        -  
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Table 23. Correlations between SE/SLA Variables and Blame Variables in the Deliberating Sample.  
 
                                                          Negative SEs          Perceptions of          Perceptions of          SLA Scale         Plain. Witness        Def. Witness 
Variables                                                                                Plaintiff                    Defendant                                            Ratings                    Ratings 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total Responsibility                              .282**                   .559**                        -.536**                    .744**                    .656**                   -.498** 
Verdict                                                    .273**                   458**                         -.514**                    .694**                    .577**                   -.442** 
Economic Damages                              .080                       .201*                          -.275**                    .404**                    .331**                   -.248* 
Non-economic Damages                     .232*                     .245*                          -.231*                      .369**                    .384**                   -.266** 




Table 24. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Total Responsibility in Deliberating Sample. 
 
SE Measure                            Direct β          SLA Measure                                Direct β           Indirect β 
Negative SE Scale                    .198**           SLA Scale                                         .634**                .067**  
Negative SE Scale                    .237**           Plaintiff Witness Ratings              .297**                .037* 
Negative SE Scale        -.234**           Defendant Witness Ratings        -.238**                .030* 
Perceptions of Plaintiff           .181**           SLA Scale                                         .634**                .093** 
Perceptions of Plaintiff           .359**           Plaintiff Witness Ratings              .297**                .087** 
Perceptions of Defendant     -.351**           SLA Scale                                        .634**               -.161**  
Perceptions of Defendant     -.313**           Plaintiff Witness Ratings             .297**               -.067** 
Perceptions of Defendant      .305**           Defendant Witness Ratings       -.238**               -.053** 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
scale scores; it also suggested that the relationship between perceptions of the defendant was 
fully mediated by the aforementioned SLA measures (Path 2 in Figure 1). There was a significant 
direct effect of perceptions of the plaintiff on total responsibility assessments (B = .164, p < 
.001), which suggests that the effects of perceptions of the plaintiff on total responsibility 
assessments was partially mediated by SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings (Path 3 in 
Figure 1).  
 Model 1: Differences between deliberating and non-deliberating samples. As explained 
earlier, slightly different models were estimated for non-deliberating and deliberating samples. 
In addition, the deliberating models were estimated using the “cluster” command and MLR to 
account for the nested nature of the data, whereas MLE was used to estimate the models 
pertaining to the non-deliberating condition. Therefore, the non-deliberating and deliberating 
models will not be compared using statistical tests to determine which one fits the data better. 
A general comparison of the specific relationships between the CCM components in the models 
is better suited to determining how attributional processes may differ among deliberating and 





 Overall, the relationships between the SE measures, SLA measures, and total 
responsibility were similar in non-deliberating and deliberating samples, but a few differences 
were noted. The extent of mediation and specific mediating variables slightly differed between 
models. In the non-deliberating sample, the effects of all of the SE measures on total 
responsibility were fully mediated by SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings, and there 
was no direct effect of defendant witness ratings (an SLA measure) on total responsibility. In the 
deliberating sample, a direct effect between defendant witness ratings and total responsibility 
assessments emerged, and the effects of negative SE scale scores and perceptions of the 
defendant on total responsibility were fully mediated by all three SLA measures. In contrast to 
the model including non-deliberating jurors, the model including deliberating jurors indicated 
that perceptions of the plaintiff directly impacted total responsibility assessments and that this 
relationship was partially mediated by two (SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings) out of 
the three SLA measures. 
 Model 2: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on verdict. All of the direct 
and indirect effects specified in Model 1 remained in model 2, with the exceptions that verdict 
was specified as the outcome variable and the “categorical” command was used. Because the 
outcome variable was categorical, it was estimated using WLSMV, which can accommodate 
nested models with dichotomous outcome variables (Geiser, 2013). The Chi-Square Test of 
Model Fit for Model 2 was marginally significant, [χ2(1) = 3.96, p > .64], and yielded a REMSA 
beyond what is considered to indicate good model fit (.98). However, the CFA value did indicate 
good model fit (.99) and eliminating various pathways did not improve these model fit statistics. 
Moreover, Model 2 yielded many significant direct and indirect effects and thus was retained as 




Figure 27. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Total Responsibility in Deliberating Sample 
 









   
 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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deliberating sample. Direct effects are depicted in Figure 28, and Table 25 displays a summary 
of indirect effects. 
 In Model 2, all SE measures included predicted deliberating jurors’ scores on SLA 
measures as reported in Model 1 results. Further, all direct effects of SLA measures on verdict 
replicated the direct effects of SLA measures on total responsibility assessments. The direct 
effect of negative SE scale scores on verdict was non-significant (B = .03, p = .68), yet negative SE 
scale scores were positively and significantly correlated with deliberating jurors’ verdicts (r = 
.271, p < .001; see Table 23). Although the indirect effect of negative SE scale scores on verdict 
via defendant witness ratings was non-significant, the indirect effects of the negative SE scale 
scores on verdict via SLA scale scores and defendant witness ratings were significant at the .05 
level. This indicates that the relationship between negative SE scale scores and verdict in the 
deliberating sample was fully mediated by SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings, as 
illustrated by Path 2 in Figure 1.  
 The direct effects of both perceptions of the plaintiff and perceptions of the defendant 
on verdicts were significant (Bs < .13, ps < .01). Tests of indirect effects of these SE variables on 
verdict also were significant, such that perceptions of the plaintiff impacted verdicts indirectly 
via SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings, and perceptions of the defendant impacted 
verdicts indirectly via all three SLA measures. These attributional pathways are most consistent 
with Path 3 in Figure 1, whereby the effects of SEs are partially mediated by SLAs.  
 Model 2: Differences between deliberating and non-deliberating sample. The models 
executed with verdict as the outcome variable with deliberating and non-deliberating samples 
were both consistent with CCM predictions. There were two main differences between the 




Figure 28. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Verdict in Deliberating Sample 
 









   
 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 25. Indirect Pathways from SE Measures to Verdict in Deliberating Sample. 
 
SE Measure                             Direct β          SLA Measure                                 Direct β         Indirect β 
Negative SE Scale                    .167**            SLA Scale                                        .382**               .064**  
Negative SE Scale                    .161**            Plaintiff Witness Ratings             .201**               .032* 
Negative SE Scale        -.167*              Defendant Witness Ratings       -.182**               .030 
Perceptions of Plaintiff           .279**            SLA Scale                                        .382**               .107** 
Perceptions of Plaintiff           .381**            Plaintiff Witness Ratings             .201**                .076** 
Perceptions of Defendant     -.404**            SLA Scale                                        .382**              -.154**  
Perceptions of Defendant     -.290**            Plaintiff Witness Ratings             .201**              -.058** 
Perceptions of Defendant      .289**            Defendant Witness Ratings       -.182**              -.053* 
Note. *p < .05; **p < 01. 
 
the non-deliberating model, and thus the relationship between perceptions of the plaintiff and 
verdict was fully mediated by plaintiff witness ratings and SLA scale scores. In the deliberating 
model, the direct effect of perceptions of the plaintiff was significant, and this relationship was 
partially mediated by plaintiff witness ratings and SLA scale score. Second, the effect of 
defendant witness ratings was non-significant in the non-deliberating model, but significant in 
the deliberating model. In the deliberating model, defendant witness ratings (along with the 
other SLA variables) served as mediators in the relationships between Negative SEs and verdict 
and between perceptions of the defendant and verdict. 
 Model 3: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on economic damage 
awards. Specification of Model 3 was similar to the specification of Model 1, with economic 
damage awards as the outcome variable. As in other models examining the impacts of SEs and 
SLAs on damage awards, both economic and non-economic damages were multiplied by .0001 
prior to inclusion in the model. Model 3 only include 96 cases, representing the 96 jurors in the 
deliberating sample who found the defendant liable for malpractice. 
 All goodness-of-fit indicators suggested that the target model fit the observed data well, 





SE variables on the SLA variables were statistically significant and in the expected directions (see 
Figure 29). Yet, all paths from the SE and SLA variables to economic damage awards were non-
significant (Bs < .32, ps > .10), and thus there also were no significant indirect effects of the SE 
variables on economic damage awards (Bs < .14, ps > .10). Because all indirect effect were non-
significant, a summary table of indirect effects is not presented for Model 3. As indicated in 
Table 23, all SLA variables are significantly correlated with economic damage awards in the 
deliberating sample, with scores on the SLA scale most strongly correlated with economic 
damages (r = .40, p < .01). These relationships did not emerge as significant in Model 3, likely 
because of the small sample size. Recommended sample sizes for path analyses with manifest 
variables vary from as low as 5 cases to as high as 30 cases per specified pathway (Starkweather, 
2014). Because Model 3 was specified so that it could be compared to Model 3 using the non-
deliberating sample, it was important to include the same number of pathways for consistency. 
With only 96 cases in the deliberating sample, it is likely that inclusion of all of the pathways 
decreased the variance attributable to any specific pathway, thereby “masking” a direct effects 
of SLA scale scores on economic damages. 
 Model 3: Differences between deliberating and non-deliberating samples. Despite the 
lack of direct effects between SLA variables and economic damages in Model 3, there were only 
a few differences between this model and the model estimated using the non-deliberating 
sample. In the non-deliberating model, only perceptions of the plaintiff and SLA scale scores 
significantly predicted economic damages. Moreover, as in the deliberating model, none of the 
indirect effects tested in the non-deliberating model reached statistical significance.   
 Model 4: Direct and indirect effects of SE and SLA measures on non-economic damage 




Figure 29. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Economic Damages in Deliberating Sample (liable verdicts 
only) 
 














Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Figure 30. Diagram of Relationships between SE Measures, SLA Measures, and Non-Economic Damages in Deliberating sample (liable 
verdicts only) 
 













Note. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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damage awards replaced economic damage awards as the outcome variable. Again, all 
goodness-of-fit indicators were within acceptable ranges, χ2(1) = 2.06, p > .15; CFI = .99; RMSEA 
= .06., and all relationships between SE and SLA variables were significant and in the expected 
direction (see Figure 39). No significant direct effects of any of the SE or SLA variables on non-
economic damage awards emerged. Because there also were no significant indirect effects of SE 
variables on non-economic damages via SLA variables, a summary table of indirect effects for 
Model 4 is not presented. As in Model 3, all SLA variables were significantly correlated with non-
economic damages, with SLA scale scores the most strongly correlated (r = .369, p < .01; see 
Table 23). A direct effect of SLA scale scores on non-economic damages may have gone 
undetected due to the small sample size given the number of pathways estimated.  
 Model 4: Differences between deliberating and non-deliberating samples. There were 
no direct effects of SE variables on non-economic damages in either the deliberating or non-
deliberating model. In the deliberating model, there was a significant direct effect of SLA scale 
scores on non-economic damages, and SLA scale scores fully mediated the relationships 
between all SE variables and non-economic damages. 
 Summary of analyses addressing Research Question 3. Overall, the models examining 
the attributional pathways followed by deliberating and non-deliberating jurors were quite 
consistent. Models for both samples specifying total responsibility and verdict as the outcome 
variable aligned with CCM predictions, though there was some variation in the extent to which 
SLA variables mediated the relationships between SE variables and the outcome variables (i.e., 
full vs. partial mediation). The most notable difference was that defendant witness ratings 
played a greater role in the attributions of deliberating jurors than in those of non-deliberating 





other SLA variables- plaintiff witness ratings and defendant witness ratings) were the most 
strongly influenced by the SE variables, and SLA variables exerted the greatest impact on the 
outcome variables. Thus, the indirect effects of SE variables via SLA scale scores on the outcome 
variables were stronger than the indirect effects with the other SLA variables as mediators. 
Though it was difficult to compare Models 3 and 4 between deliberating and non-deliberating 
samples, findings still suggest that SEs are most strongly related to SLA scale scores compared to 
the other SLA variables, and that SLA scale scores are more strongly related to damage awards 


































Chapter 12: Discussion 
 
 The primary purpose of this study was to examine the effects of plaintiff weight, 
deliberations, and individual differences on jurors’ decision-making in a medical malpractice 
case. The CCM was used to guide this research for two reasons. First, it was determined that 
among extant attribution theories, the CCM was best suited to illuminate the attributional 
processes underlying jurors’ decisions. Second, although researchers have encouraged the use 
of the CCM to guide jury decision-making research (Nadelhoffer, 2006), it has only been used in 
one jury-decision making study to date (Bright & Goodman-Delanhunty, 2008), and a full test of 
the model has never been conducted. Thus, the secondary purpose of this study was to more 
extensively test the components of the CCM and assess its applicability to research in legal 
contexts. 
 Findings indicated that plaintiff weight, deliberations, and individual differences did 
indeed impact jurors’ decisions in the hypothetical malpractice case used in this study. 
Consistent with reviews of jury decision-making literature (e.g., Feigenson, 2000; Greene & 
Bornstien, 2003), the influence of extra-legal factors on juror decisions was often dependent on 
other factors. For example, the influence of plaintiff weight was moderated by both decision 
context and participants’ individual differences. This chapter highlights the key findings of this 
research, proposing explanations for these findings and discussing their implications for both 
researchers and practitioners. In addition, this chapter addresses the limitations of this study 
and offers numerous directions for future research in this area. 
Effects of Plaintiff Weight on Jurors’ Decisions and Attributional Processes 
 Analyses revealed no main effects of the weight manipulation on any of the dependent 





components specified by the CCM (SEs, SLAs, and blame variables; blame variables include the 
“final” case decisions such as total responsibility, verdict, and damage awards). Thus, all 
components of Hypothesis 1 for the non-deliberating sample, which predicted main effects of 
the weight manipulation on all dependent variables, were unsupported. It should be noted that 
the weight manipulation used in this study was not extreme. The photograph of the “normal 
weight” plaintiff clearly depicted a thin woman (see Appendix G). The photograph of the “obese 
plaintiff” depicted the same woman who would have met the criteria for obesity given current 
CDC standards and the SFRS scale (Stunkard, Sørenson, & Shulsinger, 1983). However, it was 
initially hoped that the plaintiff photograph could be altered to make the “obese” plaintiff 
appear more overweight, but technological difficulties prohibited this. Adding additional digital 
weight to the obese plaintiff photograph may have resulted in direct impacts of plaintiff weight 
on juror decisions. Yet, published studies examining the impact of manipulated plaintiff or 
defendant weight also failed to find direct impacts of the weight manipulation on jurors’ 
decisions (Reichert et al., 20011; Schvey et al., 2013). Consistent with the findings of Schvey and 
colleagues (2013), plaintiff weight only impacted juror decisions among certain participants, and 
in certain circumstances. 
Interactive effects of plaintiff weight and decision context on jurors’ decisions and 
attributional processes. Hypothesis 1 pertaining to comparisons between the deliberating and 
non-deliberating sample posited that deliberations would help attenuate any individual juror 
biases regarding plaintiff weight. Accordingly, it was expected that the case-related judgments 
of the deliberating jurors assigned to the obese plaintiff condition (at both the individual and 
jury group level) would be more pro-plaintiff than those of non-deliberating jurors assigned to 





contradicted by the results of this study. Plaintiff weight had no significant impact on verdict or 
economic damage awards in deliberating and non-deliberating samples. However, among 
participants finding the defendant liable for malpractice, deliberating jurors awarded 
significantly fewer non-economic damages than did non-deliberating jurors when the plaintiff 
was depicted as obese. This tendency to award fewer non-economic damages occurred at both 
the individual and jury levels for deliberating jurors. In addition, assessments of total 
responsibility provided at the individual level revealed that, when the plaintiff was depicted as 
obese, deliberating jurors attributed more responsibility to the plaintiff and less responsibility to 
the defendant for the negative medical outcome than did non-deliberating jurors. 
 Research Question 2 pertaining to comparisons between deliberating and non-
deliberating samples sought to illuminate any differences between these two groups on 
measures of SEs and SLAs. Main effects of decision context on the CCM dependent variables did 
emerge, and will be further discussed in the following section. More pertinent to the current 
discussion, analyses revealed significant interactive effects between plaintiff weight and 
decision context on SE and SLA variables. Specifically, in the obese condition, deliberating jurors 
had more negative perceptions of the plaintiff, lower ratings of the plaintiff’s witnesses, higher 
ratings of the defendant’s witnesses and lower SLA scale scores than non-deliberating jurors. 
The more “anti-plaintiff” and “pro-defendant” scores on SE and SLA measures among the 
deliberating sample align with their heightened tendency to attribute more responsibility to the 
plaintiff and award fewer non-economic damages to the obese plaintiff compared to the normal 
weight plaintiff.  
 There are several possible explanations for why anti-fat bias was exacerbated rather 





deliberated in a group were college students, and often were students attending the same 
college and enrolled in the same courses. Though efforts were made to assign individuals to jury 
groups which did not include their closest peers, jury groups were often comprised of 
classmates. As previously discussed, homogenous juries are more susceptible to bias than more 
heterogeneous juries, because homogenous juries are more likely to interpret evidence in the 
same way, and they feel more comfortable with one another in discussing case interpretations 
which may reflect shared biases (Kerr et al., 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985).  
Upon viewing the photograph of the obese plaintiff, all jurors may have interpreted the 
case facts and evidence in a slightly biased manner. These biases may not have been significant 
enough to impact individual jurors’ scores on CCM dependent variables. However, if many 
deliberating jurors’ attributional processes were affected by plaintiff weight, group discussion of 
their biased interpretations of case facts and evidence may have strengthened the influences of 
these biases on attributional responses and case decisions rendered at both the jury and 
individual levels.  
It should be noted that post-hoc analyses revealed no significant main or interactive 
effects of specific features of jury composition, such as gender or the average scores on the 
individual difference variables, on case-related judgments. The average BMI of a jury (calculated 
across jury members) also did not impact case-related judgments. However, this study did not 
specifically explore how the inclusion of one obese jury member in a particular jury may affect 
that jury’s susceptibility to anti-fat bias. For instance, a jury group may have had a relatively 
average “group BMI” while still including one obese juror. Prior research indicates that jurors 
suppress racial biases when their jury includes just one juror from the relevant ethnic minority 





made more significant efforts to suppress anti-fat bias in the obese plaintiff condition when 
their jury included an obese juror.    
The liberation hypothesis also may be responsible for deliberating jurors’ increased 
tendency to blame the overweight plaintiff. According to the liberation hypothesis, jurors 
serving on ambiguous case or a case in which the evidence is strong for both sides may become 
overwhelmed in evaluating the contradictory evidence, and subsequently become more reliant 
on extra-legal factors in their decision-making (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). The case scenario used in 
this study was designed to be a very “close” case, and yielded largely “split verdicts,” with 63.1% 
of non-deliberating participants and 37.6% of the deliberating jurors (at the individual level) 
finding the defendant liable for malpractice.  
The few studies testing the liberation hypothesis have shown that the increased reliance 
on extra-legal factors when case evidence is ambiguous or equally strong for both sites occurs 
among both deliberating (De La Fuente, De La Fuente, & García, 2003; Devine et al., 2009; 
Reskin & Visher, 1986) and non-deliberating (De La Fuente et al., 2003; Reskin & Visher, 1986) 
jurors. However, no comparisons have been conducted to determine if there are any differences 
in the strength of this effect on individual and deliberating jurors’ decisions. If case ambiguity 
increases susceptibility to bias and most or all members of the jury group are affected, then 
more biased interpretations of the evidence should be shared during deliberations. This could in 
turn increase the impact of extra-legal factors on deliberating jurors’ decisions, as compared to 
those of non-deliberating jurors. 
Finally, study procedures many have unintentionally primed central or rational 
processing of the case facts and evidence in the non-deliberating sample, making these 





jurors were allowed to take notes when individually reviewing the trial summary. After 
reviewing the summary, those in the deliberating condition immediately discussed the case in 
their jury groups. Non-deliberating jurors were instructed to spend 15 minutes to think carefully 
about the case and further encouraged to write down any additional thoughts they had about 
the evidence prior to responding to the dependent measures. This 15 minute “individual 
contemplation” period was intended to ensure that any effects of deliberations could be 
attributed to group discussion rather than to additional time provided to contemplate the case. 
The contemplation instructions provided to non-deliberating jurors, however, were not much 
different from those that have been used to successfully prime rational processing (see Epstein 
et al., 1992; Scarlicki & Rupp, 2010). McCoy and colleagues (1999) found that deliberating jurors 
engaged in more rational processing and were less susceptible to the influence of extra-legal 
factors than non-deliberating jurors asked to verbally “ruminate” about the case for 15 minutes. 
Yet, the possibility remains that the instructions given to non-deliberating jurors in the present 
study may have helped shield them from the influence of extra-legal factors, even if the 
deliberating jurors had the opportunity to discuss the case with their peers. 
Interactive effects of plaintiff weight and individual differences on jurors’ decisions 
and attributional processes. Hypotheses 2-4 pertaining to the non-deliberating sample 
predicted that all individual difference variables assessed in this study would interact with 
plaintiff weight to significantly impact all CCM measures. It was predicted that, in the obese 
plaintiff condition, those with higher BJW-O, BPWE, and FPS scores would have more “anti-
plaintiff” and “pro-defendant” scores on the dependent CCM measure than their counterparts. 
In addition, it was predicted that in the obese plaintiff condition, men would have more anti-





with lower BMIs would have more anti-plaintiff and pro-defendant scores on the CCM than 
those with higher BMIs. 
 After data were collected and preliminary analyses were completed, the decision was 
made to investigate the interactive effects between plaintiff weight and individual differences 
on CCM measures in the entire sample, rather than limiting this investigation to non-
deliberating jurors. Analyses using the total sample yielded several significant interactive effects 
that did not emerge in the analyses conducted using the non-deliberating sample. This increase 
in significant effects using the total sample is likely attributable to the increased sample size and 
subsequent power to detect differences in employing the total sample. The interactive effects 
between plaintiff weight and individual difference variables that did emerge in the non-
deliberating sample were replicated in analyses including the total sample. Analyses revealed no 
significant three-way interactions between plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual 
difference variables on CCM measures. 
Analyses utilizing the total sample revealed that plaintiff weight sometimes, but not 
always, interacted with individual difference variables to influence CCM measures as predicted. 
The significant interactive effects that did emerge suggest that some individual differences are 
more consistent and powerful moderators of the effects of plaintiff weight on juror decisions 
than decision context. Among all of the individual differences assessed, BJW-O was the most 
likely to interact with plaintiff weight to affect jurors’ decisions. These interactive effects largely 
aligned with H2 and with extant literature indicating that individuals with strong BJW-O beliefs 
are particularly inclined to express negative attitudes and behaviors towards obese persons 
(Crandall; 1995; Crandall & Martinez, 1996). In the obese plaintiff condition, those with higher 





for malpractice; award fewer economic damages if finding the defendant liable; attribute 
responsibility to the plaintiff; perceive the defendant more favorably (SE measure); rate the 
defendant’s witnesses as more convincing and the plaintiff’s witnesses as less convincing (SLA 
measures); and to process attributional information related to intentionality, causality, and 
foresight in a pro-defendant manner (as indicated by lower scores on the SLA scale).  
Belief in the protestant work ethic was the second most influential individual difference 
variable with regard to the effects of plaintiff weight on CCM measures. There was a marginally 
significant interaction between BPWE and plaintiff weight on verdict, such that in the obese 
condition, those with higher BPWE scores were more likely to find the defendant liable than 
those with lower BPWE scores. In the obese plaintiff condition, those higher in BPWE also were 
more likely to attribute responsibility to the plaintiff and rated the defendant’s witnesses as 
more convincing than those lower in BPWE.  
Interestingly, FPS scores had little impact on participants’ CCM measures as a function 
of plaintiff weight, with one marginally significant interaction emerging between FPS scores and 
plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings. Contrary to H4, there were no significant 
interactions between participant BMI and plaintiff weight on any of the CCM measures. Gender 
moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on just one CCM measure (perceptions of the 
defendant) and this effect was marginally significant. The failure of gender to moderate the 
effects of plaintiff weight in most instances is largely inconsistent with H3 and with prior 
research indicating that men are more likely to discriminate against obese targets than women 
(Bannon et al., 2008; Graziano et al., 2007; Schvey et al., 2013). 
It is unknown why BJW-O scores more consistently moderated the effects of plaintiff 





establishing links between anti-fat attitudes and belief in a just world (Crandall & Martinez, 
1996) or between anti-fat attitudes and belief in the protestant work ethic (Quinn & Crocker, 
1999). The BJW-O scale used in this study, which is shorter than most BJW scales used in other 
anti-fat bias literature and focuses on just world beliefs about others (rather than about the self) 
may be better suited than the BPWE scale in predicting the effects of anti-fat bias on jurors’ 
decisions. Although research has demonstrated that both BJW and BPWE predict anti-fat 
attitudes, no published studies (to the author’s knowledge) have demonstrated that these 
variables predict decisions about or discrimination against obese persons. Perhaps BJW-O scores 
are more predictive of decisions or behaviors towards the obese than BPWE scores. 
It was anticipated that FPS scores would be among the strongest moderators of plaintiff 
weight on juror’s decisions, but findings from some prior studies as well as the current study 
design may help explain why FPS scores did not operate as expected. A large body of research 
has demonstrated that anti-fat attitudes are pervasive (see Chapter 2 for a review), but few 
studies have explored whether measures of anti-fat attitudes predict discrimination against 
obese persons. Two studies found no relationship between participants’ scores on Crandall’s 
Antifat Attitudes scale (AFA; Crandall, 1994) and subsequent discrimination against obese 
targets (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; O’Brien et al., 2008). A recent study replicating the 
methodology employed by O’Brien et al. (2008) found that anti-fat attitudes assessed by the 
Universal Measure of Bias scale (UMB) did significantly predict discrimination against obese 
targets in a job candidate selection scenario. Thus, the effects of anti-fat attitudes on decisions 
and behaviors may depend upon the particular scale used to assess these attitudes. Further, 
participants completed the FPS after reading the case scenario and rendering their judgments, 





recommended that assessments of potential moderating variables be conducted prior to 
assessment of dependent variables (MacKinnon, 2008), the FPS scale was administered 
following the assessment of DVs to avoid unintentionally informing participants about the 
purpose of the study and influencing their responses on CCM measures. However, participants 
still may have been surprised when asked about their perceptions of fat people toward the end 
of the study and concluded that these perceptions were important to the study’s purpose, 
leading many to suppress their expression of anti-fat attitudes.  
 Overall, studies have shown that individuals’ BMI does not impact measures of anti-fat 
attitudes (Bannon et al., 2008, Crocker et al, 1993, Crocker & Major, 1994), but little research 
has been conducted to determine whether participant BMI is related to discrimination against 
obese targets. This study confirms prior findings that BMI has no significant relationship with 
attitudes; in addition, BMI did not affect jurors’ decision-making. The current findings indicating 
that gender had no relationship with FPS scores and a very negligible influence on CCM 
measures in the obese plaintiff condition is more challenging to explain. These results may be 
specific to the sample of males in this study, or they may be attributable to the increasing rate 
of obesity among males in the U.S. (see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). Yet, 
a recent study revealed that male jurors were still significantly more punitive than female jurors 
when they were led to believe that the female defendant was obese (Schvey et al., 2013). Unlike 
Schvey et al.’s study, however, the current study did not test any three-way interactions 
between gender, plaintiff weight, and other individual difference variables. It is unknown, for 
example, whether the weight manipulation may have had a different impact on the decisions of 





Effects of plaintiff weight on jurors’ decisions and attributional processes: 
Implications. This is first study demonstrating that civil mock juror decisions are affected by 
plaintiff weight, and elucidating the specific circumstances under which these effects occur. 
There are several implications of these findings for both researchers and practitioners. However, 
these implications, and all others discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter, may best 
be viewed as “preliminary implications.” They should be interpreted within the context of the 
limited generalizability of this single study and its methodological limitations. Replication and a 
more comprehensive understanding of the current findings is needed to build support for the 
following implications. 
The current findings should be of interest to those who study prejudice and 
discrimination against the obese. Though numerous studies have elucidated the underpinnings 
of anti-fat attitudes and documented discrimination against the obese (see Chapter 2 for a 
review), few studies have explored if and how anti-fat attitudes and their correlates may impact 
actual decisions and behaviors evident of discrimination. Because FPS scores were not related to 
jurors’ decisions, researchers wishing to explore the effects of anti-fat attitudes should consider 
using the UMB instead. More generally, researchers may wish to more thoroughly investigate 
the construct validity of the FPS, as it was not significantly correlated with gender and only 
weakly (but significantly) correlated with BJW-O scores. 
Similarly, no published studies have explored the effects of BJW and BPWE on 
discrimination against the obese. Current findings suggest that strong just world and protestant 
work ethic beliefs did result in discrimination against the obese target; however, BJW-O scores 





considered in future research assessing both the predictors of discrimination against the obese 
and in the ideological foundations of anti-fat bias. 
Current findings generally support the JSM, although they highlight the uncertainty of 
the factors that may serve as justifications for prejudice against the obese. Based on the JSM, it 
was expected that the case scenario information and the individual decision-making task would 
provide non-deliberating jurors with a “cover” for expressing their prejudice against the obese, 
whereas deliberating jurors would not have such cover in discussing the case with a group. 
Because deliberating jurors’ decisions were more susceptible to plaintiff weight, the group 
decision-making context may have provided an unexpected type of “cover” (e.g., feeling more 
comfortable and supported by their peers who expressed similar perspectives without 
individually considering the case for 15 minutes on their own), allowing jurors to express their 
case perspectives that were in fact influenced by anti-fat bias. The influence of BJW and BPWE 
on jurors’ decisions supports the JSM, which suggests that these individual difference variables 
are justifications of prejudice towards a variety of groups (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).   
 Both the JSM and CCM predict that jurors exposed to the obese plaintiff would have 
stronger negative emotional reactions to those exposed to the normal weight plaintiff. This did 
not occur; however, plaintiff weight did impact general perceptions of both the plaintiff and 
defendant under certain circumstances (e.g, in the deliberating condition and among 
participants with strong BJW-O and BPWE). In addition, interpretation of attributional 
information also was affected by plaintiff weight under certain circumstances, which supports 
both the JSM and CCM. The researchers who developed and advanced the JSM (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003) and the CCM (Alicke, 2000) recognize that these frameworks can be influenced 





illuminated by empirical research. The present findings can be used to establish a foundation for 
future research in this area, particularly with regard to legal decision-making.  
 Current findings are relevant to attorneys and judges because they suggest that civil 
jurors’ decisions may be influenced by plaintiff weight. Though there were no direct influences 
of plaintiff weight on any of the dependent variables, several interactive effects indicate that 
plaintiff weight could potentially influence juror decisions with regard to key case decisions 
including verdict and damage awards. During jury selection, attorneys representing obese 
plaintiffs should consider the diversity of the panel in multiple respects (e.g., gender, race, age, 
background) and the implications for their client in seating a more homogenous or 
heterogeneous jury. Because BJW-O was a consistent predictor of bias in the obese plaintiff 
condition, attorneys representing obese plaintiffs should also consider including this measure in 
their pre-jury selection questionnaires when the law permits. Similarly, judges should consider 
allowing this measure to be included in the pre-selection questionnaires if the attorney provides 
an appropriate reason for doing so. This research did not investigate the effects of attempts to 
remove common justifications of anti-fat bias on juror decisions. Yet, JSM research indicates 
that subtle manipulations of such justifications can decrease discrimination against the obese 
(King et al., 2006). Attorneys representing an obese plaintiff could make efforts to present the 
plaintiff as professional, hard-working, and intelligent to counteract the common stereotypes of 
obese persons as sloppy, lazy, and stupid (see Puhl & Heuer, 2009). In medical malpractice 
cases, these attorneys also could try to introduce evidence or arguments regarding efforts their 
clients have made toward recovery from the negative medical outcome or to overall improving 





Effects of Deliberations and Individual Differences on Jurors’ Decisions and Attributional 
Processes 
  Most research examining the influence of deliberations and extra-legal factors on jurors’ 
decisions has been conducted in the criminal rather than the civil realm. In particular, empirical 
research involving medical malpractice jurors is lacking. In addition to examining plaintiff weight, 
this study also explored the main and interactive effects of deliberations and individual 
difference variables on jurors’ decisions. It was anticipated that such analyses could help 
enhance the understanding of how such variables may operate generally in malpractice cases. 
Findings indicated that deliberations and individual difference variables significantly impacted 
jurors’ decisions in several ways regardless of the weight manipulation.  
  Effects of deliberations on jurors’ decisions and attributional processes. Research 
Question 1 pertaining to the deliberating sample aimed to identify any differences in jury level 
case decisions and those rendered individually by deliberating jurors; no differences were 
found. Research Question 2 pertaining to the deliberating sample explored differences between 
deliberating and non-deliberating jurors on all dependent CCM measures. Analyses revealed 
that decision context was the most consistent predictor of jurors’ individual attributions and 
decisions, such that deliberating jurors were more lenient than non-deliberating jurors. 
Compared to non-deliberating jurors, deliberating jurors were less likely to find the defendant 
liable and responsible for the negative medical outcomes, and awarded fewer non-economic 
damages when they did find the defendant liable. Moreover, with the exception of defendant 
witness ratings, deliberating jurors were significantly more likely to score more pro-defendant 
on all SE and SLA measures than non-deliberating jurors. This suggests that the leniency effect 





Effects of individual differences on jurors’ decisions and attributional processes. 
Research Question 2 pertaining to non-deliberating jurors explored how individual differences in 
this sample may affect CCM measures independent from plaintiff weight. As previously 
discussed, this exploration was expanded to include the entire sample. Results indicated that 
individual differences did indeed influence jurors’ decisions. 
Women were more punitive toward the defendant than men, such that they were more 
likely to find the defendant liable, interpreted attributional information in a manner more 
conducive to blaming the defendant, and rated the plaintiff’s witnesses as more convincing. This 
effect is most readily explained by the similarity-leniency hypothesis (see Greene & Bornstein, 
2003). The plaintiff was female, thus female participants were more likely to identify with her 
which led to an increased tendency to interpret case facts and evidence in a manner favorable 
to the plaintiff. Males were more likely to identify with the male defendant, and thus 
interpreted evidence and case facts in a manner favorable to the defendant. Though the 
question of how gender may interact with other individual difference variables to affect juror 
decisions is an interesting one (e.g., whether the effects of BMI differ between men and 
women), it is beyond the scope of this study. 
Curiously, BJW-O scores did not directly affect any CCM measures. Conversely, BPWE 
scores influenced several CCM measures. Compared to those with lower BPWE scores, those 
with higher BPWE scores awarded fewer economic and non-economic damages, had more 
negative perceptions of the plaintiff and more positive perceptions of the defendant, and rated 
the plaintiff’s witnesses as less convincing. These findings are consistent with research indicating 
that those with strong BPWE are    inclined to find others responsible for their misfortunes, and 





date, no published studies have examined the relationship between BPWE and juror decisions, 
and it is unknown why BPWE scores directly impacted CCM measures while BJW-O scores did 
not. 
  Among all of the individual difference variables assessed in this study, FPS scores and 
participant BMI were the most likely to directly influence CCM measures. Those with higher FPS 
scores were more lenient toward the defendant than those with lower scores. Specifically, those 
with higher FPS scores were more likely to find the defendant liable, awarded fewer economic 
damages when finding the defendant liable, had less favorable perceptions of the plaintiff and 
more favorable perceptions of the defendant, interpreted attributional information in a more 
“pro-defendant” manner, and rated the plaintiff’s  witnesses as less convincing. Again, it is 
unknown why FPS scores were better predictors of CCM measures than both BJW-O and BPWE 
scores. FPS scores were significantly correlated with both PES and BJW-O scores, but it is clear 
that FPS scores uniquely contributed to the variance in CCM measures. The FPS may tap a 
separate construct that is more predictive of juror decision-making than those assessed by the 
BPWE and BJW-O scales. In addition, the FPS is a semantic-differential scale and assesses 
attitudes by eliciting more experiential “gut” responses, whereas the BPWE and BJW-O are 
standard Likert-type scales. For reasons unknown, the more experiential nature of the FPS may 
have been better-suited in predicting punitiveness and leniency compared to the more 
“cognitive” BPWE and BJW-O. 
 Compared to participants with lower BMIs, those with higher BMIs were more likely to 
find the defendant liable and responsible for the negative medical outcome. In addition, jurors 
with higher BMIs expressed more positive perceptions of the plaintiff and more negative 





plaintiff” manner and rated the defendant’s witnesses as less convincing. However, participant 
BMI did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight on any of these dependent variables. The 
direct effects of BMI on CCM measures may be attributable to attitudes towards physicians. 
Research indicates that many physicians harbor strong anti-fat attitudes and that obese patients 
are subject to weight-related discrimination in health care settings (Anderson & Wadden, 2004; 
Bertakis & Azari, 2005). In response to such instances of perceived or real discrimination, many 
overweight or obese individuals may develop negative attitudes towards physicians. If jurors 
with higher BMIs in the current study developed similar attitudes, it is not surprising that they 
would be particularly inclined to blame the physician for the negative medical outcome.  
Interactive effects of deliberations and individual differences on jurors’ decisions and 
attributional processes. There were several significant or marginally significant interactions 
between decision context and individual difference variables on CCM measures. Overall, 
deliberating jurors were more lenient than non-deliberating jurors. However, those with lower 
scores on the ideological individual difference measures were often more lenient than those 
with higher scores. In the non-deliberating condition, jurors’ liability judgments were not 
affected by BJW-O scale or BPWE scores. In the deliberating condition, those with lower BJW-O 
scale BPWE scores were less likely to find the defendant liable than those with higher scores. 
Interestingly, in the non-deliberating condition, those with lower BPWE scores were more likely 
to interpret attributional information in a “pro-defendant manner” and attribute responsibility 
to the plaintiff in than those with higher BPWE scores. In the deliberating condition, BPWE 
scores had little influence on interpretation of attributional information or responsibility 
judgments. Similarly, non-deliberating jurors scoring lower on the FPS had more positive ratings 





with higher FPS scores, whereas FPS scores had no effects on these dependent measures in the 
deliberating condition.  
The current body of juror decision-making research offers no explanations for these 
effects. In particular, it is unknown why non-deliberating jurors with higher scores on ideological 
difference measures (which are positively related to blaming others for their misfortunes) would 
be less likely to interpret attibutional information and blame the purported victim (i.e., the 
plaintiff) than those with lower scores. The ideological framework encompassing these 
individual difference variables may help explain why those with weaker BJW, BPWE, and anti-fat 
attitudes were more susceptible to the leniency effect than their counterparts. Belief in a just 
world, BPWE, and anti-fat attitudes are not only strongly correlated with one another, but also 
correlated with other ideological variables indicative of rigidity and resistance to change such as 
conservatism and authoritarianism (Christopher et al., 2008; Dittmar & Dickinson, 1993). Thus, 
deliberating jurors with stronger BJW, BPWE, and anti-fat attitudes may have been less likely to 
consider and incorporate the perspectives of their fellow jurors in their individual decisions than 
those with weaker beliefs and attitudes. 
Decision context also moderated the effects of gender on some CCM measures. Women 
were not affected by decision context, but men had more negative perceptions of the defendant 
and awarded greater economic damages in the non-deliberating condition than in the 
deliberating condition. This suggests that men were more susceptible to the leniency effect 
emerging from deliberations than women, but the reasons underlying this effect are unknown. 
Perhaps women’s identification with the female plaintiff was a bit stronger than men’s 
identification with the male defendant. In the deliberating condition, those with higher BMIs 





also is difficult to explain within the context of the extant literature, especially because analyses 
revealed no effects of the average BMI of juries on case decisions.  
Effects of deliberations on jurors’ decisions and attributional processes: Implications. 
Again, the findings of the current study must be considered in the context of their limitations. 
However, the current findings can be used to help build a foundation for understanding the 
effects of deliberations and specific individual differences on juror decisions for both 
researchers and practitioners. To the author’s knowledge, no studies have been published that 
directly compare the judgments of deliberating and non-deliberating jurors in a medical 
malpractice case. In addition, no published studies have demonstrated how BPWE, anti-fat 
attitudes, and participant weight (measured by BMI) may impact jurors’ judgments in a civil 
case. 
Overall, findings suggest that the decisions of individual jurors can significantly differ 
from those of deliberating jurors. This finding has important implications for both researchers 
and practitioners. A review of several jury decision-making studies found few differences in the 
decisions rendered by student and non-student jurors (Bornstein, 1999) but this review did not 
address potential differences between the judgments of deliberating and non-deliberating 
jurors. Deliberations had both direct and interactive (i.e., moderated the effects of plaintiff 
weight and individual differences) effects on juror decisions and judgments in the current study. 
Thus, researchers may consider the extent to which findings from studies that examine the 
judgments of individual jurors generalize to the group decision-making context. Similarly, 
practitioners may want to consider the applicability of such results to jury trials. 
MacCoun (1998) posited that the leniency effect so commonly documented in studies of 





cases. One study comparing mock jurors’ pre- and post-deliberation verdicts across four 
different civil trials found that, overall, jurors were more likely to render liable verdicts post-
deliberation (Hastie et al., 1998). The current study, however, demonstrates a consistent 
leniency effect of deliberations on mock jurors’ judgments. There is no ready explanation to 
reconcile these conflicting findings, but both researchers and practitioners should recognize that 
the leniency effect may apply to some civil juries. Further evidence for a leniency effect in civil 
juries may encourage civil plaintiffs and their attorneys to opt for a bench trial rather than a jury 
trial. Findings indicating a leniency effect in civil mock juries comprised of 4-6 members also may 
have policy implications. There has been significant controversy regarding the decreasing size of 
civil juries (Monahan & Walker, 2006); in most states, civil juries include between 6-8 members 
rather than the traditional 12 members (American Bar Association, 2015). Evidence of a leniency 
effect among civil juries suggests that smaller juries may not be as disadvantageous to the 
defendant as expected, and that challenges to the preponderance of evidence standard are still 
often raised and discussed within these juries. Yet, if this leniency effect does exist in civil juries, 
the extent to which it may increase or decrease with the addition of jury members is unknown. 
Studies have demonstrated a relationship between specific beliefs (such as beliefs in a 
litigation crisis and beliefs about physicians) and civil jurors’ decisions (Hans & Loftquist, 1994; 
Hastie et al., 1999; Reichert et al., 2011), but few studies have assessed the impacts of 
personality and demographic variables on civil jurors’ decisions. Two studies found that BJW 
was positively related to punitiveness towards civil defendants (Hans & Loftquist, 1994; Reichert 
et al., 2011). This finding was not replicated in the current study. However, BPWE scores were 
negatively related to punitiveness toward the defendant. This finding is important as no 





FPS scale scores also were consistently negatively related to punitiveness toward the defendant. 
Researchers should consider further exploring the potential for such measures to predict civil 
jurors’ decisions, whereas attorneys should consider incorporating such measures into their voir 
dire questionnaires to help inform their voir dire and juror selection strategies. Within the 
context of the current study, it is suggested that participant BMI may be related to attitudes 
towards physicians, and that the purported negative attitudes towards physicians held among 
those with higher BMIs influenced their decisions. These findings should be interpreted with 
caution among legal practitioners. To the author’s knowledge, there are no published studies 
demonstrating an empirical relationship between individuals’ BMIs and attitudes towards 
physicians. Experts recommend that attorneys representing clients in medical malpractice cases 
should include an assessment of attitudes and beliefs about physicians in voir dire 
questionnaires (see Feigenson, 2000; Vidmar, 1995). Attorneys practicing in jurisdictions that 
prohibit or discourage the addition of additional voir dire questions should consider the ethical 
implications of exercising preemptory challenges to “strike” overweight or obese jurors due to 
the association revealed in this study until a further body of evidence emerges on this topic. 
Testing the Culpable Control Model: Jurors’ Attributional Pathways 
 This study examined the relationships between the three main components of the CCM 
in both non-deliberating and deliberating samples. In prior research examining these 
relationships, each CCM component was typically operationalized by a single measure (e.g., 
emotional response or actor characterizations as SE measures; perceived causal contribution or 
negligence as SLA measures; and general “blame” or verdicts as blame measures), and these 
measures differ across studies (see Alicke, 1994; Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Mazzoco 





measures of the three types of structural linkage assessments perceivers are expected to 
consider when ascribing blame: behavioral control, causal control, and outcome control. 
However, results of factor analyses suggested that this scale tapped a unitary construct, rather 
than three distinct attribution constructs. This SLA scale was consequently used as an overall 
measure of structural linkage assessments. 
 Research Questions 1 and 3 pertaining to the non-deliberating sample explored whether 
attributional pathways differed as a function of plaintiff weight and individual differences, 
respectively. Statistical model comparisons and other analyses revealed no substantial 
differences; thus, path models including all CCM variables were estimated using the entire non-
deliberating sample. These models were highly consistent with CCM predictions. In most 
instances, jurors’ SEs influenced their SLAs, which in turn influenced their blame judgments. The 
effects of jurors’ SEs on total responsibility assessments, verdict, and non-economic damage 
awards were typically fully mediated by the SLA measures, although partial mediation also 
occurred. It should be noted that most, but not all of the CCM components were significant 
predictors of the outcome variables. For instance, ratings of the defendant’s witnesses did not 
significantly predict any blame measures, and thus the indirect effects of the SE measures only 
operated through scores on the SLA scale and plaintiff witness ratings. In addition, there were 
no significant indirect effects of the SE measures on economic damage awards. 
 Overall, these findings reflect the “primary” CCM attributional pathway (Path 2 in Figure 
1) advanced by Alicke (2000). This pathway suggests that perceivers’ initial reactions to a 
situation involving a negative outcome and to the actors involved color their interpretation of 
attibutional information, which can include evidence presented in a civil trial. In turn, these 





SEs only directly impacted blame measures in three instances. In two out of these three 
instances, the relationship between these SEs and blame measures were still partially mediated 
by SLAs. This indicates that, in the current study, jurors’ initial reactions to the case seldom 
affected final judgments without also influencing their consideration of attributional 
information. Though the conclusion that jurors in this study followed Paths 2 and 3 in Figure 1 is 
supported by theory and study design (i.e., participants responded to CCM measures in a 
specific order), the possibility exists that jurors may have followed Path 1B, which proposes that 
SEs directly impact blame, and that SLAs are subsequently modified to support these blame 
ascriptions. Within the context of the current study, however, this pathway is unlikely given the 
limited direct effects between measures of SEs and blame and the consistent indirect effects of 
SE measures on blame measures through SLA measures.  
 There were no indirect effects of SEs on economic damage awards via SLAs in the non-
deliberating sample. Rather, both SLA scale scores and perceptions of the defendant (an SE 
measure) directly influenced economic damage awards. It is unknown why the attributional 
pathways emerging in the model specifying economic damage awards as the blame variable 
differed from the pathways emerging in the other three models. Both models specified with 
economic and non-economic damage awards included significantly fewer cases than the other 
models, as only jurors who found the defendant liable awarded damages. The plaintiff 
requested greater compensation in non-economic damage awards ($400,000.00) than in 
economic damage awards ($250,000.00), and more specific justifications were provided for the 
economic awards compared to the non-economic awards (see Appendix H). This may have 





attributional pathways could be illuminated, whereas economic damage awards may have been 
more constrained. 
Although current findings indicate the deliberating jurors were more likely to be 
influenced by plaintiff weight than non-deliberating jurors, attributional pathways followed by 
deliberating jurors also did not significantly differ between weight conditions. Research question 
3 pertaining to comparisons between samples explored differences in attributional pathways 
followed by deliberating and non-deliberating jurors. Though these pathways could not be 
compared statistically, there appeared to be minimal differences between the two samples. SLA 
measures often fully mediated the relationships between SE measures and the total 
responsibility and verdict outcome variables. Partial mediation occurred in a few instances; for 
example, perceptions of the plaintiff directly impacted both total responsibility assessments and 
verdict, and this effect was partially mediated by SLA scale scores and plaintiff witness ratings.  
There was one main difference between the attributional pathways followed by 
deliberating and non-deliberating samples: defendant witness ratings significantly influenced 
total responsibility assessment and verdict in the deliberating sample, but not in the non-
deliberating sample. It follows that defendant witness ratings mediated the relationship 
between SEs and outcome measures in the deliberating sample, but not in the non-deliberating 
sample. Again, there are no simple explanations for these differences. Research on the leniency 
effect suggests that deliberations allow for more opportunities to discuss doubt regarding the 
plaintiff’s case (i.e., whether it meets the standard of proof; MacCoun, 1990; MacCoun & Kerr, 
1988); therefore, deliberating jurors may have either considered the defendant’s witnesses’ 
testimony more carefully, assigned greater weight to the defendant’s witnesses’ testimony, or 





sample. However, this may be due to the decreased sample size of deliberating jurors finding 
the defendant liable than to actual differences in attributional pathways between samples. 
 Two specific trends emerged from path analyses conducted using both non-deliberating 
and deliberating samples. First, among the SE variables, perceptions of the plaintiff and 
perceptions of the defendant were stronger predictors of the SLA variables than negative SE 
scale scores. The indirect effects of negative SE scale scores via SLA variables on the outcome 
variables were smaller than those of the other two SE variables, and negative SE scale scores did 
not directly influence outcome variables in any of the estimated models. Overall, jurors did not 
have strong negative emotional reactions to the case, perhaps because the outcomes of the 
surgery were negative (vision loss) but not severe (chronic illness or death). SEs may be a better 
predictor of attributions in cases involving more disturbing or graphic allegations. 
Second, among the SLA variables, the SLA scale was the strongest and most consistent 
predictor of the outcome variables. In the non-deliberating sample, the SLA scale was the only 
SLA measure that significantly predicted economic and non-economic damage awards. All three 
SLA measures had adequate reliability, but the SLA scale was much more comprehensive than 
the measures of plaintiff and defendant witness ratings. In addition, the SLA scale did not 
examine jurors’ direct reactions to the evidence and testimony presented in the trial summary. 
Rather, participants were asked to provide their opinions regarding the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s intention, foresight, and casual contribution relative to the negative medical 
outcome. The SLA scale likely provided jurors with a better opportunity to express their opinions 






 Finally, it should be noted that results of the path analyses did not strongly support or 
refute key propositions of the JSM. Again, no specific tests of the JSM were conducted in this 
study, but this framework was used to help support the use of the CCM as a guiding theory and 
to anticipate effects of plaintiff weight and deliberations on jurors’ interpretation of the case 
evidence and case decisions. JSM theorists conceptualize “genuine prejudices” as immediate 
negative emotional reactions to a minority group or its members, and that this negative 
emotional reaction often directly affects final judgments or blame ascriptions in an attributional 
scenario involving the target of prejudice; individuals may subsequently adjust their cognitions 
or beliefs to support this blame ascription (Crandall & Eshleman, 2000). Current findings suggest  
that jurors’ initial perceptions and emotional responses directly impact their cognitions and 
beliefs pertaining the case evidence, which subsequently influences blame ascriptions. Based on 
the assumption that most study participants (like most Americans) harbor prejudices against the 
obese, the overarching JSM framework would predict some differences in attributional 
processes between jurors assigned to normal and obese plaintiff conditions. Yet, the JSM also 
acknowledges that genuine prejudices may sometimes directly alter values, thoughts, and 
beliefs about a target group or group member, which then are used to justify blame against the 
target for their situation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2000). This pattern aligns with the current 
findings.   
 Testing the Culpable Control Model: Implications. This study examined the 
relationships between the CCM components in greater depth than the extant literature 
grounded in the CCM. Thus, findings should be of interest to CCM theorists and the larger 
population of attribution researchers. Many attribution theories fail to consider how initial 





information, or processes that in turn may influence blame ascriptions (e.g., Gailey & Lee, 2005; 
Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 2006). Current results highlight the importance of considering both the 
effects of initial reactions to a scenario and the factors that may mediate the relationship 
between initial reactions and blame ascriptions in understanding attributional processes. 
Current results also support the CCM’s applicability to juror decision-making research, as only 
one published study (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty,2006) has demonstrated that jurors’ initial 
reactions to a case influence their interpretations of case evidence in testimony, which in turn 
influences verdicts.  
 Current findings have more specific implications for CCM researchers. Alicke’s (2000) 
initial theoretical article outlining all of the potential relationships between the CCM 
components and sub-components (i.e., the three types of structural linkage assessments) 
operationalized SEs as affective reactions to a situation leading to a negative outcome and/or to 
the actors involved in that situation. Yet, most studies grounded in the CCM have 
operationalized SEs as perceptions or characterizations of the actors, rather than as general 
affective reactions (Alicke, 1994; Alicke & Zell, 2009; Mazocco et al., 2004: see Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006, for an exception). In a later theoretical paper, Alicke (2008) 
acknowledged that SEs may also include initial, more generalized perceptions of the actors 
involved in an attributional scenario. Results of this study suggest that perceptions of actors may 
indeed be better predictors of both SLAs and blame than affective responses in attributional 
scenarios that are not highly emotionally provocative (e.g., do not focus on psychologically 






 No prior studies have examined the specific contributions of the three hypothesized 
structural linkage assessments to blame ascriptions. The current study aimed to do so; however, 
factor analyses indicated that the scale developed to measure these three distinct linkages was 
actually a unitary measure of SLAs. This does not necessarily imply a theoretical weakness. 
However, the value of considering these three structural linkages in both understanding and 
predicting attributions merits further exploration.   
 Many judges, attorneys, and other legal professionals already recognize that juror 
decisions are susceptible to bias, and that early reactions to a case and its parties can influence 
both consideration of the evidence and case judgments (Broadsky, 2009). Although current 
results support these beliefs, they are limited in illuminating ways in which legal professionals 
can help influence these initial reactions and their subsequent impact on interpretation of 
evidence and testimony. In the current study, SEs influenced SLAs regardless of decision context 
or plaintiff weight. Legal professionals cannot anticipate the countless factors that may affect 
jurors’ initial reactions, nor can they attempt to address all of these factors. They can, however, 
make efforts to attenuate negative reactions upon identifying specific case features or 
characteristics of the parties that could inappropriately influence jurors’ attributional processes 
and decisions. Such efforts are often apparent during voir dire. For instance, attorneys 
representing a client belonging to a minority group with regard to ethnicity, religion, or sexual 
orientation will often highlight their client’s minority status during voir dire. Next, they will ask 
members of the jury panel if they have any attitudes or beliefs about the specific minority group 
that would unduly influence their decisions in the case. Not only may such inquiries help identify 





importance of remaining impartial fact finders even when they harbor prejudices related to a 
client’s minority status (Broadsky, 2009).  
 There is insufficient evidence to advance a recommendation that attorneys representing 
an obese client highlight their client’s weight during vior dire and directly ask members of the 
jury panel if they are prejudiced against the obese. Prior research suggests that presenting 
obese targets in a manner that counteracts commonly held stereotypes can help remove these 
stereotypical “justifications” for expressing prejudice, which in turn decreases discrimination 
(King et al., 2006). Thus, attorneys concerned about jurors’ anti-fat biases may consider 
highlighting characteristics of their client that undermine weight-related stereotypes. If 
appropriate, this could include referencing the client’s strong work ethic or educational 
background. Attorneys representing obese clients who have been injured or endured other 
negative medical outcomes could highlight their client’s efforts towards recovery, if doing so is 
not expected to inappropriately influence jurors’ damage awards related to medical costs and 
leave from work.  
 Given the documented influences of SEs on offense or case-related information in this 
study and in others (Alicke et al., 2009; Mazocco et al., 2004), managing jurors’ initial reactions 
to their clients is likely the best strategy for attorneys concerned about juror bias related to 
salient client characteristics such as ethnicity and weight. However, attorneys anticipating initial 
negative reactions to their client could potentially minimize the effects of such reactions by 
presenting comprehensive and consistent evidence and testimony. Some attorneys may 
perceive similar witness testimony as repetitive and reiteration of case facts favorable to their 
client as unnecessary, but jurors may experience greater difficulty in modifying their 





Limitations and Future Research 
 There are two primary approaches to studying juror decision-making. The first involves 
analyzing actual jury-rendered case decisions and their relationships with a variety of known 
characteristics of the jury members, trial participants, and the case itself (e.g., see De La Fuente 
et al., 2003; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Vidmar & Hans, 2007). The second involves manipulation of  
various aspects of the case, trial participants, and/or decision context to assess the influences of 
such manipulations on mock jurors’ decisions in a laboratory setting (e.g., see Kerr et al., 1995; 
Miller et al., 2011; Sommers, 2006). Both approaches have several, though different, limitations. 
 This study explored mock jurors’ decisions in a laboratory setting so that researchers 
could manipulate plaintiff weight and explore the impacts of this manipulation on jurors’ 
decisions about the same case scenario. Verisimilitude is always a concern in such laboratory 
juror decision making studies (Bornstein, 1999). Though participants in the current study were 
instructed to carefully and thoroughly review the case scenario, and to base their decision on 
only the case facts and evidence, they were well aware that the case judgments rendered had 
no actual legal or human impacts. Moreover, there are many critical differences between 
participants’ experiences in this study and those of actual jurors. For instance, study participants 
served as “jurors” for one hour, based their decisions on a trial summary consisting of five 
pages, and were not exposed to several other experiences and information sources common in 
actual trials (e.g., juror orientation, voir dire, opening and closing arguments, cross-examination 
of witnesses, having the opportunity to submit questions). It follows that the judgments of mock 
jurors in this study and actual jurors may differ in many ways, and it is not easy to predict 





there is a strong possibility that mock jurors in the current study may have been more 
susceptible to extra-legal influences compared to actual jurors. 
 This study did assess jury level case-related judgments and determined that there were 
few differences between jury decisions and deliberating juror’s decisions at the individual level. 
However, findings did not reveal why some deliberating jurors rendered judgments that differed 
from those of their jury group. In addition, attributional processes were not examined at the 
jury level, and no higher-level (level two) analyses were conducted that explored the decisions 
of deliberating jurors while accounting for the context within their specific jury group. Future 
research should more carefully examine how jury level processes can be affected by individual 
juror biases, while considering several aspects of jury composition (e.g., gender, ethnicity, SES, 
personality variables and case-specific beliefs) as potential moderators of jury susceptibility to 
bias. 
 The sample in this study was entirely comprised of college students. Those who actually 
serve on juries are typically much older and less educated that the average college student 
(Cutler & Hughes, 2001) and likely differ from college students in several other respects. 
Bornstein’s (1999) review comparing the outcomes of juror decision-making studies using 
college and community member samples found few differences between the two groups. More 
recent studies, however, have uncovered substantial differences in the judgments of student 
and community member mock jurors (McCabe, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010; Reichert et al., 2011; 
Schwartz & Hunt, 2011). Thus, it is quite possible that the attributional processes and case 
judgments assessed in the current sample of college students could significantly differ from 
those in community member samples. In addition, deliberating jury groups in this study were 





same class. As previously noted, this resulted in more homogenous jury groups than would be 
expected if juries were comprised of community members, and this homogeneity could have 
increased susceptibility to anti-fat bias and other extra-legal factors. 
 There also are limitations associated with the assessment of attributional processes. 
Prior to rendering individual level case judgments, participants were asked to express specific 
emotions, perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant, and opinions about witness credibility as 
well as those regarding actors’ intention, causality, and foresight. This process may have 
increased participants’ awareness and consideration of their reactions to the case and 
interpretations of attributional information, leading to an increased tendency to incorporate 
their expressed reactions and opinions into their case judgments. Jurors may have been 
motivated to incorporate their SE and SLA responses in order to maintain cognitive consistency 
or because they believed they were expected to do so. Essentially, analyses indicated that SEs 
predicted SLAs which predicted case judgments, but these relationships may be partially 
attributable to the “forced” expression of specific SEs and SLAs. 
 Findings from this study suggest that jurors followed the primary attributional pathways 
proposed by the CCM (Paths 2 and 3 as illustrated in Figure 1), but it is possible that some jurors 
may have followed Path 1B. Such alternative pathways should be tested in future research. In 
addition, this study failed to illuminate any differences in participant’s perceptions of the three 
structural linkages as proposed by the CCM and how these three SLAs may impact decision-
making. The scale designed to assess these three SLAs instead appeared to measure a unitary 
construct of interpretation of attributional criteria. The three hypothesized SLAs may indeed 





Perhaps the three unique SLAs could be more appropriately measured using a different scale or 
a different sample. 
 Both the limitations and contributions of this study can help inform future research. 
Clearly, more research is needed to better understand the circumstances in which plaintiff 
weight may influence jurors’ decisions in malpractice cases. There were no direct effects of 
plaintiff weight on any of the dependent variables assessed in this study. The plaintiff was 
depicted as obese, but most participants likely did not perceive her as “morbidly” obese. Studies 
depicting the plaintiff as substantially heavier than the current depiction may reveal stronger 
effects of anti-fat bias on jurors’ decisions. The effects of plaintiff weight on jurors’ decisions 
may also depend on whether key features of the case trigger activation of weight-related 
stereotypes. The scenario involving LASIK surgery was purposely used in this study because it did 
not imply that the plaintiff’s weight contributed to either her condition that necessitated the 
surgery or its negative outcomes. The effects of plaintiff weight may be stronger in medical 
malpractice cases in which an obese plaintiff has a condition that is more directly associated 
with obesity, such as heart disease or diabetes. Future research could explore the effects of 
plaintiff weight and condition/illness type (i.e., associated with obesity vs. not associated) on 
jurors’ decisions using similar case scenarios. Findings that jurors render more “anti-plaintiff” 
judgments when an obese plaintiff’s underlying condition is strongly associated with obesity 
could lend support to the JSM, which would conceptualize the obese plaintiff’s reason for 
surgery as a justification for blame. 
 The depiction of the defendant in this study, “Dr. Kelly,” was held constant across all 
conditions. Though the photograph of Dr. Kelly was not pre-tested or rated prior to being 





attractiveness of Dr. Kelly may have affected jurors’ decisions, such that jurors were more 
lenient towards the defendant. This leniency may have been more pronounced in the 
deliberating condition to the extent that all deliberating jurors similarly favored Dr. Kelly 
because of his attractiveness. Thus, findings from the current study must be replicated in studies 
that present different defendants to participants (e.g., less attractive defendants, female 
defendants, ethnic minority defendants, etc.) to ensure that effects are in fact attributable to 
plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences rather than to participants’ 
reactions to the defendant’s appearance.  
   Among all of the independent and individual difference variables included in this study, 
decision context had the strongest and most consistent effects on jurors’ decisions. Further 
exploration of the dynamics and impacts of deliberations on jurors’ decisions in medical 
malpractice cases and in civil cases in general is greatly needed, especially considering the 
dearth of research in this area. Experimental studies using community samples and different 
case scenarios can compare either the pre- and post-deliberation decisions of deliberating jurors 
or the decisions of deliberating and non-deliberating jurors to determine whether the current 
study’s leniency effect occurs in other contexts. Evidence supporting or opposing a leniency 
effect in civil juries could also be obtained by comparing judicial and jury civil case judgments in 
both laboratory and real-world settings. 
 Sommer and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that the decision of mock civil juries were 
inappropriately influenced by decision rules (i.e., strict vs. contributory and comparative rules). 
Current findings highlight the need to examine civil juries’ susceptibility to other extra-legal 
factors. Other studies using community samples and different case scenarios must be conducted 





anti-fat bias than non-deliberating jurors. Civil jury decision-making researchers should also 
consider examining the effects of other potential biases related to plaintiff and defendant 
characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, SES, attractiveness, individual differences) on jurors’ decisions in 
both deliberating and non-deliberating contexts. In particular, research is needed to better 
understand how related ideological variables such as BPWE, BJW, and anti-fat attitudes can 
impact civil jurors’ decisions. Morevoer, findings from the current study indicate that 
deliberations influenced jurors’ decisions, but they do not explain how deliberations influenced 
these decisions. An enhanced understanding of deliberation processes and the topics discussed 
could be obtained by video or audio taping mock juror’s deliberations. 
 Two additional key elements of civil jury decision-making were not explored in this 
study and merit further attention. Juries in the current study were required to render a 
unanimous verdicts; however, several state statues specify that majority rather than unanimous 
agreement is sufficient to render judgments in many civil cases (Monahan & Walker, 2006). In 
future research, it will be important to consider unanimity as a factor in exploring both civil 
decision-making as a whole and how extra-legal factors can influence the judgments of 
deliberating juries. In addition, the current study did not ask juries to elect a foreperson. Yet, 
both civil and criminal juries elect a foreperson to serve as the chief jury leader and 
administrator (Feigenson, 2000). There has been little empirical research on the influences of 
jury forepersons on juror decisions; however, one study involving a civil case suggests that such 
influence is substantial (Foley & Pigott, 1997). Thus, future research investigating the effects of 
exta-legal factors on deliberating jurors’ decisions should also explore the general role of the 
foreperson in such decisions as well as how characteristics of the foreperson (e.g., individual 





 Finally, there is a need for more empirical research grounded in the CCM. Such research 
should not only conduct additional tests of the framework, but also explore its capability to 
enhance the understanding of attributional processes and blame ascriptions in applied contexts. 
Both theorists and applied researchers have highlighted the CCM’s applicability to real-world 
decision making, and to legal decision-making in particular (Alicke & Zell, 2009; Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2006). Published empirical studies to date have only 
examined select components of the CCM (e.g., Alicke, 1994; Alicke & Zell, 2009. Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty). The more comprehensive test of the CCM conducted in this study 
supports the main tenets of the CCM and the hypothesized relationships between its 
components. However, understanding how each component operates to influence jurors’ 
decisions was challenging, and the full CCM framework may be too complex for use in applied 
settings. Thus, future research should focus on identifying the components of the CCM that are 
most predictive of attributional processes and blame ascriptions across various scenarios. For 
instance, current findings indicated that perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant were 
stronger predictors of attributional processes and blame than affective reactions, and that three 
separate SLAs conceptualized by the CCM may represent a single construct. Findings from 
research focused on identifying the strongest, most consistent predictors in the CCM could lead 
to the development of a simplified model, which in turn may increase the use of the CCM in 









Chapter 13: Conclusion 
 Despite the growing rate of obesity in the U.S., weight-related prejudice perseveres. 
These prejudices often lead to discrimination against overweight and obese individuals in a 
variety of settings (Puhl & Heuer, 2009). Little research, however, has been conducted to 
determine whether obese individuals may be subject to discrimination in legal contexts such as 
jury trials. In addition, little is known about how extra-legal factors in general may influence 
juror decisions in jury trials and if deliberations serve to exacerbate or attenuate such 
influences. 
 This study explored the effects of plaintiff weight, deliberations, and individual 
differences on mock jurors’ decisions in a medical malpractice case.  The CCM was used to 
ground the research, as this attributional framework considers how initial reactions and biases 
can influence both interpretation of attributional information (e.g., case evidence) and blame 
ascriptions. It was predicted that jurors exposed to the obese plaintiff would express more anti-
plaintiff reactions, interpret the evidence in a manner more conducive to blaming the plaintiff, 
and render case decisions less favorable to the plaintiff than jurors exposed to the normal 
weight plaintiff. In the obese plaintiff condition, men and those with strong ideological beliefs 
associated with anti-fat bias were expected to render more anti-plaintiff judgments than their 
counterparts. In addition, deliberations were expected to minimize the effects of anti-fat bias on 
both jury and individual level judgments when the plaintiff was depicted as obese. 
 Findings revealed no direct effects of plaintiff weight on case judgments or any of the 
attributional measures. Contrary to expectations, results suggested that deliberating jurors were 
more likely than non-deliberating jurors to incorporate plaintiff weight into their case-related 





plaintiff weight on verdicts. Analyses including both deliberating and non-deliberating jurors 
generally supported predictions regarding interactive effects between plaintiff weight and 
individual differences on jurors’ decisions. Mock jurors with strong just world beliefs were 
particularly likely to render anti-plaintiff judgments in the obese condition. Tests of the CCM 
indicated that jurors’ attributions and attributional processes aligned with theoretical 
expectations and proposed relationships between the various CCM components. This study also 
yielded important findings that were not directly tied to formally advanced hypotheses. Overall, 
deliberating jurors were more lenient towards the defendant than non-deliberating jurors. 
Several individual difference impacted jurors’ decisions regardless of plaintiff weight. 
Specifically, BPWE, anti-fat attitudes, and participant BMI were all positively related to leniency 
(toward the defendant). 
 This research has many limitations, specifically with respect to verisimilitude and 
generalizability. Yet, this study also yielded numerous main and interactive effects that have not 
been documented in the published civil juror decision-making literature, which can help build a 
foundation for understanding how extra-legal factors and deliberations can affect civil jury 
decisions. Both the contributions and limitations of this study illuminate exciting directions for 
future research. 
Ultimately, this research reinforces the notion of juror and jury decision-making as a 
complex process that may be influenced by multiple factors. Plaintiff weight was introduced as a 
salient source of bias in this study, but it only influenced jurors’ decisions in particular 
circumstances. In those specific circumstances, plaintiff weight still only exerted a small effect 
on jurors’ decisions. In anticipating jurors’ decisions, it is important that researchers and 





interact with one another. However, simplification of research results and theoretical models 
guiding such predictions (such as the CCM and other attributional frameworks) is also needed so 
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Appendix A: Summary of Abbreviations and Terms 
Table 1. Descriptions of key abbreviations and terms used in this study.  
 
Abbreviation or Term Full name or construct Description  
AFAs  Anti-fat Attitudes Negative attitudes toward 
overweight or obese people; 
also a scale used to measure 
Anti-Fat Attitudes in other 
studies. 
BJW Belief in a Just World The belief that that the world is 
a fair and just place and that 
individuals get what they 
deserve. This term is used to 
discuss this general construct as 
examined in prior literature. 
BJW-O/ 
BJW-O Scale 
Belief in a Just World-Other Individuals’ beliefs that the 
world is just for others around 
them. The 8 item BJW-O scale 
used in this study assessed 
beliefs using a 5-point scale, 
such that 1 = very weak beliefs 
and 5 = very strong beliefs.  
BMI Body Mass Index A measure to categorize 
individuals as underweight, 
normal weight, overweight, or 
obese; participant BMI in this 
study was calculated using self-
reported weight and height. 
Higher BMIs indicate 
participants with greater body 




Belief in the Protestant Work 
Ethic 
Belief in the value of hard work 
and self-discipline; and that 
success can be achieved for 
those who work hard. This 
abbreviation refers to the 
general construct as well as 
Protestant Ethic beliefs as 
assessed in this study. Scores on 
the 11 item BPWE scale can 
range from 1 to 7, such that 1 = 






Table 1 Continued.  
 
Abbreviation or Term Full name or construct Description 
CCM Culpable Control Model Attributional theory used to 
ground the current study; 
proposes that attributional 
processes and blame are 




Defendant Witness Ratings: A 
Measure of Structural Linkage 
Assessments (SLAs) 
This 2 item scale is an average of 
ratings of the convincingness of 
the two witnesses for the 
defendant. Scores can range 
from 1-7, with 1 = extremely 
negative ratings of the 
defendant’s witnesses’ 
convincingness and 7 = 
extremely positive ratings of the 
defendant’s witnesses’ 
convincingness 
FPS Fat Phobia Scale This 14 item semantic 
differential scale measures anti-
fat attitudes and beliefs. Scores 
can range from 1 to 5, with 
higher scores indicating stronger 
anti-fat attitudes and beliefs. 
JSM Justification-Suppression 
Model of Prejudice 
Theory of the expression of 
prejudice used to guide and 
contextualize the current study; 
proposes that all individual 
harbor “raw” or genuine 
prejudices and that these 
prejudices are expressed 





“Negative SEs” refers to the 
initial negative emotional and 
perceptual experiences of 
perceivers after exposure to an 
event involving a negative 
outcome. The three item 
Negative SE scale used in this 
study assesses participant’s 
negative emotional responses to 
the event using a 5-point scale, 





Table 1 Continued.  
 
Abbreviation or Term Full name or construct Description 
Negative SEs/Negative 
SE Scale (Continued) 
Negative Spontaneous 
Evaluations (Continued) 
emotional response and 5 = 
strong negative emotional 
response. 
Perceptions of the 
Plaintiff 
Perceptions of the Plaintiff: A 
Measure of Spontaneous 
Evaluations (SEs) 
Individuals’ initial reactions to 
the plaintiff, which occurred on 
a 7-point scale with 1 = 
extremely negative and 7 = 
extremely positive. This is one of 
the three measures of 
spontaneous evaluations (SEs) 
according to the CCM.  
Perceptions of the 
Defendant 
Perceptions of the Plaintiff: A 
Measure of Spontaneous 
Evaluations (SEs) 
Individuals’ initial reactions to 
the defendant, which occurred 
on a 7-point scale with 1 = 
extremely negative and 7 = 
extremely positive. This is one of 
the three measures of 
spontaneous evaluations (SEs) 
according to the CCM. 
Plaintiff Witness 
Ratings 
Plaintiff Witness Ratings: A 
Measure of Structural Linkage 
Assessments (SLAs) 
This 3 item scale is an average of 
ratings of the convincingness of 
the three witnesses for the 
plaintiff. Scores can range from 
1-7, with 1 = extremely negative 
ratings of the plaintiff’s 
witnesses’ convincingness and 7 
= extremely positive ratings of 
the plaintiff’s witnesses’ 
convincingness 
SLAs Structural Linkage Assessments As proposed by the CCM, SLAs 
are the attributional criteria 
perceivers consider when 
ascribing blame. There are three 
SLAs perceivers can make: 
causal control, behavioral 
control, and outcome control. 
SLA Scale Structural Linkage Assessment 
Scale 
This 11-item scale was created 
for the purposes of this study to 
assess the extent to which 
perceivers interpret 
attributional criteria in a manner 





Table 1 Continued.  
 
Abbreviation or Term Full name or construct Description 
SLA Scale (Continued) Structural Linkage Assessment 
Scale (Continued) 
plaintiff or to blaming the 
defendant. It incorporates 
elements of the three proposed 
structural linkages. The scale 
ranged from 1-7, with higher 
scores indicating more pro-
plaintiff attributions and lower 
scores indicating more pro-
defendant attributions. 
Total Responsibility Total Responsibility Scale: A 
Measure of Blame 
This two item scale is an average 
of total responsibility assigned 
to the plaintiff and defendant 
for the negative medical 
outcome. Scores can range from 
1-7, such that 1 = responsibility 
completely assigned to the 
plaintiff and 7 = responsibility 




























Appendix B: Information Sheet for Non-Deliberating Participants 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TITLE OF STUDY:  Juror’s Decisions in Medical Malpractice Trials 
INVESTIGATORS: Monica Miller, J.D., Ph.D.(mkmiller@unr.edu; 784-6021); Lorie Sicafuse 
(lsicafuse@unr.edu) 
PROTOCOL NUMBER: XXXX/XXXX 
 
PURPOSE: You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to 
learn more about factors that may affect jurors’ decision making in medical malpractice trials.   
 
PARTICIPANTS: You are being asked to participate in this dissertation study conducted by 
researchers at the University of Nevada, Reno, because you are currently enrolled in an 
undergraduate social sciences course. You are not obligated to participate in this specific study 
for course credit. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PROCEDURES: If you choose to participate, you will be asked to read a summary of a medical 
malpractice lawsuit. You will be asked to take some time to think about the case and then 
complete a survey asking you about your attitudes concerning the issues involved. In addition, 
you may complete a series of questionnaires regarding your personal beliefs and personality 
characteristics. Questions about demographic information (e.g., age, gender) will also be asked. 
The study will last approximately 60 minutes. 
 
RISKS: There are minimal risks for participating in the study.  However, you will be asked to 
imagine you are serving as a juror for a medical malpractice trial. You might become upset by 
reading about medical malpractice, especially if it has ever happened to you or someone you 
know. In addition, you might become fearful that something like that could happen to you if you 
ever have surgery.  If you think that this activity might upset you, you may withdraw from the 
study with no penalty.  If you feel the need to speak to a counseling professional, you may contact 
the Counseling and Testing Center at (775) 784-4648, or the Crisis Call center (775) 784-8090, or 
a mental health professional of your choice. 
 
BENEFITS: There may be no direct benefits to you as a participant in this study. However, you 
may find it interesting to learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted and 
about medical malpractice litigation. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your responses are completely confidential, and will have absolutely no 
effect on your relationships with your course instructor or with your institution. Only the 
investigator, research assistants, and the UNR Social Behavioral Institutional Review Board will 
have access to the data.  All surveys will be stored for 5 years in a locked space in the 
investigator’s laboratory and then destroyed. Although your name or identifying information will 
not be collected, you will be asked to wear a sticker displaying your juror number (as actual 
jurors do) while you participate in this study. After you have finished the study, you will be asked 
to remove your sticker with your Juror ID number and place it on the cover sheet of your 
completed survey. This number will allow researchers to link the survey with the database in case 
researchers need to double check the information that was entered in the database (e.g., in case 





correct response was). This number will only be used for data analysis purposes; it cannot and 
will not be used to identify you personally. 
COSTS/COMPENSATION: There will be no cost to you for participating in this study. You will 
receive credit to be applied to your undergraduate course for participation as determined by your 
professor. Equivalent alternatives for credit will be offered in every class where credit is given for 
participation in this study. If you are in a class that offers credit for this study and wish to 
complete an alternate opportunity, please ask your professor. Reading and summarizing a 
research article is a common example of an alternative activity offered by professors. You will 
receive equivalent credit for this alternate activity. 
 
 RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW: You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the 
study at anytime without penalty and there will be no negative impact on services, grades, or 
education. You may choose to skip questions that you do not want to answer.  
 
QUESTIONS: If you have any questions, please ask us.  If you have additional questions later, 
contact  Monica Miller, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Social 
Psychology; Department of Criminal Justice Mailstop 214; Leifson Physics Building; (775) 784-
6021; mkmiller@unr.edu. You also may contact Lorie Sicafuse (lsicafuse@unr.edu). 
   
You may ask about your rights as a human subject or you may report (anonymously if you so 
choose) any comments, concerns, or complaints to the University of Nevada, Reno Social 
Behavioral Institutional Review Board, telephone number 775-327-2368, or by addressing a letter 
to the Chair of the Board, c/o Office of Human Research Protection, 205 Ross Hall/331, 



















Appendix C: Information Sheet for Deliberating Participants 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TITLE OF STUDY:  Juror’s Decisions in Medical Malpractice Trials 
INVESTIGATORS: Monica Miller, J.D., Ph.D.(mkmiller@unr.edu; 784-6021); Lorie Sicafuse 
(lsicafuse@unr.edu) 
PROTOCOL NUMBER: XXXX/XXXX 
 
PURPOSE: You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to 
learn more about factors that may affect jurors’ decision making in medical malpractice trials.   
 
PARTICIPANTS: You are being asked to participate in this dissertation study conducted by 
researchers at the University of Nevada, Reno, because you are currently enrolled in an 
undergraduate social sciences course. You are not obligated to participate in this specific study 
for course credit. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PROCEDURES: If you choose to participate, you will be asked to read a summary of a medical 
malpractice lawsuit and “deliberate” the case with other participants in a small group, as actual 
jurors do before deciding on a verdict. After discussing the case and sharing your perspectives, 
your “jury” will be asked to render a group decision about the case. Next, you will be asked to 
complete a survey asking you about your own attitudes regarding the case and the issues 
involved. In addition, you may complete a series of questionnaires regarding your personal 
beliefs and personality characteristics. Questions about demographic information (e.g., age, 
gender) will also be asked. The study will last approximately 60 minutes. 
 
RISKS: There are minimal risks for participating in the study.  However, you will be asked to 
imagine you are serving as a juror for a medical malpractice trial. You might become upset by 
reading about medical malpractice, especially if it has ever happened to you or someone you 
know. In addition, you might become fearful that something like that could happen to you if you 
ever had surgery.  If you think that this activity might upset you, you may withdraw from the 
study with no penalty.  If you feel the need to speak to a counseling professional, you may contact 
the Counseling and Testing Center at (775) 784-4648, or the Crisis Call center (775) 784-8090, or 
a mental health professional of your choice. 
 
BENEFITS: There may be no direct benefits to you as a participant in this study; however you 
may find it interesting to learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted and 
about medical malpractice litigation. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: This survey is completely confidential, and will have absolutely no effect 
on your relationships with your course instructor or with your institution. Only the investigator, 
research assistants, and the UNR Social Behavioral Institutional Review Board will have access 
to the data.  All surveys will be stored for 5 years in a locked space in the investigator’s 
laboratory and then destroyed. Although your name or identifying information will not be 
collected, you will be asked to wear a sticker displaying your juror number (as actual jurors do) 
while you participate in this study. After you have finished the study, you will be asked to remove 
your sticker with your Juror ID number and place it on the cover sheet of your completed survey. 





to double check the information that was entered in the database (e.g., in case there is a 
typographical error in the database, we can go back to the survey and see what the correct 
response was), and it will allow us determine which jury group you belonged to. This number will 
only be used for data analysis purposes; it cannot and will not be used to identify you personally. 
 
COSTS/COMPENSATION: There will be no cost to you for participating in this study. You will 
receive credit to be applied to your undergraduate course for participation as determined by your 
professor. Equivalent alternatives for credit will be offered in every class where credit is given for 
participation in this study. If you are in a class that offers credit for this study and wish to 
complete an alternate opportunity, please ask your professor. Reading and summarizing a 
research article is a common example of an alternative activity offered by professors. You will 
receive equivalent credit for this alternate activity. 
 
 RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW: You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the 
study at anytime without penalty and there will be no negative impact on services, grades, or 
education. You may choose to skip questions that you do not want to answer.  
 
QUESTIONS: If you have any questions, please ask us.  If you have additional questions later, 
contact  Monica Miller, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Social 
Psychology; Department of Criminal Justice Mailstop 214; Leifson Physics Building; (775) 784-
6021; mkmiller@unr.edu. You may also contact Lorie Sicafuse (lsicafuse@unr.edu). 
   
You may ask about your rights as a human subject or you may report (anonymously if you so 
choose) any comments, concerns, or complaints to the University of Nevada, Reno Social 
Behavioral Institutional Review Board, telephone number 775-327-2368, or by addressing a letter 
to the Chair of the Board, c/o Office of Human Research Protection, 205 Ross Hall/331, 

































Appendix E: Belief in a Just World-Other and Protestant Ethic Scales 
INSTRUCTIONS: We are interested in learning more about college students’ perspectives of 
the world and people in general. Your responses to the next two series of items will be very 
helpful to us as we explore this topic. There are no right or wrong answers; we are only 
interested in your individual perspectives and opinions.  
First, using the following scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree, please 
circle the response to each item that best corresponds to your own personal opinions. 
1) I feel that the world treats people fairly. 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
2) I feel that people get what they deserve. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
3) I feel that people treat each other fairly in life. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
4) I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
5) I feel that people treat each other with the respect they deserve. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
6) I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 








7) I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
8) I feel that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves. 
 
1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4----------------------5 
      Strongly Disagree                                      Neither Agree                                             Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
Second, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements using the scale 
provided where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree. 
 
1) Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
2) Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
3) Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
4) Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
5) Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 






6) People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
7) Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 




Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
9)  If people work hard enough, they are likely to make a good life for themselves. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
10) I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
11) A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 















Appendix F: Trial Summary with Instructions for Non-Deliberating Jurors 
Case: Morrison vs. Kelly 
Presided by: Judge Robert W. Pratt 
 
The presiding judge, the Honorable Robert Pratt, gives you the following INSTRUCTIONS: 
“You have been selected to serve as a juror in a case involving an allegation of medical 
malpractice.  Our entire justice system rests on the decisions of citizens like you, and it is 
important that you take your job seriously. Please carefully read the following summary of the 
case. After you have finished reading the summary, I ask that you take some additional time, 
approximately 10-15 minutes, to further consider the case facts, evidence, and witness 
testimony included in the trial summary. You may refer back to the summary as you are 
thinking about the case and you make take notes on the scratch paper provided. The 
investigator will tell you when it is time to render your case decisions.”   
The plaintiff, Andrea Morrison, is a 32 year-old resident of Henderson, Nevada who earns 
$43,000 a year as a Human Resources Assistant. On April 20, 2010, Ms. Morrison visited the 
Southern Nevada Eye Institute for consultation regarding corrective eye surgery for moderate 
myopia (nearsightedness). During this appointment, two technicians conducted a 
comprehensive eye exam, measured Ms. Morrison’s corneal thickness in both eyes, and 
obtained a detailed medical history. Based on these results, the technicians informed Ms. 
Morrison that she would be a good candidate for LASIK surgery to correct her myopia. Ms. 
Morrison decided to undergo LASIK eye surgery on June 23, 2010. She was directed to stop 
wearing her contact lenses two weeks prior to surgery so that her cornea would return to its 
natural shape for the procedure. 
On the afternoon of her surgery, Ms. Morrison signed documents indicating that she was aware 
of the risks and side effects of LASIK and consenting to the surgery. Dr. Steven Kelly, a 35 year-
old ophthalmic surgeon who was recently certified by the American Board of Ophthalmology, 
was scheduled to perform the procedure. Dr. Kelly had already performed 30 Lasik surgeries 
that day, and had two additional appointments scheduled after Ms. Morrison’s surgery. Dr. Kelly 
made his first contact with Ms. Morrison 45 minutes prior to surgery. During this time he 
conducted a pre-surgery exam, lasting approximately 20 minutes. He also counseled Ms. 
Morrison on what to expect during surgery and discussed the potential risks and benefits of 
LASIK. She was informed that there was approximately a 90% chance that her current vision of 
20/60 would be fully corrected by the procedure and that various complications could occur, but 
that the risks were very low (less than 5%). Dr. Kelly explained that he would be using a 
mechanical microkeratome, a precision surgical instrument with an oscillating blade, to first cut 
a flap in the cornea which would be lifted to expose the corneal bed. Next, an excimer laser 
would be applied to erode and reshape the exposed corneal tissue, ultimately remodeling the 
cornea to properly refract light and most likely correcting Ms. Morrison’s myopia. Finally, the 
flaps would be repositioned, and Ms. Morrison would return home to rest for the next several 
days to facilitate healing. The entire surgical procedure was expected to last between 10-15 
minutes. Ms. Morrison was strictly instructed to remain still during surgery and not to move her 
head, as patient head movement may result in imprecise corneal incisions.  Ms. Morrison stated 
that she understood all of these precautions. As is typical in LASIK surgery, Ms. Morrison 





Ms. Morrison’s surgery did not proceed as planned. Dr. Kelly first applied a corneal suction ring 
to Ms. Morrison’s right eye to immobilize the eye. Next, he proceeded to make a corneal 
incision to create the “flap” using the microkeratome; however, the microkeratome passed 
through the top of the cornea, creating a thin, incomplete flap with a hole in its center. This rare 
complication of LASIK surgery is referred to as a “buttonhole flap.” Dr. Kelly immediately 
suspended surgery following this error and replaced the damaged corneal flap. Two days later, 
he performed a “refloat” procedure on Ms. Morrison’s right eye during which he repositioned 
and smoothed the flap. Dr. Kelly also removed an additional small piece of corneal tissue during 
this time to ensure optimal repositioning. 
One week later, Ms. Morrison sought care at another facility (LasikPlus Vision Center in Las 
Vegas, Nevada), where she was diagnosed with decreased vision due to irregular astigmatism, 
corneal scarring, and some missing corneal flap in her right eye. She was subsequently referred 
to a local corneal specialist, who recommended a corneal transplant to remedy the damage. 
However, Ms. Morrison was unwilling to have the transplant and was left with extreme loss of 
vision, double vision, and blurriness in her right eye which cannot be corrected.  
Ms. Morrison is suing the defendant, Dr. Kelly, on the grounds that he exhibited preoperative, 
interoperative, and postoperative negligence resulting in her current pronounced visual 
deficiencies. Several witnesses testified during the trial, including Ms. Morrison and her 
husband, David Morrison; Dr. Kelly; and two expert witnesses, Dr. Jordan and Dr. Elliot. Neither 
of the expert surgeons were directly related to the case (i.e., were not involved in Ms. 
Morrison’s surgery or treatment).  
Plaintiff Witnesses 
Dr. Karen Jordan 
Dr. Karen Jordan, an ophthalmic surgeon specializing in LASIK procedures, testified for the 
plaintiff. Based on her knowledge and professional experience, Dr. Jordan concluded that Dr. 
Kelly behaved negligently before, during, and following Ms. Morrison’s surgery. Dr. Jordan 
testified that only a Board-certified physician should assess a patient’s suitability for corrective 
eye surgery; yet, in Ms. Morrison’s case, such an assessment was conducted by two ophthalmic 
technicians. Though qualified in their current role, these individuals did not hold an MD and Dr. 
Kelly accepted their recommendations in lieu of conducting his own extensive pre-examination 
to determine whether LASIK would be appropriate for Ms. Morrison. Dr. Jordan believed that 
Ms. Morrison was in fact not a good candidate for LASIK due to an inadequate amount of 
corneal tissue. She explained that the recommended corneal thickness for LASIK is at least 500 
microns; however, the technicians obtained a corneal thickness measurement of approximately 
490 microns for both of Ms. Morrison’s eyes. Dr. Jordan stated that this lack of corneal tissue 
could have possibly resulted in Dr. Kelly cutting a thinner corneal flap than is typical for LASIK. 
Further, Dr. Jordan opined that Dr. Kelly made an imprecise corneal incision with the mechanical 
microkertatome resulting in the thin buttonhole flap which led to the subsequent irreversible 
visual complications experienced by the plaintiff. 
Dr. Jordan believed that Dr. Kelly’s inexperience and fatigue from performing over 30 
procedures on the same day likely contributed to the surgical error. She noted that 





and that Dr. Kelly had only been performing LASIK procedures for two weeks prior to Ms. 
Morrison’s surgery. Though a typical LASIK procedure is completed in less than 15 minutes, Dr. 
Jordan emphasized that each procedure requires a great deal of concentration and preciseness 
on the part of the surgeon. She testified that, in her experience, LASIK surgeons generally 
perform approximately 20 procedures a day, which allows time for breaks and further patient 
consultation. Upon further questioning, Dr. Jordan said that Dr. Kelly may have scheduled an 
excessive number of surgeries in order to gain more experience and referrals, and that it was 
possible that he was “rushing”- that is, trying to complete Ms. Morrison’s surgery as quickly as 
possible to allow time for the additional two surgeries he had scheduled for that day.    
Finally, Dr. Jordan testified Dr. Kelly was negligent in removing any further corneal tissue in 
performing the “refloat” procedure two days following the failed surgery, and that the typical 
protocol for buttonhole flaps is to immediately replace the flap, let the hole heal over the course 
of several months, and to attempt surgery again if indeed the flap has healed.  
Ms. Andrea Morrison 
Ms. Morrison testified that that Dr. Kelly and the Southern Eye Institute of Nevada staff had 
informed her of the potential risks and benefits of surgery, and that she had signed documents 
consenting to the procedure. She stated that she adhered to all preoperative, intraoperative, 
and postoperative instructions she was given. Ms. Morrison testified that her life was severely 
and permanently impacted by the outcome of her surgery. She reported experiencing moderate 
pain and irritation in her right eye during the two months following the unsuccessful procedure, 
as well as visual disturbances such as “floaters” (spots and lines in her field of vision) and “halos” 
(luminous rings around light sources). Based on her surgical consultation, Ms. Morrison 
anticipated taking three days of paid leave from work to recover from her procedure; however, 
due to complications, she missed an additional 5 weeks of work, 3 of which were unpaid. Ms. 
Morrison testified that she is no longer able to drive due to her decreased vision and relies on 
her husband to transport her to and from work; she also requires special visual accommodations 
in her job. Ms. Morrison estimated that her work productivity has decreased by 50% as a result 
of her permanent visual impairment. During cross-examination, Ms. Morrison admitted that she 
continued to wear her contact lenses until five days prior to surgery, though she had been 
instructed to stop wearing them a full two weeks before the surgery. Yet, she maintained that 
she followed all other instructions related to her surgery and adamantly denied moving her 
head during the procedure. 
Mr. Brian Morrison 
During his testimony, Ms. Morrison’s husband, Brian, confirmed that she had followed all pre, 
post, and intraoperative instructions with the exception of continuing to wear her contacts until 
five days before the surgery. Mr. Morrison was present in the operating room, and stated that 
Ms. Morrison remained still throughout the procedure and did not move her head. He further 
corroborated Ms. Morrison’s testimony in describing the significant impact that the failed 
surgery has had on her life. In addition, Mr. Morrison indicated that Ms. Morrison’s injuries also 
have impacted his life and household finances. Most notably, Mr. Morrison (who works as a 
warehouse supervisor) said that he had to switch his regular work hours from swing shift (3 PM 
– 12 PM) to day shift in order to drive Ms. Morrison to work; this change resulted in a 10% 





Following Ms. And Mrs. Morrison’s testimony, the plaintiff’s attorney again called their expert 
witness, Dr. Jordan, for brief follow-up questioning. Dr. Jordan testified that Ms. Morrison’s 
failure to follow instructions regarding discontinuing the use of contact lenses likely did not 
contribute to the surgical complications. She explained that although continued use of contact 
lenses may alter the natural shape of the cornea and decrease the likelihood of LASIK success, it 
should not impact initial surgical procedures or estimations of corneal thickness.  
Defense Witnesses 
Dr. Lisa Elliot 
Ophthalmic surgeon Dr. Lisa Elliot testified for the defense. Like the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Elliot 
specializes in LASIK procedures and based her testimony on her years of education and 
experience. In addressing the plaintiff’s claims of preoperative negligence, Dr. Elliot conceded 
that only a qualified physician should assess a patient’s suitability for LASIK surgery. However, 
she testified that ophthalmic surgeons sometimes largely base these assessments on exams 
conducted by qualified ophthalmic technicians and on their pre-operative examination, and that 
this practice is generally accepted in the ophthalmic medical community. Dr. Elliot agreed with 
the plaintiff’s expert that basic guidelines for LASIK indicate that patients’ corneal width should 
measure 500 microns, but countered that exceptions often are made based on the degree to 
which the surgeon must erode or “ablate” the exposed corneal tissue to reshape the cornea. In 
addition, Dr. Elliot testified that although Dr. Kelly only had been routinely performing LASIK 
surgery for two weeks prior to Ms. Morrison’s procedure, he was qualified to do so as he had 
performed such surgeries during his residency and had been certified by the American Board of 
Ophthalmology. She disagreed with the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that Dr. Kelly performed an 
“excessive” number of procedures on the day of Ms. Morrison’s surgery, noting that there are 
no clear professional guidelines regarding this matter. However, she stated that, based on her 
experience, it was highly unusual for a surgeon to perform more than 25 procedures in one day.   
Dr. Elliot opined that the buttonhole complication during surgery was most likely caused by 
sudden patient head movements, causing Dr. Kelly to involuntarily “pull up” on the 
microkeratome resulting in the thin flap with a central hole. Regarding the plaintiff’s continued 
use of contact lenses until five days prior to surgery, Dr. Elliott testified that this precaution was 
primarily intended to prevent excessive bleeding and to ensure surgical success in correcting 
myopia, but that this possibly could have affected Dr. Kelly’s estimations of the amount of tissue 
he would need to erode via laser, and subsequently the amount of corneal surface tissue to 
initially cut. Finally, Dr. Elliot testified that “refloat” procedures are routine following LASIK 
surgical procedures regardless of the outcome, and that performing such procedures is not in 
and of itself indicative of negligence. She admitted that removal of any corneal tissue during a 
refloat procedure is uncommon, but that this may possibly be required to ensure proper 
placement of the corneal tissues in some cases. 
Dr. Steven Kelly 
Dr. Kelly testified that he was fully qualified to perform LASIK surgery and submitted 
documentation of his certification from the American Board of Ophthalmology to the court. He 
stated that he had conducted LASIK several times during his residency, though he was unable to 





located. However, he did produce records of 208 LASIK surgical procedures he had performed at 
the Southern Nevada Eye Institute during the two weeks prior to Ms. Morrison’s procedure. The 
patient’s eyesight was successfully restored in 190 of these cases; the remaining 18 patients 
experienced minimal or no improvements in vision. Dr. Kelly noted that his record is consistent 
with the overall 90% success rate of LASIK surgery. No significant complications were 
documented in any of the 208 cases. 
Dr. Kelly refuted the plaintiff’s claims that he had failed to assess Ms. Morrison’s suitability for 
LASIK, stating that he conducted his own assessment based on the consulting technician’s exam 
results and on his examination of Ms. Morrison one hour prior to surgery. He acknowledged that 
Ms. Morrison’s corneal thickness fell slightly below recommended guidelines for LASIK at 490 
microns, but that he was not overly concerned due to his estimation that only 50 microns of 
tissue would need to be eroded to reshape the corneas. Dr. Kelly explained that a corneal bed of 
250 microns must remain at the end of LASIK to promote surgical success and healing, and that 
the typical width of the initial corneal flap measures 150 microns. After creating the corneal flap 
(150 microns) and ablating 50 microns of tissue in each eye, Ms. Morrison would be left with 
290 microns of corneal tissue in each eye. 
 The defendant also denied that the buttonhole flap complication resulted from fatigue or his 
“rushing” Ms. Morrison’s surgery in order to attend to other patients. Dr. Kelly admitted that he 
had a “heavy” schedule on the day of Ms. Morrison’s surgery, but this it was no more intense 
than that experienced by many surgical residents (himself included).  
Dr. Kelly claimed that Ms. Morrison repeatedly made significant “jerking” movements of her head 
during the procedure and that he had written a chart note extensively detailing the patient jerking 
her head. This documentation was produced and submitted to the court. Dr. Kelly testified that 
the patient’s head movements caused the buttonhole flap complication. Though he admitted to 
pulling back on the microkeratome, he said that this action was necessary to prevent more 
extensive injury to Ms. Morrison (e.g., to prevent the microkeratome from cutting deep into the 
eye). In examining Ms. Morrison two days following the incomplete LASIK surgery, Dr. Kelly noted 
that the replaced corneal flap had not returned to its prior position and was slightly “wrinkled,” 
thus necessitating a “refloat” procedure to smooth and reposition the flap. Dr. Kelly further stated 
that he removed part of the corneal flap to ensure proper placement though this is not typically 
recommended. Documentation of these notes and of the refloat procedure were submitted to 
the Court.   
 














Appendix G: Trial Summary with Instructions for Deliberating Jurors 
Case: Morrison vs. Kelly 
Presided by: Judge Robert W. Pratt 
 
The presiding judge, the Honorable Robert Pratt, gives you the following INSTRUCTIONS: 
“You have been selected to serve as a juror in a case involving an allegation of medical 
malpractice.  Our entire justice system rests on the decisions of citizens like you, and it is 
important that you take your job seriously. Please carefully read the following summary of the 
case. After you have finished reading the summary, you will be asked to deliberate the case 
with your assigned jury; that is, you will be asked to discuss the case facts, evidence, and 
witness testimony provided in this summary in a group and reach an agreement about liability 
and damages. You may refer back to the summary as you are deliberating this case.”   
The plaintiff, Andrea Morrison, is a 32 year-old resident of Henderson, Nevada who earns 
$43,000 a year as a Human Resources Assistant. On April 20, 2010, Ms. Morrison visited the 
Southern Nevada Eye Institute for consultation regarding corrective eye surgery for moderate 
myopia (nearsightedness). During this appointment, two technicians conducted a 
comprehensive eye exam, measured Ms. Morrison’s corneal thickness in both eyes, and 
obtained a detailed medical history. Based on these results, the technicians informed Ms. 
Morrison that she would be a good candidate for LASIK surgery to correct her myopia. Ms. 
Morrison decided to undergo LASIK eye surgery on June 23, 2010. She was directed to stop 
wearing her contact lenses two weeks prior to surgery so that her cornea would return to its 
natural shape for the procedure. 
On the afternoon of her surgery, Ms. Morrison signed documents indicating that she was aware 
of the risks and side effects of LASIK and consenting to the surgery. Dr. Steven Kelly, a 35 year-
old ophthalmic surgeon who was recently certified by the American Board of Ophthalmology, 
was scheduled to perform the procedure. Dr. Kelly had already performed 30 Lasik surgeries 
that day, and had two additional appointments scheduled after Ms. Morrison’s surgery. Dr. Kelly 
made his first contact with Ms. Morrison 45 minutes prior to surgery. During this time he 
conducted a pre-surgery exam, lasting approximately 20 minutes. He also counseled Ms. 
Morrison on what to expect during surgery and discussed the potential risks and benefits of 
LASIK. She was informed that there was approximately a 90% chance that her current vision of 
20/60 would be fully corrected by the procedure and that various complications could occur, but 
that the risks were very low (less than 5%). Dr. Kelly explained that he would be using a 
mechanical microkeratome, a precision surgical instrument with an oscillating blade, to first cut 
a flap in the cornea which would be lifted to expose the corneal bed. Next, an excimer laser 
would be applied to erode and reshape the exposed corneal tissue, ultimately remodeling the 
cornea to properly refract light and most likely correcting Ms. Morrison’s myopia. Finally, the 
flaps would be repositioned, and Ms. Morrison would return home to rest for the next several 
days to facilitate healing. The entire surgical procedure was expected to last between 10-15 
minutes. Ms. Morrison was strictly instructed to remain still during surgery and not to move her 
head, as patient head movement may result in imprecise corneal incisions.  Ms. Morrison stated 
that she understood all of these precautions. As is typical in LASIK surgery, Ms. Morrison 





Ms. Morrison’s surgery did not proceed as planned. Dr. Kelly first applied a corneal suction ring 
to Ms. Morrison’s right eye to immobilize the eye. Next, he proceeded to make a corneal 
incision to create the “flap” using the microkeratome; however, the microkeratome passed 
through the top of the cornea, creating a thin, incomplete flap with a hole in its center. This rare 
complication of LASIK surgery is referred to as a “buttonhole flap.” Dr. Kelly immediately 
suspended surgery following this error and replaced the damaged corneal flap. Two days later, 
he performed a “refloat” procedure on Ms. Morrison’s right eye during which he repositioned 
and smoothed the flap. Dr. Kelly also removed an additional small piece of corneal tissue during 
this time to ensure optimal repositioning. 
One week later, Ms. Morrison sought care at another facility (LasikPlus Vision Center in Las 
Vegas, Nevada), where she was diagnosed with decreased vision due to irregular astigmatism, 
corneal scarring, and some missing corneal flap in her right eye. She was subsequently referred 
to a local corneal specialist, who recommended a corneal transplant to remedy the damage. 
However, Ms. Morrison was unwilling to have the transplant and was left with extreme loss of 
vision, double vision, and blurriness in her right eye which cannot be corrected.  
Ms. Morrison is suing the defendant, Dr. Kelly, on the grounds that he exhibited preoperative, 
interoperative, and postoperative negligence resulting in her current pronounced visual 
deficiencies. Several witnesses testified during the trial, including Ms. Morrison and her 
husband, David Morrison; Dr. Kelly; and two expert witnesses, Dr. Jordan and Dr. Elliot. Neither 
of the expert surgeons were directly related to the case (i.e., were not involved in Ms. 
Morrison’s surgery or treatment).  
Plaintiff Witnesses 
Dr. Karen Jordan 
Dr. Karen Jordan, an ophthalmic surgeon specializing in LASIK procedures, testified for the 
plaintiff. Based on her knowledge and professional experience, Dr. Jordan concluded that Dr. 
Kelly behaved negligently before, during, and following Ms. Morrison’s surgery. Dr. Jordan 
testified that only a Board-certified physician should assess a patient’s suitability for corrective 
eye surgery; yet, in Ms. Morrison’s case, such an assessment was conducted by two ophthalmic 
technicians. Though qualified in their current role, these individuals did not hold an MD and Dr. 
Kelly accepted their recommendations in lieu of conducting his own extensive pre-examination 
to determine whether LASIK would be appropriate for Ms. Morrison. Dr. Jordan believed that 
Ms. Morrison was in fact not a good candidate for LASIK due to an inadequate amount of 
corneal tissue. She explained that the recommended corneal thickness for LASIK is at least 500 
microns; however, the technicians obtained a corneal thickness measurement of approximately 
490 microns for both of Ms. Morrison’s eyes. Dr. Jordan stated that this lack of corneal tissue 
could have possibly resulted in Dr. Kelly cutting a thinner corneal flap than is typical for LASIK. 
Further, Dr. Jordan opined that Dr. Kelly made an imprecise corneal incision with the mechanical 
microkertatome resulting in the thin buttonhole flap which led to the subsequent irreversible 
visual complications experienced by the plaintiff. 
Dr. Jordan believed that Dr. Kelly’s inexperience and fatigue from performing over 30 
procedures on the same day likely contributed to the surgical error. She noted that 





and that Dr. Kelly had only been performing LASIK procedures for two weeks prior to Ms. 
Morrison’s surgery. Though a typical LASIK procedure is completed in less than 15 minutes, Dr. 
Jordan emphasized that each procedure requires a great deal of concentration and preciseness 
on the part of the surgeon. She testified that, in her experience, LASIK surgeons generally 
perform approximately 20 procedures a day, which allows time for breaks and further patient 
consultation. Upon further questioning, Dr. Jordan said that Dr. Kelly may have scheduled an 
excessive number of surgeries in order to gain more experience and referrals, and that it was 
possible that he was “rushing”- that is, trying to complete Ms. Morrison’s surgery as quickly as 
possible to allow time for the additional two surgeries he had scheduled for that day.    
Finally, Dr. Jordan testified Dr. Kelly was negligent in removing any further corneal tissue in 
performing the “refloat” procedure two days following the failed surgery, and that the typical 
protocol for buttonhole flaps is to immediately replace the flap, let the hole heal over the course 
of several months, and to attempt surgery again if indeed the flap has healed.  
Ms. Andrea Morrison 
Ms. Morrison testified that that Dr. Kelly and the Southern Eye Institute of Nevada staff had 
informed her of the potential risks and benefits of surgery, and that she had signed documents 
consenting to the procedure. She stated that she adhered to all preoperative, intraoperative, 
and postoperative instructions she was given. Ms. Morrison testified that her life was severely 
and permanently impacted by the outcome of her surgery. She reported experiencing moderate 
pain and irritation in her right eye during the two months following the unsuccessful procedure, 
as well as visual disturbances such as “floaters” (spots and lines in her field of vision) and “halos” 
(luminous rings around light sources). Based on her surgical consultation, Ms. Morrison 
anticipated taking three days of paid leave from work to recover from her procedure; however, 
due to complications, she missed an additional 5 weeks of work, 3 of which were unpaid. Ms. 
Morrison testified that she is no longer able to drive due to her decreased vision and relies on 
her husband to transport her to and from work; she also requires special visual accommodations 
in her job. Ms. Morrison estimated that her work productivity has decreased by 50% as a result 
of her permanent visual impairment. During cross-examination, Ms. Morrison admitted that she 
continued to wear her contact lenses until five days prior to surgery, though she had been 
instructed to stop wearing them a full two weeks before the surgery. Yet, she maintained that 
she followed all other instructions related to her surgery and adamantly denied moving her 
head during the procedure. 
Mr. Brian Morrison 
During his testimony, Ms. Morrison’s husband, Brian, confirmed that she had followed all pre, 
post, and intraoperative instructions with the exception of continuing to wear her contacts until 
five days before the surgery. Mr. Morrison was present in the operating room, and stated that 
Ms. Morrison remained still throughout the procedure and did not move her head. He further 
corroborated Ms. Morrison’s testimony in describing the significant impact that the failed 
surgery has had on her life. In addition, Mr. Morrison indicated that Ms. Morrison’s injuries also 
have impacted his life and household finances. Most notably, Mr. Morrison (who works as a 
warehouse supervisor) said that he had to switch his regular work hours from swing shift (3 PM 
– 12 PM) to day shift in order to drive Ms. Morrison to work; this change resulted in a 10% 





Following Ms. And Mrs. Morrison’s testimony, the plaintiff’s attorney again called their expert 
witness, Dr. Jordan, for brief follow-up questioning. Dr. Jordan testified that Ms. Morrison’s 
failure to follow instructions regarding discontinuing the use of contact lenses likely did not 
contribute to the surgical complications. She explained that although continued use of contact 
lenses may alter the natural shape of the cornea and decrease the likelihood of LASIK success, it 
should not impact initial surgical procedures or estimations of corneal thickness.  
Defense Witnesses 
Dr. Lisa Elliot 
Ophthalmic surgeon Dr. Lisa Elliot testified for the defense. Like the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Elliot 
specializes in LASIK procedures and based her testimony on her years of education and 
experience. In addressing the plaintiff’s claims of preoperative negligence, Dr. Elliot conceded 
that only a qualified physician should assess a patient’s suitability for LASIK surgery. However, 
she testified that ophthalmic surgeons sometimes largely base these assessments on exams 
conducted by qualified ophthalmic technicians and on their pre-operative examination, and that 
this practice is generally accepted in the ophthalmic medical community. Dr. Elliot agreed with 
the plaintiff’s expert that basic guidelines for LASIK indicate that patients’ corneal width should 
measure 500 microns, but countered that exceptions often are made based on the degree to 
which the surgeon must erode or “ablate” the exposed corneal tissue to reshape the cornea. In 
addition, Dr. Elliot testified that although Dr. Kelly only had been routinely performing LASIK 
surgery for two weeks prior to Ms. Morrison’s procedure, he was qualified to do so as he had 
performed such surgeries during his residency and had been certified by the American Board of 
Ophthalmology. She disagreed with the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that Dr. Kelly performed an 
“excessive” number of procedures on the day of Ms. Morrison’s surgery, noting that there are 
no clear professional guidelines regarding this matter. However, she stated that, based on her 
experience, it was highly unusual for a surgeon to perform more than 25 procedures in one day.   
Dr. Elliot opined that the buttonhole complication during surgery was most likely caused by 
sudden patient head movements, causing Dr. Kelly to involuntarily “pull up” on the 
microkeratome resulting in the thin flap with a central hole. Regarding the plaintiff’s continued 
use of contact lenses until five days prior to surgery, Dr. Elliott testified that this precaution was 
primarily intended to prevent excessive bleeding and to ensure surgical success in correcting 
myopia, but that this possibly could have affected Dr. Kelly’s estimations of the amount of tissue 
he would need to erode via laser, and subsequently the amount of corneal surface tissue to 
initially cut. Finally, Dr. Elliot testified that “refloat” procedures are routine following LASIK 
surgical procedures regardless of the outcome, and that performing such procedures is not in 
and of itself indicative of negligence. She admitted that removal of any corneal tissue during a 
refloat procedure is uncommon, but that this may possibly be required to ensure proper 
placement of the corneal tissues in some cases. 
Dr. Steven Kelly 
Dr. Kelly testified that he was fully qualified to perform LASIK surgery and submitted 
documentation of his certification from the American Board of Ophthalmology to the court. He 
stated that he had conducted LASIK several times during his residency, though he was unable to 





located. However, he did produce records of 208 LASIK surgical procedures he had performed at 
the Southern Nevada Eye Institute during the two weeks prior to Ms. Morrison’s procedure. The 
patient’s eyesight was successfully restored in 190 of these cases; the remaining 18 patients 
experienced minimal or no improvements in vision. Dr. Kelly noted that his record is consistent 
with the overall 90% success rate of LASIK surgery. No significant complications were 
documented in any of the 208 cases. 
Dr. Kelly refuted the plaintiff’s claims that he had failed to assess Ms. Morrison’s suitability for 
LASIK, stating that he conducted his own assessment based on the consulting technician’s exam 
results and on his examination of Ms. Morrison one hour prior to surgery. He acknowledged that 
Ms. Morrison’s corneal thickness fell slightly below recommended guidelines for LASIK at 490 
microns, but that he was not overly concerned due to his estimation that only 50 microns of 
tissue would need to be eroded to reshape the corneas. Dr. Kelly explained that a corneal bed of 
250 microns must remain at the end of LASIK to promote surgical success and healing, and that 
the typical width of the initial corneal flap measures 150 microns. After creating the corneal flap 
(150 microns) and ablating 50 microns of tissue in each eye, Ms. Morrison would be left with 
290 microns of corneal tissue in each eye. 
 The defendant also denied that the buttonhole flap complication resulted from fatigue or his 
“rushing” Ms. Morrison’s surgery in order to attend to other patients. Dr. Kelly admitted that he 
had a “heavy” schedule on the day of Ms. Morrison’s surgery, but this it was no more intense 
than that experienced by many surgical residents (himself included).  
Dr. Kelly claimed that Ms. Morrison repeatedly made significant “jerking” movements of her head 
during the procedure and that he had written a chart note extensively detailing the patient jerking 
her head. This documentation was produced and submitted to the court. Dr. Kelly testified that 
the patient’s head movements caused the buttonhole flap complication. Though he admitted to 
pulling back on the microkeratome, he said that this action was necessary to prevent more 
extensive injury to Ms. Morrison (e.g., to prevent the microkeratome from cutting deep into the 
eye). In examining Ms. Morrison two days following the incomplete LASIK surgery, Dr. Kelly noted 
that the replaced corneal flap had not returned to its prior position and was slightly “wrinkled,” 
thus necessitating a “refloat” procedure to smooth and reposition the flap. Dr. Kelly further stated 
that he removed part of the corneal flap to ensure proper placement though this is not typically 
recommended. Documentation of these notes and of the refloat procedure were submitted to 
the Court.   
 














Appendix H: Trial Summary Cover Sheet with Photographs- Obese Condition 
 
 
CASE # 1941A 
Presiding Judge: Honorable Robert W. Pratt 
 
 Ms. Andrea Morrison              vs                 Dr. Steven Kelly 
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Appendix I: Trial Summary Cover Sheet with Photographs- Normal Weight Condition 
 
 
CASE # 1941A 
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Appendix J: Spontaneous Evaluation Measures 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following list contains a number of words that describe different feelings 
and emotions. For each item, please select the option that best describes the feelings you 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 




very slightly                      a little                     moderately                   quite a bit                     extremely 
or not at all 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select the response that best describes your overall perception of: 
 
1) The plaintiff, Andrea Morrison 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Extremely negative                                      Neither Positive           Extremely positive 







2) The defendant, Dr. Kelly 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Extremely negative                                      Neither Positive           Extremely positive 












































Appendix K: Structural Linkage Assessments 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: We would like to learn more about your own personal opinions concerning 
various aspects of this case. Using the following scale provided where 1 = Strongly Disagree 
and 7 = Strongly Agree, please indicate your personal level of agreement with the following 
statements about the plaintiff’s (Ms. Morrison’s) decisions and actions. 
 
1) Ms. Morrison’s actions (or failure to act accordingly) contributed to her injuries.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 




Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
3) Anything Ms. Morrison might have done to contribute to her injuries was likely accidental and 
not done on purpose. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree  
  
4) Ms. Morrison behaved the way that most reasonable people would in her situation.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
5) Ms. Morrison should have spent more time thinking about the potential complications that 
could result from her surgery. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 




Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 





INSTRUCTIONS: Now, please provide your own personal opinions about the defendant’s (Dr. 
Kelly’s) decisions and actions. 
 
1) Dr. Kelly’s actions (or failure to act accordingly) contributed to Ms. Morrison’s injuries.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 




Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
3) Anything Dr. Kelly might have done to contribute to Ms. Morrison’s injuries was likely 
accidental and not done on purpose. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
4) Dr. Kelly behaved the way that most reasonable people would in his situation.  
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
5) Dr. Kelly should have spent more time thinking about the potential complications that could 
result from Ms. Morrison’s surgery. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 
                                                                             nor Disagree 
 
6) Ms. Morrison’s injuries could have been easily prevented if Dr. Kelly had followed 
recommended protocol for conducting LASIK surgery. 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Strongly Disagree                                            Neither Agree                Strongly Agree 









INSTRUCTIONS: Using the following scale where 1 = Not convincing and 7 = Extremely 
convincing, please rate the testimony given by the following witnesses. 
 
1) Ms. Morrison’s (the plaintiff) testimony: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Not convincing                                                   Somewhat                                                       Extremely 
                         convincing                                                      convincing 
 
2) Mr. Morrison’s (the plaintiff’s husband) testimony: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Not convincing                                                   Somewhat                                                       Extremely 
                         convincing                                                      convincing 
 
3) Dr. Karen Jordan’s (expert for the plaintiff) testimony: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Not convincing                                                   Somewhat                                                       Extremely 
                         convincing                                                      convincing 
 
4) Dr. Kelly’s (the defendant) testimony: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Not convincing                                                   Somewhat                                                       Extremely 
           convincing                                                      convincing 
 
5) Dr. Lisa Elliot’s (expert for the defense) testimomy: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6---------------7 
Not convincing                                                   Somewhat                                                       Extremely 
           convincing                                                      convincing 
 

















Appendix L: Individual Case Judgments 
 
The presiding Judge in this case, the Honorable Robert W. Pratt, gives you the following 
instructions: 
“Your task as a juror is to determine whether Dr. Kelly is liable for medical malpractice, and if so, 
to further determine the amount of economic and non-economic damages that should be 
awarded to the plaintiff (Ms. Andrea Morrison).   
In order to render a verdict of liable for medical malpractice, you must determine that the 
defendant (Dr. Kelly) behaved negligently in his care of the plaintiff (Ms. Morrison). That is, you 
must conclude that the defendants’ treatment of the plaintiff fell below the accepted standard 
of practice in the medical community, and that this negligence resulted in unnecessary injury to 
the plaintiff. Importantly, negligence may emerge in actions or inactions (e.g., failing to behave 
in accordance with acceptance medical standards or behaving contrary to such standards, or not 
acting as a reasonable, qualified physician would under such circumstances).  
If and only if you find the defendant liable for medical malpractice, you must next determine 
the amount of damages that the defendant should award to the plaintiff. Economic damages 
compensate the plaintiff for actual financial losses resulting from an injury, such as medical bills 
and uncompensated medical leave from work. Non-economic damages compensate the plaintiff 
for his or her pain and suffering endured as a result of medical malpractice. In this case, the 
plaintiff, Ms. Morrison, is requesting that jurors award $250,000.00 in economic damages to 
cover her medical expenses, her three weeks of unpaid leave from work, her decreased 
productivity at work, and the wages (both present and future) lost from her husband’s 
modified work schedule as a direct result of the surgical error. In addition, she is requesting 
that jurors award $400,000.00 in non-economic damages due to the pain and suffering she 
experienced following the surgical error, which includes her permanent inability to drive and 
perform everyday tasks. Remember, you should only consider damages if you find the 
defendant liable for medical malpractice. 
Your decisions should be based on the evidence, case facts, and testimony provided in the trial 
summary, rather than on emotions or personal attitudes.”    
 INSTRUCTIONS: Please respond to the following items: 
1) On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = not at all responsible and 7 = completely responsible, please 
indicate the degree to which you believe that… 
A.  The physician, Dr. Kelly, was responsible for the injuries Ms. Morrison incurred as a result of 
the failed LASIK surgery 
1------------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Not at all                                                                                Somewhat                                                                            Completely 











B. The patient, Ms. Morrison, was responsible for the injuries she incurred as a result of the 
failed LASIK surgery 
 
1------------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Not at all                                                                                Somewhat                                                                            Completely 
responsible                                                                            responsible                                                                          responsible 
 
2) Do you find the defendant, Dr. Kelly, liable for medical malpractice? 
                  ____ Yes        ____ No 
Please only respond to the following items if you indicated that Dr. Kelly was liable for medical 
malpractice: 
3) Please circle the value that best corresponds to the amount of economic damages you award 
to the plaintiff, Ms. Morrison. 
$0.00---$25,000---$50,000---$75,000---$100,000---$125,000---$150,000---$175,000--- 
$200,000---$225,000---$250,000---$275,000---$300,000---$325,000---$350,000---$400,000--- 
$425,000---$450,000    
4) Please circle the value that best corresponds to the amount of non-economic damages you 
award to the plaintiff, Ms. Morrison. 
$0.00---$25,000---$50,000---$75,000---$100,000---$125,000---$150,000---$175,000--- 
$200,000---$225,000---$250,000---$275,000---$300,000---$325,000---$350,000---$400,000--- 


















Appendix M: Jury Verdict Form 
 
The presiding Judge in this case, the Honorable Robert W. Pratt, gives you the following 
instructions: 
“Your task as a jury is to determine whether Dr. Kelly is liable for medical malpractice, and if so, 
to further determine the amount of economic and non-economic damages that should be 
awarded to the plaintiff (Ms. Andrea Morrison).   
In order to render a verdict of liable for medical malpractice, you must determine that the 
defendant (Dr. Kelly) behaved negligently in his care of the plaintiff (Ms. Morrison). That is, you 
must conclude that the defendants’ treatment of the plaintiff fell below the accepted standard 
of practice in the medical community, and that this negligence resulted in unnecessary injury to 
the plaintiff. Importantly, negligence may emerge in actions or inactions (e.g., failing to behave 
in accordance with acceptance medical standards or behaving contrary to such standards, or not 
acting as a reasonable, qualified physician would under such circumstances).  
If and only if you find the defendant liable for medical malpractice, you must next determine 
the amount of damages that the defendant should award to the plaintiff. Economic damages 
compensate the plaintiff for actual financial losses resulting from an injury, such as medical bills 
and uncompensated medical leave from work. Non-economic damages compensate the plaintiff 
for his or her pain and suffering endured as a result of medical malpractice. In this case, the 
plaintiff, Ms. Morrison, is requesting that jurors award $250,000.00 in economic damages to 
cover her medical expenses, her three weeks of unpaid leave from work, her decreased 
productivity at work, and the wages (both present and future) lost from her husband’s 
modified work schedule as a direct result of the surgical error. In addition, she is requesting 
that jurors award $400,000.00 in non-economic damages due to the pain and suffering she 
experienced following the surgical error, which includes her permanent inability to drive and 
perform everyday tasks. Remember, you should only consider damages if you find the 
defendant liable for medical malpractice. 
Your jury’s final decisions should be based on the evidence, case facts, and testimony provided 
in the trial summary, rather than on emotions or personal attitudes. As you deliberate, you are 
encouraged to share your own perspectives on the case information provided and to consider 
the perspectives of fellow jury members in arriving at your ultimate decisions. Your jury must 
render unanimous decisions (i.e. all jurors must agree) on the case verdict and any damages 
awarded to the plaintiff. You will have 30 minutes to deliberate this case with your fellow jurors. 
Each member of your jury will pledge to keep all contents of deliberations confidential.” 
 INSTRUCTIONS: Please respond to the following items as a jury. All jury members must be in 
agreement with these responses. 
1) We the jury render the following collective decision regarding the defendant’s (Dr. Kelly’s) 
liability for medical malpractice: 








2) Please circle the value that best corresponds to the amount of economic damages the jury 
awards to the plaintiff, Ms. Morrison. 
$0.00---$25,000---$50,000---$75,000---$100,000---$125,000---$150,000---$175,000--- 
$200,000---$225,000---$250,000---$275,000---$300,000---$325,000---$350,000---$400,000---   
$425,000---$450,000    
3) Please circle the value that best corresponds to the amount of non-economic damages the 
jury awards to the plaintiff, Ms. Morrison. 
$0.00---$25,000---$50,000---$75,000---$100,000---$125,000---$150,000---$175,000--- 
$200,000---$225,000---$250,000---$275,000---$300,000---$325,000---$350,000---$400,000--- 
$425,000---$450,000    
 
WE REQUEST THAT EACH JUROR INITIAL THIS DOCUMENT TO CONFIRM THAT THEY AGREE 
WITH THE ABOVE DECISIONS REGARDING THE TRIAL VERDICT AND DAMAGE AWARDS: 
Juror 1  ______ 
Juror 2  ______ 
Juror 3  ______ 
Juror 4  ______ 
Juror 5  ______ 
















Appendix N: Fat Phobia Scale 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Listed below are 14 pairs of adjectives sometimes used to describe obese or 
fat people. For each adjective pair, please place an X on the line closest to the adjective that 
you feel best describes your feelings and beliefs. Please answer as honestly as possible, and 
remember that your responses are anonymous. 
Fat or Obese people are: 
1) Lazy   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Industrious 
2) No will power   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Has will power 
3) Attractive   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Unattractive 
4) Good self-control   ___                 ___                 ___                   ___              ___   Poor self-control 
5) Fast   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Slow 
6) Having endurance   ___               ___              ___                ___            ___   Having no endurance 
7) Active   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Inactive 
8) Weak   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Strong 
9) Self-indulgent   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Self-sacrificing 
10) Dislikes food  ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Likes food 
11) Shapeless   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Shapely 
12) Undereats   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Overeats 
13) Insecure   ___                   ___                   ___                   ___              ___   Secure 








Appendix O: Demographic Information 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions about you. 
1)  I am:    _____  Male      _____  Female 
2) What is your age?  _____ years 
3) Have you ever had LASIK eye surgery or a similar procedure?  _____  Yes   _____  No 
If yes, please elaborate on your experience. What type of surgery did you have? Was it 









4) Please indicate your height and weight: 
Height:  _____  feet   _____ inches  Weight: _____ lbs. 
5) Which of the following best represents your ethnic or racial background? 
_____  White/Non-Hispanic  _____  Native American/American Indian 
_____  Black/African American                  _____  Pacific Islander 
_____  Asian/Asian American                     _____ Multi-ethnic 







Appendix P: Debriefing Form 
 “Jurors’ Decisions in Medical Malpractice Trials” 
PURPOSE 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. This study has three main objectives or purposes. The 
first objective is to investigate the processes responsible for jurors’ decisions in medical 
malpractice cases. The second is to determine whether the weight of the plaintiff may affect 
jurors’ judgments in malpractice cases, even if the plaintiff’s weight is unrelated to the 
allegation of malpractice. The third purpose is determine whether juries deliberating as a group 
provide different case-related decisions than jurors providing individual case judgments. 
 
All participants were asked to review the same trial summary. However, some were randomly 
assigned to view a photograph depicting an obese plaintiff, whereas others viewed a 
photograph depicting a normal-weight plaintiff. In addition, participants were assigned to be 
“deliberating” or “non-deliberating” jurors based on the date and time scheduled for the 
research participation session. That is, some of you were asked to review the trial summary, 
think about what you had read, and provide your own judgments about the case. Others were 
asked review the trial summary and deliberate the case with other participants, render a group 
verdict, and then provide individual judgments about the case. 
 
Prejudice and discrimination against the overweight in America is widespread and well-
documented (Crandall, 1994; Puhl & Heuer, 2009). Accordingly, we hypothesized that 
participants exposed to the photograph of the obese plaintiff would be more likely to 
demonstrate an “anti-plaintiff” bias in their case-related judgments (i.e., be more likely to find 
the defendant not liable, award fewer damages to the plaintiff) than those exposed to the 
photograph of the normal-weight plaintiff. Due to pervasive social stereotypes, these results 
may occur even if jurors attempt to render fair decisions in line with the evidence and testimony 
prevented in the trial summary.  We also hypothesized that jurors exposed to a photograph of 
the obese plaintiff would interpret the evidence differently than those exposed to a photograph 
of the normal-weight plaintiff. Specifically, we thought that those exposed to the photograph of 
the obese plaintiff would be more likely to view the evidence as favorable to the defense (the 
physician charged with medical malpractice) than would those exposed to the photograph of 
the normal-weight plaintiff.  
 
Prior research has shown that deliberations may lesson or eliminate the impact of biases held by 
individual jurors (Miller et al., 2011; Sommers, 2006). Thus, we expect that deliberations may 
decrease the impact of any biases related to plaintiff weight. This should result in more liable 
verdicts rendered by juries (as a group decision) than by individual jurors when the plaintiff is 
depicted as overweight.  We also wanted to explore the differences in medical malpractice case-
related judgments among deliberating and non-deliberating jurors, as little prior research has 
been conducted in this area. 
 
Finally, research has suggested that the body type and personality characteristics of jurors may 
influence their decisions in medical malpractice cases involving an obese plaintiff (see Crandall 





questions about their general beliefs about the world and about obese persons, as well as to 
provide their height and weight. Because self-reported height and weight can sometimes be 
inaccurate, the investigator also used a numbered scale to record the body type of each 
participant in a confidential codebook. This codebook contains participants’ Juror ID numbers 
followed by their assigned body type; it does not contain any other participant information. 
After the study is completed, the investigator will enter the numeric body type information into 
a database and match it to your survey using your Juror ID number.      
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
You will not be personally identified in any reports that may result from this study, and all of the   
responses you provide (case-related judgments and attitudes, responses to personality and 
belief questionnaires, demographic information, and reported height and weight) will remain 
anonymous. The number representing your body type also cannot be used to personally identify 
you; it will be linked to your Juror ID number strictly for analysis purposes and kept confidential.  
Only the investigator, research assistants, and the UNR Social Behavioral Institutional Review 
Board will have access to the data. All surveys will be stored for 5 years in a locked space in the 
investigator’s laboratory and then destroyed. We request that you not discuss this experiment 
or share information included in this debriefing form with other individuals who may be 
participants themselves. If you discussed your opinions about the case with fellow participants, 
we ask that you refrain from further discussing the contents of deliberations and the 
perspectives of any other fellow participants shared during these group discussions. 
FINAL REPORT 
If you are interested in obtaining a copy of the final report of this study, please contact Monica 
Miller, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Social Psychology, at 775-784-6021; 
Department of Criminal Justice Mailstop 214, Leifson Physics Building; mkmiller@unr.edu; or 
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Appendix Q: Summary of Findings 
Table 1. Summary of findings addressing hypotheses and research questions regarding non-




Overall Finding Comments 
H1 A-F  Unsupported There were no significant main 
effects of the weight manipulation 
on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case 
judgments. 
H2 A-F Partially Supported BJW was the only individual 
difference variable that moderated 
the effects of plaintiff weight on 
CCM measures. There were 
significant interactions between 
BJW and plaintiff weight in the 
hypothesized direction on 
perceptions of the plaintiff, plaintiff 
witness ratings, and economic 
damage awards. 
H3 A-F Unsupported Participant gender did not 
moderate the effects of plaintiff 
weight on any of the dependent 
CCM variables.  
H4 A-F Unsupported BMI did not moderate the effects 
of plaintiff weight on any of the 
dependent CCM variables.  
RQ 1 Negative Results from chi-square difference 
tests indicated that plaintiff weight 
did not moderate the attributional 
pathways followed in assigning 
blame. 
RQ 2 Affirmative There were significant main effects 
of participating BMI on perceptions 
of the plaintiff, of BPWE on 
perceptions of the defendant and 
SLA scale scores, and of FPS scores 
on verdict. 
RQ 3 Negative A series of regression analyses 
suggested that individual 
differences did not moderate the 
effects of the weight manipulation 
on the attributional pathways 





Table 2. Summary of findings addressing hypotheses and research questions comparing 




Overall Finding Comments 
H1 A-E  Unsupported There were no significant 
interactions between plaintiff 
weight and decision context on 
verdicts. Significant interactive 
effects between plaintiff weight 
and decision context on non-
economic damages and total 
responsibility opposed what was 
predicted in H1 B, D, and E. 
RQ 1 Negative In the deliberating sample, there 
were no notable differences in the 
verdicts and economic damage 
awards rendered at the jury and 
individual levels. However, the 
individual level non-economic 
damage awards among deliberating 
jurors were slightly higher than jury 
awards. 
RQ 2 Affirmative Deliberating jurors showed more 
leniency toward the defendant 
than non-deliberating jurors. This 
effect occurred on verdicts and 
total responsibility, and on many of 
the other dependent CCM 
measures. Analyses conducted 
using the entire sample (both 
deliberating and non-deliberating 
jurors) also revealed several 
significant interactions between 
plaintiff weight and individual 
differences and decision context 
and individual differences on 
dependent CCM measures. 
RQ 3 Negative There were few meaningful 
differences in the attributional 
pathways followed in assigning 
blame in the deliberating and non-







Appendix R: Chi-Square Difference Tests Conducted to Eliminate Plaintiff Weight as a 
Moderator of Attributional Pathways in the Non-Deliberating Sample 
Overview 
 Chi-square difference testing is a means of comparing a set of two nuanced path 
analyses or structural equation models to determine whether one model fits the data 
significantly better than the other (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). In comparing models pertaining to 
two different experimental conditions (i.e., normal weight plaintiff vs. obese plaintiff), this 
typically first involves specifying the theoretically grounded path model with the condition as 
the “grouping variable.” In the initial path model, all coefficients are “free,” permitting the 
coefficients to vary between these two conditions (Geiser, 2013). Next, a series of path analyses 
are estimated in which one coefficient is constrained or “fixed,” meaning that the coefficient is 
forced to be equal across the two conditions. In comparing the difference between the chi-
square values in the Test of Model Fit for each model and its correspondence to the chi-square 
critical value as determined by the difference in degrees of freedom for each model, it can be 
determined if a given relationship between variables significantly differs across conditions 
(Satorra & Bentler, 2001).  
 There are four outcome measures corresponding to participants’ blame ascriptions in 
this study: scores on the total responsibility scale, verdict, economic damage awards, and non-
economic damage awards. However, testing to determine whether models significantly varied 
between weight conditions was only conducted on path analyses specifying total responsibility 
and verdict as the dependent variable. This is because only participants finding the defendant 
liable (n = 128) awarded damages, and this decreased sample sizes prohibited valid model 
comparisons between weight conditions.   





  As a first step in specifying a model with the CCM blame measure of total responsibility 
as the DV, two path analyses (one including participants exposed to the normal weight plaintiff 
and one including those exposed to the obese plaintiff) were estimated using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) in which each endogenous SLA variable (SLA scale scores, plaintiff 
witness ratings, and defendant witness ratings) was regressed upon each exogenous SE variable 
(negative SE scale, perceptions of plaintiff, perceptions of defendant). Through this process, it 
was discovered that scores on the negative SE scale did not significantly predict scores on the 
SLA scale in either the normal weight or obese conditions (bs > .15, ps > .08). Thus, the 
regression of SLA scores on negative SE scores were not included in this model to avoid model 
saturation and to produce Chi-Square Test of Model Fit statistics (Geiser, 2013). A series of path 
analyses were estimated fixing each parameter and were compared to the free model. The 
difference between Model Fit in each comparative instance did not exceed the chi-square 
critical value of 3.84 at one degree of freedom, and neither freeing nor constraining the 
parameters significantly influenced model fit. Thus, it can be concluded that that plaintiff weight 
did not moderate attributional pathways in assigning total responsibility for the negative 
medical outcome. 
Chi-Square Difference Tests Comparing Models with Verdict as the DV 
 Weighted least squares means and variance adjusted (WLSMV) is the default estimator 
used by Mplus in estimating models with categorical dependent variables. In models using 
WLSMV, the typical method of chi-square difference testing to assess competing model fits is no 
longer appropriate (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), and thus the “difftest,” recommended for 
comparing models with the WLSMV estimation method, was used. This procedure involves 





constrained parameter. Mplus produces a “Chi-Square Statistic for Difference Testing” that can 
be used to compare each model. In each comparison, the chi-square statistic for difference 
testing was non-significant (ps > .09) indicating that free model did not fit the data any worse 









































Appendix S: Intra-Class Correlation Coefficients Calculated for Dependent Variables in 
Deliberating and Non-Deliberating Samples 
Table 1. Summary of intra-class correlation coefficients obtain from null models in deliberating 
and non-deliberating samples.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                               Deliberating                                      Non-Deliberating*   
Variable                                                    ICC          Wald Z          p                        ICC          Wald Z          p                                                                                                 
 
Negative SE Scale                                   .10            1.73           .08                      .03             .62            .54                   
Perceptions of the Plaintiff         .19            2.81          >.01                     .07           1.11            .27                   
Perceptions of the Defendant         .27            3.18          >.01                     .02             .33            .72 
SLA Scale           .32            3.52          >.01                     .01             .01            .99 
Plaintiff Witness Ratings         .21            2.78          >.01                     .04             .66            .51 
Defendant Witness Ratings         .18            2.53            .01                        -                -                - 
Total Responsibility          .48            4.09          >.01                        -                -                -    
Economic Damages          .61            3.12          >.01                     .06             .65            .52 
Non-Economic Damages         .43            2.52            .01                        -                -                - 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. *Covariance parameters for null models executed with defendant witness ratings, total 
responsibility, and non-economic damages as DVs in the deliberating sample could not be 
obtained due to an apparent Hessian matrix issue. Thus, the ICCs for these measures could not 
be calculated. This failure may indicate that a very low amount of variance is attributable to 














Appendix T: Complete Results of Analyses Addressing RQ 2 Using Deliberating and Non-
Deliberating Samples 
Interactive Effects of Plaintiff Weight and Decision Context on Individual-Level SE and SLA 
Measures: Analyses Addressing RQ 2 
 As initially proposed, RQ 2 aimed to examine “differences between deliberating and 
non-deliberating jurors on measures of SEs, SLAs, and case judgments” in the normal weight 
condition. After completing data collection and analyses, the decision was made to expand the 
scope of this research question so that it included samples in both weight conditions, as there 
were no main effects of plaintiff weight on any of the dependent variables in deliberating and 
non-deliberating conditions. In addition, analyses addressing RQ 2 also explored potential 
interactive effects between individual difference variables, decision context, and plaintiff weight 
on SE and SLA measures. The effects of decision context, weight condition, and individual 
difference variables on case judgments are described in the previous section. The current 
section explores whether condition assignment interacts with individual differences to influence 
initial, emotionally-based reactions to the case (indicated by SE measures) and attributional, 
decision-making processes (indicated by SLA measures) that are hypothesized to lead to case 
judgments. 
  All analyses addressing RQ 2 were conducted using mixed modeling procedures in SPSS, 
with separate models estimated to examine the effects of each individual difference variable on 
each SE and SLA measure. Each model included jury group as a random effect, and the following 
predictors as fixed effects variables: decision context; plaintiff weight; the decision context by 
plaintiff weight interaction term; the individual difference variable being examined; the 
individual difference variable by decision context interaction term; the individual difference 





individual difference variable, decision context, and plaintiff weight. Table 1 includes a summary 
of fixed effects for all models with SE measures as the dependent variable, and Table 2 
summarizes the fixed effects for all models with SLA measures as the dependent variable. 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on negative 
spontaneous evaluations (SE measure). Null models were executed to determine the extent to 
which jury groups accounted for the variance in scores on the negative SE scale. Jury group 
membership in the deliberating sample only accounted for approximately 10% of the variance in 
negative SE scale scores, ICC = .10, Wald Z = 1.73, p = .08. Though the variance component due 
to the random jury effect was non-significant, it has been suggested that ICCs as low as .10 can 
cause erroneous results if using linear regression (Bickel, 2007; Geiser, 2013), and thus the use 
of multi-level modeling is continued for this series of analyses. As expected, the between-groups 
variance component in the non-deliberating sample was lower than that in the deliberating 
sample, ICC = .03, Wald Z = .62, p = .54.  
 Tests of all five models incorporating each individual difference variable yielded only 
one statistically significant effect, which emerged across the five models. Thus, comprehensive 
results for each model will not be reported separately. Results from first model, which 
incorporated gender as the individual difference variable, indicated that decision context had a 
significant effect on negative SE scale scores, F(1,100.4) = 9.90, p = .002. Participants in the non-
deliberating condition had stronger negative emotional reactions to the case (M = 2.07, SE = .07) 
than did those in the deliberating condition (M = 1.77, SE = .063). This effect was replicated in 
the other four models, Fs > 8.90, ps < .004. It should be noted that, overall, participants did not 
express negative strong emotional reactions to the case. No other variables in any of the five 





 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on perceptions 
of the plaintiff (SE measure). The null model indicated that, in the deliberating condition, 
approximately 19.2% of the variance in perceptions of the plaintiff could be attributed to jury 
group membership, ICC = .19, Wald Z = 2.81, p = .009. In the deliberating condition, 
approximately 6.9% of the variance in perceptions of the plaintiff could be attributed to 
difference between the randomly assigned “jury groups,” and this variance component was non-
significant, ICC = .07, Wald Z = 1.11, p = .27. Results of all models testing the effects of plaintiff 
weight, decision context, and individual differences on perceptions of the plaintiff are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 Model 1E: Effects of gender on perceptions of the plaintiff. This model yielded a main 
effect of decision context on perceptions of the plaintiff, F(1,94.7) = 9.77, p = .002, such that 
those in the non-deliberating condition had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff (M = 3.99, 
SE = .11) than those in the deliberating condition (M = 3.44, SE = .10). This effect was replicated 
in each of the following four models (Fs > 9.60, ps < .01), and thus will not be reiterated in the 
results for these models. There were no main effects of plaintiff weight in this model (F = .62, p 
= .43) or in the following four models (Fs < .96, ps > .31). The interaction between plaintiff 
weight and decision context was marginally significant, F(1,94.7) = 3.15, p = .079. This 
interaction will be graphed and described in further detail in the results for model 2E. Gender 
did not significantly impact perceptions of the plaintiff, and there were no significant 
interactions between gender, plaintiff weight, and decision context (Fs < 1.76, ps >.18). 
 Model 2E: Effects of BJW-O on perceptions of the plaintiff. The interaction between 
plaintiff weight and decision context reached statistical significance in Model 2E, F(1,92.3) = 





plaintiff among non-deliberating (M = 3.82, SD = .15) and deliberating jurors (M = 3.64, SE = .13) 
were similar. When the plaintiff was depicted as obese, however, those in the deliberating 
condition had more negative perceptions (M = 3.25, SE = .14) than those in the non-deliberating 
condition (M = 4.01, SE = .15). Pairwise comparisons indicate that the difference in perceptions 
of the plaintiff in the obese condition between deliberating and non-deliberating conditions is 
significant (p < .001), as is the difference in perceptions of the plaintiff in the deliberating sample 
between obese and normal weight conditions (p = .044). BJW-O scores had no significant effect 
on perceptions of the plaintiff, and there were no  significant interactions between BJW-O 
scores, plaintiff weight, and decision context (Fs < 1.73, ps >.18). 
 Model 3E: Effects of BPWE on perceptions of the plaintiff. The significant interactive 
effect between plaintiff weight and decision context that emerged in Model 2E was replicated in 
Model 3E, F(1,90.8) = 5.04, p = .027. This model also yielded a main effect of BPWE scale scores 
on perceptions of the plaintiff, F(1,433.9) = 8.49, p = .004. Though the fixed effect estimate for 
BPWE was non-significant, it indicated that those lower in BPWE had more positive perceptions 
of the plaintiff than those higher in BPWE (b = -.19, SE = .13, p = .17). There were no significant 
interactions between BPWE, decision context, and plaintiff weight (Fs < 1.56, ps > .21). 
 Model 4E: Effects of FPS on perceptions of the plaintiff. In Model 4E, the interaction 
between plaintiff weight and decision context on perceptions of the plaintiff was marginally 
significant, F(1,83.2) = 3.61, p = .061. Estimated marginal means revealed the same pattern 
observed in prior analyses, such that there was little difference in perceptions of the normal 
weight plaintiff in non-deliberating (M = 3.83, SE = .14) and deliberating conditions (M = 3.62, SE 
= .13). There was a greater difference in perceptions of the obese plaintiff between non- 




Table 1. Fixed effects of decision context, plaintiff weight, and individual difference variables on SE measures in total sample. 
 
Model                                                                              D: Negative SEs                  E: Perceptions of plaintiff            F: Perceptions of defendant  
     Variable*                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 1: Effects of Gender 
     Decision context                                                       9.68-         >.01                                 9.77         >.01                                         2.27            .14                   
     Weight condition                                                        .07            .79                                   .62           .43                                          1.75            .19 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    1.32            .25                                 3.15           .08                                         1.10             .30 
     Gender                                                                         .50             .48                                 1.76           .19                                         8.26           >.01    
     Gender x Decision context                                       .01             .95                                   .79           .38                                            .60             .44     
     Gender x Weight condition                                      .02             .31                                   .35           .56                                          5.01             .02 
 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
     Decision context                                                     10.50-        >.01                               10.74          .001                                        4.91            .03 
     Weight condition                                                        .07            .79                                   .71           .20                                            .93            .34 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    2.12            .15                                 4.10           .05                                          2.82            .10                 
     BJW-O                                                                           .19            .67                                 1.73           .19                                        10.28            .001 
     BJW-O x Decision context                                         .04            .85                                   .76           .38                                            .09            .77 
     BJW-O x Weight condition                                        .41            .52                                 2.32           .13                                          4.42            .04 
 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
     Decision context                                                       8.90-         >.01                               10.81          .001                                        4.47            .04  
     Weight condition                                                        .35            .56                                   .14            .71                                            .07            .79 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    1.88            .17                                  5.04           .03                                          2.18            .08 
     BPWE                                                                          1.64            .20                                  8.49         >.01                                       23.18         >.001 
     BPWE x Decision context                                          .01            .97                                  1.56           .21                                            .84           .36    
     BPWE x Weight condition                                       1.37            .24                                    .23           .63                                            .64           .42 
 
Note.  *Each model also included a three-way interaction term between decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference 





Table 1 (continued).  
 
Model                                                                             D: Negative SEs                   E: Perceptions of plaintiff            F: Perceptions of defendant  
     Variable                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
     Decision context                                                     11.67-           .001                            11.42           .001                                      3.62            .06 
     Weight condition                                                        .13            .72                                   .62           .43                                          .52             .47 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     1.57           .21                                 3.61           .06                                        2.07            .15 
     FPS                                                                                  .78           .38                               12.02           .001                                      3.44           .06 
     FPS x Decision context                                                .01           .95                                   .43           .51                                          .79            .38 
     FPS x Weight condition                                               .95           .33                                   .20           .65                                          .77            .38          
 
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
     Decision context                                                     10.09          >.01                                 9.59          >.01                                      3.73            .06                    
     Weight condition                                                        .20            .66                                   .99            .32                                       1.04            .31 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    2.94            .10                                 4.63            .03                                      2.02             .16  
     BMI                                                                              1.12            .27                               14.17         >.001                                     5.71            .02 
     BMI x Decision context                                              .71            .40                                  1.76           .19                                        .25             .62 








who deliberated had more negative perceptions of the plaintiff than those who did not. Again, 
pairwise comparisons indicate a significant difference in perceptions of the plaintiff between 
non-deliberating and deliberating jurors in the obese condition (p < .001) and between 
deliberating jurors in the normal weight and obese conditions (p = .047). 
 There was a significant main effect of FPS scores on perceptions of the plaintiff, F(1,430) 
= 12.02, p = .001. Estimates of fixed effects indicate that those with lower FPS scores had more 
positive perceptions of the plaintiff than those with higher scores (b = -.38, SE = .18, p = .036). 
FPS scores did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on perceptions of 
the plaintiff (Fs < .48, ps > .48).  
Figure 1. Interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight on perceptions of the plaintiff 
in the total sample. 
 
 
 Model 5E: Effects of BMI on perceptions of the plaintiff. The interaction between 





























p = .034. In addition, participant BMI was a significant predictor of perceptions of the plaintiff, 
F(1,434.6) = 14.18, p > .001. Though the fixed effects estimate was non-significant, it indicated 
that those with higher BMIs had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff than those with lower 
BMIs (b = 1.48, SE = 1.37, p = .28). There were no significant interactions between participant 
BMI, decision context, or plaintiff weight (Fs < 1.76, ps > .18).  
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on perceptions 
of the defendant (SE measure). The null model indicated that the variance component due to 
the random jury effect was significant in the deliberating condition, accounting for 
approximately 26.5% of the variance in jurors’ perceptions of the defendant, ICC = .265, Wald Z 
= 3.18, p = .001. In comparison, the variance component due to the random jury effect was very 
low and non-significant for the non-deliberating sample, ICC = .017, Wald Z = .33, p = .72. Results 
of all models testing the effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences 
on perceptions of the defendant are summarized in Table 1. 
 Model 1F: Effects of gender on perceptions of the defendant. Model 1F yielded no 
significant main effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on perceptions of the defendant, 
and the interaction between plaintiff weight and decision context also was non-significant (Fs < 
2.28, ps > .14). Plaintiff weight as an individual predictor failed to impact perceptions of the 
defendant in any of the other models in this series (Fs < 2.00, ps > .19), and thus will not be 
further discussed. Gender significantly impacted perceptions of the defendant, F(1,440) = 8.26, 
p = .004, such that males had more positive perceptions of the defendant than females (b = -.42, 
SE = .25, p = .04). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between participant 
gender and plaintiff weight, F(1,440) = 5.51, p = .019, which is displayed in Figure 2. In the 





= .11) and male (M = 3.98, SE = .13) participants. In the obese condition, however, males had 
more positive perceptions of the defendant (M = 4.40, SE = .14) than did females (M = 3.85, SE = 
.11). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that, for males, the difference in perceptions of the 
defendant between normal weight and obese plaintiff conditions was significant (p < .001). 
Gender did not moderate the effects of decision context on perceptions of the plaintiff, and the 
three-way interaction between gender, decision context, and plaintiff weight also was non-
significant (Fs < .60, ps > .43). 
 Model 2F: Effects of BJW-O on perceptions of the defendant. A significant main effect 
of decision context emerged in Model 2F, F(1,95) = 4.91, p = .029. Estimated marginal means 
revealed that deliberating jurors had more positive perceptions of the defendant (M = 4.15, SE = 
.09) than non-deliberating jurors (M = 3.86, SE = .09). Yet, the interaction between decision  
Figure 2. Interaction between plaintiff weight and participant gender on perceptions of the 











































context and plaintiff weight did not reach statistical significance (F = 2.83, p = .097). There was a 
significant main effect of BJW-O scores on perceptions of the defendant, F(1,434.6) = 10.28, p = 
.001, such that those with higher BJW-O scores had more positive perceptions than those with 
lower BJW-O scores (b = .55, SE = .18, p = .002). In addition, BJW-O moderated the effects of 
plaintiff weight on perceptions of the defendant, F(1,434.6) = 4.42, p = .036 (see Figure 3). 
Estimated marginal means were calculated at +1 and -1 standard deviations of scores on the 
BJW-O scale to help interpret this interaction. These calculations revealed that perceptions of 
the defendant did not substantially differ among those low in BJW-O, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff was depicted as normal weight (M = 3.89, SE = .12) or obese (M = 3.80, SE = .12). Those 
high in BJW-O had more positive perceptions of the defendant when the plaintiff was depicted 



































SE = .11). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that the difference in perceptions of the 
defendant between normal weight and obese plaintiff condition among those higher in BJW-O is 
significant (p = .044). The two-way interaction between BJW-O scale scores and decision context 
was non-significant, as was the three-way interaction between BJW-O scale scores, decision 
context, and plaintiff weight (Fs < .48, ps > .45). 
 Model 3F: Effects of BPWE on perceptions of the defendant. The main effect of decision 
context was again significant in Model 3F, F(1,90.9) = 4.47, p = .037, with those in the 
deliberating condition expressing more favorable perceptions of the defendant than those in the 
non-deliberating condition. The interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight was 
marginally significant, F(1,90.9) = 3.18, p = .078. Perceptions of the defendant in the normal 
weight condition were similar among non-deliberating (M = 3.94, SE = .14) and deliberating (M = 
3.99, SE = .12) samples. However, this interactive effect did not approach significance in any of 
the other models described in this series of analyses. In the obese condition, there was slight 
but non-significant decrease in non-deliberating jurors’ perceptions of the defendant (M = 3.74, 
SE = .14), whereas deliberating jurors expressed significantly more positive perceptions of the 
defendant (M = 4.26, SE = .13, p = .008).  
 There was a significant main effect of scores on the BPWE measure on perceptions of 
the defendant, F(1,429.9) = 23.18, p < .001, such that those higher in BPWE had more positive 
perceptions of the defendant than those lower in BPWE (b = .34, SE = .12, p = .005). However, 
BPWE did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on perceptions of the 
defendant (Fs < .85, ps > .35). 
 Model 4F: Effects of FPS on perceptions of the defendant. The main effect of decision 





p < .06. As in Models 2F and 3F, those in the deliberating condition expressed more positive 
perceptions of the plaintiff than those in the non-deliberating condition. However, the 
interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight was non-significant (F = 2.07, p = .15). 
The main effect of FPS scores on perceptions of the defendant approached significance, 
F(1,425.5) = 3.44, p = .064. The fixed effects estimate was non-significant, but indicated that 
those with higher FPS scores had more positive perceptions of the defendant than those with 
lower FPS scores (b = .14, SE = .18, p = .38). There were no significant interactions between 
scores on the FPS, decision context, or plaintiff weight (Fs < .79, ps > .37). 
 Model 5F: Effects of BMI on perceptions of the defendant. The main effect of decision 
context on perceptions of the defendant approached significance in Model 5F, F(1,93.5) = 3.73, 
p < .06, but there was no significant interactive effect between plaintiff weight and decision 
context (F = 2.02, p = .16). Participant BMI significantly predicted perceptions of the defendant, 
F(1,431.6) = 5.17, p = .017. The fixed effects estimate for BMI was non-significant, but indicated 
that participants with higher BMIs had more negative perceptions of the defendant than those 
with lower BMIs (b = -1.55, SE = 1.24, p = .21). There were no significant interactions between 
decision context, plaintiff weight, and participant BMI on perceptions of the defendant (Fs < .25, 
ps > .61). 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on the SLA scale 
(SLA measure). The null model indicated that the variance component due to the random jury 
effect was significant in the deliberating condition, ICC = .322, Wald Z = 3.52 p < .001. 
Approximately 32% of the variance in SLA scale scores could be attributed to differences 
between jury groups. In contrast, less than .01% of the variance could be attributed to 





.003, p = .998. Results for all models specifying SLA measures as dependent variables (including 
SLA scale scores, plaintiff witness ratings, and defendant witness ratings) are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 Model 1G: Effects of gender on SLA scale. Because there was no main effect of plaintiff 
weight on SLA scale scores in this model or in any of the other four models in this series (Fs < 
2.26, ps > .13), results of plaintiff weight as an individual predictor will not be discussed further. 
A significant effect of decision context did emerge, F(1,98.6) = 11.15, p = .001, such that 
deliberating jurors had lower scores on the SLA scale (M = 3.47, SE = .08) than non-deliberating 
jurors (M = 3.85, SE = .08). That is, deliberating jurors were less likely than non-deliberating 
jurors to express pro-plaintiff attributions and more likely to express pro-defendant attributions. 
The main effect of decision context remained significant in the following four models (Fs > 
10.81, ps < .01) and thus specific results pertaining to the main effect will not be further 
reported for this series of models. There was no significant interaction between plaintiff weight 
and decision context (F = 2.70, p = .10). 
 SLA scale scores were lower among males (M = 3.48, SE = .08) than among females (M = 
3.83, SE = .07), and this difference was statistically significant, F(1,439.2) = 14.92, p < .001. 
Analyses failed to reveal any significant interactive effects between gender, plaintiff weight, and 





Table 2. Fixed effects of decision context, plaintiff weight, and individual difference variables on SLA measures in total sample. 
 
Model                                                                                 G: SLA Scale                     H: Plaintiff witness ratings          I: Defendant witness ratings  
     Variable*                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 1: Effects of Gender 
     Decision context                                                      11.15-         >.01                              14.90           >.001                                    1.89            .17                   
     Weight condition                                                       2.07            .14                                 2.61            .43                                         .36            .55 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     2.70            .10                                   .82            .37                                       2.94            .90 
     Gender                                                                       14.92         >.001                             19.05          >.001                                      .07            .79    
     Gender x Decision context                                         .08            .78                                   .39            .53                                       3.18            .09     
     Gender x Weight condition                                        .43            .51                                   .30            .59                                       1.43            .23 
 
Model 2: Effects of BJW-O 
     Decision context                                                    13.46-         >.001                             17.53          >.001                                        .95            .33 
     Weight condition                                                      2.37            .13                                 2.03            .16                                          .03            .87 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    5.68            .02                                 2.22            .14                                        5.02            .03                 
     BJW-O                                                                         6.35            .01                                   .36            .55                                      12.02            .001 
     BJW-O x Decision context                                       1.20            .27                                   .98            .32                                           .06            .81 
     BJW-O x Weight condition                                      8.58          >.01                                 4.48            .04                                        2.93            .08 
 
Model 3: Effects of BPWE 
     Decision context                                                     13.61-         >.001                            18.40          >.001                                       1.07            .31  
     Weight condition                                                        .84            .36                                 1.47            .23                                            .35            .56 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    7.45          >.01                                  3.06            .08                                         5.56            .02 
     BPWE                                                                        24.15          >.001                               4.79            .03                                       13.68         >.001 
     BPWE x Decision context                                        7.79           >.01                                1.35            .25                                            .30            .58    
     BPWE x Weight condition                                       2.45             .12                                1.08            .30                                          6.89           >.01 
 
Note.  *Each model also included a three-way interaction term between decision context, plaintiff weight, and the individual difference 





Table 2 (continued).  
 
Model                                                                               G: SLA Scale                      H: Plaintiff witness ratings           I: Defendant witness ratings  
     Variable                                                                       F                  p                                   F                  p                                            F                  p   
Model 4: Effects of FPS 
     Decision context                                                      11.44-          .001                           16.96          >.001                                      .97             .06 
     Weight condition                                                       2.54           .12                                2.74            .10                                        .15             .47 
     Decision context x Weight condition                     5.10           .03                                2.60            .11                                      2.79            .10 
     FPS                                                                              13.13        >.001                              7.65          >.01                                    10.52            .001 
     FPS x Decision context                                                .38           .54                                  .04            .84                                       5.89            .02 
     FPS x Weight condition                                             2.01           .15                                  .20            .65                                       3.42            .07          
 
Model 5: Effects of BMI 
     Decision context                                                     10.82            .001                             17.27         >.001                                       .48            .49                    
     Weight condition                                                      3.05            .09                                 2.96            .32                                         .01            .31 
     Decision context x Weight condition                    6.41            .01                                 3.07            .08                                       3.74            .06  
     BMI                                                                              5.34            .02                                   .52            .47                                     10.84            .001 
     BMI x Decision context                                            1.06            .30                                   .07            .80                                         .18             .67 




 Model 2G: Effects of BJW-O on SLA scale. Model 2G yielded a significant interactive 
effect between plaintiff weight and decision context on SLA scale scores, F(1,94.7) = 5.68, p = 
.019. As Figure 4 indicates, non-deliberating jurors had similar scores on the SLA scale regardless 
of whether they were assigned to normal weight (M = 3.85, SE = .11) or obese (M = 3.95, SE = 
.12) plaintiff conditions. In the deliberating condition, jurors in the obese condition had lower 
SLA scale scores (M = 3.28, SE = .11) than jurors in the normal weight condition (M = 3.71, SE = 
.10). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicated that the difference between SLA scale scores in the 
normal weight and obese conditions was significant for the deliberating sample (p < .001). 
 There was a significant main effect of BJW-O scale scores on SLA scale scores, F(1,439.2) 
= 14.92, p < .001. The fixed effects estimate for BJW-O revealed that those lower in BJW-O 
scored higher on the SLA scale (indicating stronger endorsement of pro-plaintiff attributions and 
weaker endorsement of pro-defendant attributions) than those higher in BJW-O. This main 
effect, however, was qualified by a significant interaction between BJW-O and plaintiff weight, 
which is depicted in Figure 5. Consistent with prior results, SLA scale score means calculated at 
+1 and -1 standard deviations of BJW-O indicated that plaintiff weight did not impact SLA scale 
scores among those lower in BJW-O (normal weight M = 3.77, SE = .10; obese M = 3.84, SE = 
.10). Those higher in BJW-O had lower scores on the SLA scale in the obese condition (M = 3.38, 
SE = .10) than in the normal weight condition (M = 3.81, SE = .09), and tests of pairwise 
comparisons indicated that this difference was significant (p = .003). BJW-O scale scores did not 
moderate the effects of decision context on SLA scale scores, and the three-way interaction 






















































 Model 3G: Effects of BPWE on SLA scale. The interaction between plaintiff weight and 
decision context was significant in this model as well as in the following two models in this series 
(Fs > 5.09, ps < .03). The interaction pattern was the same across all models: deliberating jurors 
had significantly lower SLA scale scores when exposed to the obese plaintiff than when exposed 
to the normal weight plaintiff, whereas plaintiff weight had little impact on non-deliberating 
jurors’ SLA scores.  
 There was a significant main effect of BPWE, F(1,429.9) = 24.15, p < .001, such that 
those lower in BPWE scored higher on the SLA scale than those higher in BPWE (b = -.18, SE = 
.10, p = .065). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between BPWE and 
decision context, F(1,429.9) = 7.79, p = .005 (see Figure 6). Those higher in BPWE had similar SLA 
scale scores regardless of whether they were in the non-deliberating (M = 3.60, SE = .10) or 
deliberating (M = 3.43, SD = .09) condition. Among those lower in BPWE, SLA scale scores were 
higher for those in the non-deliberating condition (M = 4.24, SE = .10) compared to the 
deliberating condition (M = 3.60, SE = .09). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that the 
difference between decision contexts for those lower in BPWE is significant (p < .001). The 
interaction term between plaintiff weight and BPWE and the three-way interaction term were 
both non-significant (Fs < 2.45, ps > .11). 
 Model 4G: Effects of FPS on SLA scale. There was a significant main effect of FPS scores 
on SLA scale scores, F(1,427.1) = 13.13, p < .001. According to the fixed effects estimate, SLA 
scale scores decreased as FPS scores increased (b = -.28, SE = .13, p = .037). However, there were 
no significant interactions between FPS scores and plaintiff weight and decision context on SLA 






Figure 6. Interaction between decision context and BPWE scores on SLA scale in the total sample. 
 
 
 Model 5G: Effects of BMI on SLA scale. Participant BMI significantly impacted SLA scale 
scores, F(1,433.5) = 5.34, p = .021, such that SLA scale scores decreased as BMI decreased. The 
fixed effects estimate for BMI, however, was non-significant (b = - .21, SE = 1.03, p = .84). BMI 
did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on SLA scale scores (Fs < 
1.06, ps > .30). 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on plaintiff 
witness ratings (SLA measure). Null models were executed with Jury ID as the grouping variable 
and the scale comprised of ratings of the convincingness of the witnesses for the plaintiff as the 
dependent variable. The null model including the deliberating sample revealed that 20.5% of the 
variance in plaintiff witness ratings was attributable to differences between jury groups, ICC = 























variance component due to random assignment to nominal jury groups was non-significant, ICC 
= .038, Wald Z = .66, p = .51. 
 Model 1H: Effects of gender on plaintiff witness ratings. There were no significant main 
effects of plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings in Model 1H or in Models 2H – 5H (Fs < 
2.97, ps > .10). Decision context did significantly impact plaintiff witness ratings, F(1,100.2) = 
14.90, p < .001. Estimated marginal means revealed that non-deliberating jurors perceived the 
plaintiff’s witnesses as more convincing (M = 4.57, SE = .11) compared to deliberating jurors (M 
= 4.02, SE = .10). This main effect of decision context persevered in Models 2H – 5H (Fs > 16.96, 
ps < .001) and will not be reported separately for each of the following individual models. All 
interaction terms, including those between plaintiff weight and decision context and those 
between plaintiff weight, decision context, and gender were non-significant (Fs < .82, ps > .36). 
However, there was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 441.7) = 19.85, p < .001, such that 
males had lower scores on the plaintiff witness scale (M = 4.04, SE = .10) than did females (M = 
4.56, SE = .08). 
 Model 2H: Effects of BJW-O on plaintiff witness ratings. There was no significant main 
effect of BJW-O scale scores on plaintiff witness ratings (F = .36, p = .55). Yet, BJW-O scale scores 
moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings, F(1,437.3) = 4.48, p = .035 
(see Figure 7). Plaintiff weight did not significantly impact plaintiff witness ratings among 
participants lower in BJW-O (normal weight M = 4.31, SE = .13; obese M = 4.41, SE = .13). 
Plaintiff weight had a significant effect on plaintiff witness ratings among those higher in BJW-O 
(p < .001). Those with higher BJW-O scores rated the plaintiff’s witnesses as more convincing in 
the normal weight condition (M = 4.55, SE = .12) than in the obese condition (M = 4.10, SE = 









 Model 3H: Effects of BPWE on plaintiff witness ratings. In Model 3H, the interaction 
between decision context and plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings was marginally 
significant, F(1, 437.3) = 4.48, p = .035. This interactive effect is illustrated in Figure 8. Plaintiff 
weight had a negligible effect on plaintiff witness ratings in the non-deliberating condition 
(normal weight M = 4.64, SE = .15; obese M = 4.71, SE = .15). There was a more pronounced 
effect of plaintiff weight in the deliberating condition, such that deliberating jurors had lower 
ratings of plaintiff witness convincingness with presented with an obese plaintiff (M = 3.86, SE = 
.14) than when presented with a normal weight plaintiff (M = 4.28, SE = .13). Tests of pairwise 
comparisons indicate a significant difference in plaintiff witness ratings between normal weight 
































Figure 8. Interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight on plaintiff witness ratings in 
the total sample. 
 
 
 In addition, a significant main effect of BPWE scores on plaintiff witness ratings 
emerged, F(1, 434.5) = 4.79, p = .029. The fixed effects estimate for BPWE was non-significant, 
but indicated that plaintiff witness ratings decreased as BPWE scores increased (b = -.15, SE = 
.14, p = .256). BPWE did not moderate the effects of decision context or plaintiff weight on 
plaintiff witness ratings (Fs < 1.36, ps > .24). 
 Model 4H: Effects of FPS on plaintiff witness ratings. In Model 4H, the interaction 
between decision context and plaintiff weight did not approach statistical significance (F = 2.60, 
p = .11). Further, FPS scores did not moderate the effects of decision context or plaintiff weight 
on plaintiff witness ratings (Fs < .45, ps > .50). There was, however, a significant main effect of 


































effects estimate for FPS scores indicated that as FPS scores decreased, ratings of the plaintiff’s 
witnesses increased (b = -.23, SE = .18, p = .20).  
 Model 5H: Effects of BMI on plaintiff witness ratings. As in Model 3H, the interaction 
between plaintiff weight and decision context on plaintiff witness ratings was marginally 
significant, F(93.6,1) = 3.07, p = .083. Again, estimated marginal means revealed little difference 
between plaintiff weight conditions in the non-deliberating sample (normal weight M = 4.66, SE 
= .15; obese M = 4.66, SE = .15). In the deliberating sample, participants rated the plaintiff’s 
witnesses as less convincing in the obese condition (M = 3.83, SE = .14) than in the normal 
weight condition (M = 4.32, SE = .13). There was no significant main effect of participant BMI 
and BMI did not moderate the effects of plaintiff weight or decision context on plaintiff witness 
ratings (Fs < .47, ps > .47). 
 Effects of plaintiff weight, decision context, and individual differences on defendant 
witness ratings (SLA measure). The null model for the deliberating sample indicated that 
approximately 17.6% of the variance in defendant witness ratings was attributable to 
differences between jury groups, and this random variance component was significant, ICC = 
.176, Wald Z = 2.53, p = .011. Estimates of covariance parameters for the null model only 
including the non-deliberating sample could not be obtained, and thus the ICC could not be 
calculated. Again, the failure of the null model to yield estimates of covariance parameters may 
be due to a negligible amount of variance in defendant witness ratings between the nominal 
jury groups. 
 Model 1I: Effects of gender on defendant witness ratings. There were no significant 
main effects of plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings in this model (F = .336, p = .55) or 





context on defendant witness ratings in this model (F = 1.88, p = .17) or in any of the other 
models in this series (Fs < .95 , ps > .22). Therefore, the non-significant results of the main 
effects of plaintiff weight and decision context will not continue to be reported in the following 
series of analyses. In the current model, the interaction between plaintiff weight and decision 
context also failed to approach significance (F = 2.94, p =.09). 
 The main effect of gender was non-significant (F = .07, p = .79), but the interaction 
between gender and decision context on defendant witness ratings was marginally significant, 
F(1, 447.3) = 3.18, p = .075. As Figure 9 illustrates, female participants provided similar ratings of 
the defendant’s witnesses in the non-deliberating (M = 4.84, SE = .10) and deliberating (M = 
4.81, SE = .09) conditions. However, males in the non-deliberating condition perceived the 
defendant’s witnesses as less convincing (M = 4.62, SE = .13) than males in the deliberating 
condition (M = 4.97, SE = .12). Tests of pairwise comparisons showed that, for male participants, 
the difference in defendant witness ratings between non-deliberating and deliberating 
conditions was significant (p = .048). The interaction between gender and plaintiff weight on 
defendant witness ratings was non-significant, as was the three-way interaction (Fs < 1.43, ps > 
.23). 
 Model 2I: Effects of BJW-O on defendant witness ratings. The interaction between 
plaintiff weight and decision context reached statistical significance in Model 2I, F(1, 96.3) = 
5.02, p = .027. Estimated marginal means indicated that participants in the obese condition 
viewed the defendant’s witness as more credible when they deliberated (M = 5.01, SE = .11) 
than when they considered the case individually (M = 4.63, SE = .13; see Figure 10). 
Deliberations did not substantially affect defendant witness ratings in the normal weight 









Figure 10. Interaction between decision context and plaintiff weight on defendant witness 




























































 Participants’ scores on the BJW-O scale significantly impacted defendant witness 
ratings, F(1, 442.9) = 12.02, p < .001. Estimates of fixed effects indicated that scores on the BJW-
O scale were positively related to ratings of the defendant’s witnesses’ convincingness (b = .45, 
SE = .18, p = .001). The interaction between plaintiff weight and BJW-O scores on defendant 
witness ratings was marginally significant, F(1, 442.9) = 2.93, p < .087. As Figure 11 illustrates, 
BJW-O scores had a greater impact on defendant witness ratings in the obese condition (low 
BJW-O M = 4.89, SE = .11; high BJW-O M = 5.08, SE = .11) than in the normal weight condition 
(low BJW-O M = 4.71, SE = .11; high BJW-O M = 4.56, SE = .10). That is, those with stronger just 
world beliefs found the defendant’s witnesses more convincing than those with weaker beliefs, 
but only when they were exposed to the obese plaintiff. Tests of pairwise comparisons could not 
be used to further inform the significance of this effect, as the main difference emerged 
between means calculated at +1 and -1 standard deviations of the centered BJW-O variable in 
the obese condition only (as opposed as between obese and normal weight conditions at either 
low or high BJW-O scores). BJW-O scale scores did not moderate the effects of decision context 
on defendant witness ratings, and the three-way interaction between BJW-O, plaintiff weight, 
and decision context also was non-significant (Fs > .45, ps < .50). 
Model 3I: Effects of BPWE on defendant witness ratings. The interaction between plaintiff 
weight and decision context on defendant witness ratings again reached statistical significance, 
F(1, 94.8) = 5.58, p = .020. Consistent with the interaction that emerged in Model 2I, participants 
exposed to the obese plaintiff viewed the defendant’s witnesses as more convincing when they 
deliberated in groups (M = 4.95, SE = .11) than when they did not deliberate (M = 4.56, SE = .12). 
Those exposed to the normal weight plaintiff provided similar ratings of the defendant’s 





deliberating M = 4.74, SE = .11). Tests of pairwise comparisons confirmed that the difference 
between deliberating and non-deliberating jurors in the obese condition was significant (p = 
.021). 
Model 3I yielded a main effect of BPWE on defendant witness ratings, F(1, 441.5) = 
13.68, p < .001. Estimates of fixed effects indicated that scores on the BPWE scale were 
positively related to ratings of the convincingness of the defendant’s witnesses (b = .31, SE = .12, 
p = .009). Two significant interactions provide further insight into the additional factors 
underlying this main effect. First, BPWE moderated the effects of decision context on defendant 
witness ratings, F(1, 441.5) = 4.33, p < .038. Estimated marginal means were calculated at +1 
and -1 standard deviations of the centered BPWE variable to help clarify this interactive effect. 
Decision context had a negligible effect on defendant witness ratings among those higher in 
Figure 11. Interaction between plaintiff weight and BJW-O scores on defendant witness ratings in 




































BPWE (non-deliberating M = 5.02, SE = .11; deliberating M = 4.93, SE = .10; see Figure 12).  
Participants lower in BPWE, however, perceived the defendant’s witnesses as more convincing 
in the deliberating condition (M = 4.77, SE = .10) than in the non-deliberating condition (M = 
4.44, SE = .11). Tests of pairwise comparisons indicate that the difference in defendant witness 
ratings between deliberating and non-deliberating conditions is significant among those with 
lower BPWE scale scores (p = .033).  
 Second, BPWE moderated the effects of plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings, 
F(1, 441.5) = 6.89, p < .009. This interaction is depicted in Figure 13. In the normal weight 
condition, defendant witness ratings were similar among those with a stronger BPWE (M = 4.87, 
SE = .11) and those with a weaker BPWE (M = 4.77, SE = .10). In the obese condition, those 
scoring lower on the BPWE scale had less favorable perceptions of the defendant’s witnesses (M 
= 4.44, SE = .11) than those scoring higher on the BPWE scale (M = 5.07, SE = .10). According to 
tests of pairwise comparisons, the difference between obese and normal weight conditions 
among those lower in BPWE is significant (p = .032). There also appears to be a substantial 
difference between those lower and higher in BPWE in the obese condition only, though 
pairwise comparisons cannot be used to determine the statistical significance of this difference. 
The three-way interaction between BPWE, plaintiff weight, and decision context was non-
significant (F = .30, p = .58). 
 Model 4I: Effects of FPS on defendant witness ratings. The interaction between plaintiff 
weight and decision context did not reach statistical significance in Model 4I (F = 2.79, p = .098). 
The main effect of FPS on defendant witness ratings was significant, F(1, 435.5) = 10.52, p = 
.001, and was qualified by a significant interaction between decision context and FPS scores, F(1, 





calculated at +1 and -1 standard deviations of the centered FPS score indicated that those with 
higher FPS scores provided similar ratings of the defendant’s witnesses in non-deliberating (M  = 
5.05, SD = .11) and deliberating (M = 4.91, SD = .10) conditions. Those with lower FPS scores 
perceived the defendant’s witnesses as less convincing in the non-deliberating condition (M = 
4.47, SE = .12) than in the deliberating condition (M = 4.83, SE = .10). Tests of pairwise 
comparisons confirmed that there was a statistically significant difference in defendant witness 
ratings between non-deliberating and deliberating conditions for those with lower FPS scores (p 
= .020). This effect is similar to that obtained in examining the interaction between decision 
context and FPS scores on total responsibility assessments, which indicated that those with 
lower FPS scores were more likely to find the defendant responsible for the negative medical 
outcome in only the non-deliberating condition. 
Figure 12. Interaction between decision context and BPWE scores on defendant witness ratings 





































Figure 13. Interaction between plaintiff weight and BPWE scores on defendant witness ratings in 
the total sample. 
 
Figure 14. Interaction between decision context and FPS scores on defendant witness ratings in 




































































 The interaction between plaintiff weight and FPS scores approached significance, F(1, 
435.5) = 3.42, p = .065. FPS scores had little impact on defendant witness ratings in the normal 
weight condition (low FPS M = 4.77, SE = .11; high FPS M = 4.91, SE = .11). In the obese 
condition, those with higher FPS scale scores perceived the defendant’s witnesses as more 
convincing (M = 5.05, SE = .11) than those with lower FPS scores (M = 4.53, SE = .11; see Figure 
15). Because this difference emerged between weight conditions across levels of FPS scores 
(rather than between conditions within levels of FPS scores), routine tests of pairwise 
comparisons to indicate the statistical significance between groups could not be conducted. The 
three-way interaction between decision context, plaintiff weight, and FPS scores was non-
significant (F = .85, p = .36). 
Figure 15. Interaction between plaintiff weight and FPS scores on defendant witness ratings in 






































 Model 5I: Effects of BMI on defendant witness ratings. In Model 5I, the interaction 
between decision context and plaintiff weight on defendant witness ratings was marginally 
significant, F(1, 90.1) = 3.74, p = .056. Estimated marginal means revealed the same pattern 
emerging in models 2I and 3I, such that there was a greater difference between ratings of the 
defendant’s witnesses between non-deliberating jurors (M = 4.66, SE = .12) and deliberating 
jurors (M = 4.96, SE = .11) in the obese condition than in the normal weight condition (non-
deliberating M = 4.88, SE = .12; deliberating M = 4.74, SE = .10). Tests of pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the difference in defendant witness ratings between non-deliberating and 
deliberating jurors in the obese plaintiff sample was again only marginally significant (p = .072).  
 There was a significant main effect of participant BMI on defendant witness ratings, F(1, 
438.0) = 10.84, p = .001. The fixed effects estimate for BMI was marginally significant, and 
indicated that ratings of the defendant’s witnesses’ convincingness increased as participant BMI 
decreased (b = -2.19, SE = 1.22, p = .073). Participant BMI did not moderate the effects of 
plaintiff weight or decision context on defendant witness ratings (Fs < .36, ps > .55) 
 Summary of results of analyses addressing RQ 2. Analyses revealed that there were 
indeed many differences in deliberating and non-deliberating jurors’ scores on SE and SLA 
measures. Deliberating jurors had weaker negative emotional reactions to the case than non-
deliberating jurors. On all other SE and SLA measures with the exception of defendant witness 
ratings, deliberating jurors’ scores indicated more support for the defendant and less support 
for the plaintiff than non-deliberating jurors’ scores. In addition, plaintiff weight only impacted 
SE and SLA measures in the deliberating condition. When the plaintiff was depicted as obese, 
deliberating jurors had less favorable perceptions of the plaintiff, lower scores on the SLA scale, 





when the plaintiff was depicted as normal weight. These findings are consistent with those 
examining the effects of decision context and plaintiff weight on case outcome variables. 
 Decision context did not appear to moderate the effects of the individual difference 
variables on SE measures, but it did moderate the effects of certain individual difference 
variables on certain SLA measures. Men perceived the defendant’s witnesses as less convincing 
in the non-deliberating than in the deliberating condition, which may explain why men awarded 
higher economic damages in the non-deliberating condition than in the deliberating condition 
(women’s scores on SLA measures did not differ as a function of decision context). SLA scale 
scores and ratings of the defendant’s witnesses did not differ across deliberating and non-
deliberating conditions among participants with strong BPWE. Those with weaker BPWE, 
however, had higher SLA scale scores and lower ratings of the defendant’s witnesses in the 
deliberating condition than in the non-deliberating condition. These patterns were replicated in 
examining the interactive effects of BPWE and decision context on verdict and assessments of 
total responsibility. In addition, decision context moderated the effects of FPS scores on 
defendant witness ratings, such that those with lower FPS scores found the defendant’s 
witnesses to be less convincing in the non-deliberating than in the deliberating condition. This 
interaction mirrors the interaction between decision context and FPS scores on assessments of 
total responsibility. 
 Analyses revealed several significant or marginally significant interactions between 
plaintiff weight and scores on the BJW-O scale on SE and SLA measures. Specifically, plaintiff 
weight moderated the effects of BJW-O on perceptions of the defendant, SLA scale scores, 
plaintiff witness ratings, and defendant witness ratings. The pattern of all of these interactive 





associated with anti-fat bias (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996). Overall, plaintiff weight 
had no influence on the aforementioned SE and SLA measures for participants lower in BJW-O. 
For those higher in BJW-O, responses indicated more favorable perceptions of the defendant 
and interpretation of attributional information more conducive to blaming the plaintiff in the 
obese condition compared to the normal weight condition. Again, these interactive effects 
cohere with the interactions between plaintiff weight and scores on the BJW-O scale on 
verdicts, economic damages, and assessments of total responsibility. Interestingly, there were 
no significant main effects of BJW-O scores on any of the SE and SLA measures in the total 
sample.  
 Plaintiff weight moderated the effects of other individual difference variables on SE and 
SLA measures pertaining to the defendant. These effects again are consistent with extant 
literature regarding the relationships between individual differences and anti-fat bias (e.g., 
Latner et al., 2008; Quinn & Crocker, 1999). Males had more positive perceptions of the 
defendant when the plaintiff was depicted as obese than when she was depicted as normal 
weight, and those high in BPWE provided more favorable ratings of the defendant’s witnesses in 
the obese condition than in the normal weight condition. Analyses also indicated that the 
interactive effect between plaintiff weight and FPS scores on defendant witness ratings was 
marginally significant, such that those with higher FPS scores perceived the defendant’s 
witnesses as more convincing in the obese plaintiff condition than in the normal weight 
condition. 
 Finally, several main effects of individual difference variables on SE and SLA measures 
emerged, which were not qualified by interactions with decision context or plaintiff weight. 





manipulations. Analyses revealed significant main effects of BPWE on perceptions of the 
plaintiff, perceptions of the defendant, and plaintiff witness ratings, such that those lower in 
BPWE scored more “pro-plaintiff” and “anti-defendant” on these measures than those higher in 
BPWE. Recall that participant BPWE influenced damage awards in a similar manner, though 
BPWE itself did not significantly impact verdicts or assessments of total responsibility. Scores on 
the FPS impacted perceptions of the plaintiff, plaintiff witness ratings, and SLA scale scores. 
Those with higher FPS scores had less favorable perceptions of the plaintiff and interpreted 
attributional information to be more consistent with blaming the plaintiff than those with lower 
FPS scores. Prior analyses also revealed that those with higher FPS scores were less likely to find 
the defendant liable and awarded fewer economic damages than those with lower FPS scores. 
 Participant BMI also impacted SE and SLA measures independent of plaintiff weight and 
decision context. Those with higher BMIs had more positive perceptions of the plaintiff, more 
negative perceptions of the defendant, higher SLA scale scores (indicating interpretation of 
attributional information in a manner consistent with blaming the defendant) and lower ratings 
of the defendant’s witnesses than those with lower BMIs. As reported earlier, those with higher 
BMIs were significantly more likely to find the defendant liable than those with lower BMIs. 
Interestingly, participant BMI did not moderate the effects of the weight manipulation on any of 
the SE or SLA measures.  
 In sum, analyses revealed many significant main effects of decision context and 
individual differences on SE and SLA measures; several significant two-way interactions between 
decision context and plaintiff weight, decision context and individual differences, and plaintiff 
weight and individual differences also emerged. These effects typically aligned with those 





difference variables on case outcomes. Whether the interactions between individual 
differences, decision context, and plaintiff weight affect the relationships between CCM 

























Appendix U: Chi-Square Difference Tests Conducted to Eliminate Plaintiff Weight as a 
Moderator of Attributional Pathways in the Deliberating Sample 
 As described in Chapter 10 and in Appendix R, chi-square difference testing was 
conducted to determine whether attributional pathways leading to assessments of total 
responsibility and verdicts differed as a function of plaintiff weight. These results indicated no 
significant differences between models estimated for the obese and normal weight conditions. 
However, plaintiff weight had a stronger impact on many SE, SLA, and case outcome variables in 
the deliberating condition compared to the non-deliberating condition. Due to these 
differences, chi-square testing was again utilized to determine whether the weight manipulation 
significantly impacted attributional pathways in the deliberating sample. As in the non-
deliberating sample, comparisons were only conducted for the models specifying total 
responsibility and verdict as outcome variables; there were not enough cases to compare 
models for the obese and normal weight conditions with damages as the outcome variable. The 
same procedures for model specification described in Chapter 10 were used to compare models 
for the non-deliberating sample. The models examined the relationships between the 
endogenous variables (all SE measures), the exogenous variables (all SLA measures) and the 
outcome variables (total responsibility and verdict). Using weight condition as a grouping 
variable, “free”’ models were specified in which the coefficients were allowed to vary between 
the two weight conditions. For both total responsibility and verdict, the “free” models were 
compared to a series of thirteen “fixed” models in which one coefficient (for each pathway) was 
constrained to be equal across weight conditions.  
 To account for the nested nature of the data, Maximum Likelihood Estimation with 
robust standard errors (MLR) was used to estimate the model specifying total responsibility as 





MLE: the Sartorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference test. The Sartorra-Bentler adjusted chi-
square values are calculated using the Chi-Square Test of Model Fit scaling correction factor and 
degrees of freedom for the free model and the fixed model, which are then used to calculate a 
chi-square test statistic and the degrees of freedom for evaluating the test statistic (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2012). A chi-square distribution table can then be consulted to determine if the models 
significantly differ. The Satrorra-Bentler chi-square statistic was calculated to compare each of 
the fixed models to the free model using an online calculator 
(http://www.uoguelph.ca/~scolwell/difftest.html), and in each case the test statistic exceeded 
the chi-square critical value of 23.69 at 14 degrees of freedom. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the CCM models specifying total responsibility as the outcome variable did not significantly 
differ between weight conditions.  
 As in the model for the non-deliberating sample, WLSMV estimation was used for the 
model specifying verdict as the outcome variable in the deliberating sample. The “difftest” 
(described in Chapter 10) was used to compare the free model with all of the fixed models. The 
“difftest” procedure actually produces a Chi-Square Test for Difference Testing statistic 
pertaining to the two models. The Chi-Square Test for Difference Testing was non-significant for 
all comparisons (ps > .16), indicating that the attributional pathways deliberating jurors followed 
in arriving at individually-rendered verdicts did not differ between weight conditions. Therefore, 
all models of attributional pathways estimated below will include the entire sample of 
deliberating jurors, regardless of weight condition assignment. 
 
 
